

SOME PROBLEMS OF SANSKRIT POETICS

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IN MEMORIAM

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This volume contains a selection of monographs and articles of the distinguished author published in various oriental journals. They deal with some problem or theory of Sanskrit Poetics and have a bearing on the study of Sanskrit literature. We also reprint here the *editio princeps* of Abhinavagupta's *Kavyaloka locana* iv, 25 well as of a part of his *Abhinava bhāratī* vi on Bharata's *Rasa sūtra*.

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THE PROBLEM OF POETIC EXPRESSION¹

One of the fundamental problems of Sanskrit Poetics as indeed of all Poetics is the problem of the content and expression of Poetry. From the beginning of the discipline this is recognised and the parts of language namely the *Śabda* and *Artha* word and sense or technically the *Vacaka* and *Vācya* the expressor and the expressed had already been distinguished by grammatical and philosophical speculation as the medium of linguistic expression. The essential element of all literature as of all language therefore is said to consist of the material of word and sense and the earliest definitions of Poetry naturally start in terms of *Śabda* and *Artha*. So long as Poetry is a kind of expression conveyed through the medium of language this is inevitable. Accordingly Bhamaha defines Poetry as *śabdārthau sahityaḥ* *kavyam* which is followed by Rudrata's more general statement *śabdārthau kavyam* while Dandin describes the body of Poetry as *īśārtha vyavacchinna padavali* and Vamana speaks of *īśārta pada racana* as its essence. Thus the *Śabda* and *Artha* united together and not in themselves constitute Poetry and all later writers more or less accept this position of the *Sahitya* or unity of *Śabda* and *Artha* as the starting point. The term *Sahitya* implies that *Śabda* and *Artha* are inseparable and go together. Kuṭataka describes this *Sahitya* as *Anyuna anantiktatva* or *Paraspara spardhā*.

1 Lectures delivered by invitation at the University of Bombay in 1943. The approach is from the standpoint of modern Aesthetic, and therefore it is different from that of my *Sanskrit Poetics* which gives only a descriptive-historical treatment. First printed in *New Indian Antiquary* ix nos. 1-3.—Much of the matter of this monograph the topics being overlapping is taken over from the author's *Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetics* which was delivered as lectures at Annamalai University in December 1935 and printed in the *Dacca University Studies* vol. i. This last monograph, therefore is not reprinted in this volume.

but Kālidāsa conveys it more beautifully by his well known comparison of Poetry to Ardhanarīśvara in which Parvatī is Vac or Śabda and Paramaśvara is Artha. That the poets and not only the theorists were aware of this idea is also clear from Magha's declaration that the discerning poet pays equal regard to Śabda and Artha in the well known line

śabdārthan sat kaur na dhyaan nīdhan apekṣate

This concept of the Sāhitya of Śabda and Artha from which literature itself came to take the designation of Sāhitya is not new but it had a grammatical origin. It means the general grammatical and logical relation between word and sense in all linguistic expression and did not at first connote any special poetic relation between the two. We know that like Sanskrit Grammar Sanskrit Poetics started as an empirical and normative discipline and since from the very beginning Poetics accepted the authority of the older science of Grammar to which it was closely related the grammatical speculations on speech in general not only prompted its speculations on poetic speech but also influenced its method and outlook. It is no wonder therefore that both Bhamaha and Vamaṇa two of the earliest formulators of poetic theory devote whole sections of their works to the question of grammatical correctness and the grammatical analysis of word and sense came to possess an important place in rhetorical speculation. As set forth by the grammarians the Śabdārtha or Vācaka Vācya sambandha was taken to comprehend the consideration of the structure and variety of the Vācaka of the syntactic import of a succession of Vācakas in a Vācya and of the logicity of the expressed idea in other words Pada Vākya and Pramāṇa are comprehended in all expression and constituted the original meaning of Sāhitya.

But it is also perceived that even though grammatical correctness or logical consistency characterises speech in general this is not enough for poetic speech. What then is Sāhitya from the standpoint of Poetics? It is true that

Bhamaha's definition *śabdārthan sahitau kavyam* implies that neither Śabda nor Artha alone is Poetry but both must be united together. In Poetry there is no question of the superiority of the one or the other or of the one being Bahya and the other Abhyantara or as Bhartrhari puts it of the Artha being the Vivarta of Śabda. But mere Sahitya of Śabda and Artha is not Poetry, it is a grammatical fact common to all speech to the utterances of ordinary life of Śāstra of Akhyana as well as of Poetry. It is therefore realised that this Sahitya of Poetry must be of a special kind so that the special charm of poetic speech which distinguishes it from ordinary speech can be properly explained. It cannot be missed that Śabda and Artha in their unity bring about a special beauty in Poetry which is not found elsewhere. Poetry is not merely linguistic expression but beautiful expression. In other words it came to be recognised that the Sahitya of Śabda and Artha in Poetry must have a Viśeṣa or speciality. Hence Vāmana speaks of Viśeṣa pada racana and Kuntaka declares more clearly that *visittam eva sahitayam abhipretam* while Samudrabandha in summarising the views of different schools of Poetics is emphatic that *ita viśittam śabdārthan kavyam*. The question of deciding what this Viśeṣa is and how it is realised thus becomes the main problem of Poetics.

Some theorists approach the problem from the stand point of outward expression and declare the Viśeṣa to be the Dharma of Śabda and Artha which could be analysed into categories of Lakṣaṇa Alaṅkāra or Guṇa. Some dive deeper into the content and maintain that it is the poet's peculiar way the work of his poetic imagination the Kavi vyāpāra which is the Viśeṣa whether it takes the form of Ukti Bhaṇiti Bhoga or Vyāṅjana. But it is admitted on all hands that the Sahitya which by its Viśeṣa makes ordinary Śabdārtha into poetic Śabdārtha is not the sum total of grammatical and logical relation but indicates a certain poetic relation between the two. It is the magical quality

pertaining to words and ideas springing from the imaginative power of the poet which makes ordinary utterance with its Pada Vākya and Pramāṇa into the charming utterance of Poetry. The Sāhitya therefore is a certain charming commensurateness between content and expression and becomes synonymous with Poetry.

Exactly when and how the term Sāhitya came to be employed for Poetry in this technical sense we do not know but the concept is acknowledged from the very beginning. We find however that it is no longer a grammatical but a poetical concept in Rājasekhara who mentions Sāhitya and Sāhitya vidyā as Poetry and Poetics although Rājasekhara in his allegorical description does not bring out the theoretical implications of the idea. Among the theorists the credit of divesting Sāhitya for the first time of its starting grammatical associations and defining it clearly as a poetic quality imparted by the imagination of the poet belongs to Kuntaka.

The earlier speculations on the subject are vague and insufficient but several tentative approaches appear to have been made. One of the earliest was through the idea of Śayya to which Bana refers and for which the *Agnyaprara* appears to employ the term *Mudra* with a similar connotation. The Śayya is described as the repose of word and sense in their mutual favourableness like the repose of the body in bed. The idea of Sāhitya is also recognised in what is called the *Maitri* or mutual friendship of verbal and ideal elements of Poetry which is apparently a variation of Kālidāśa's more perfect conjugal metaphor. The theory however is not elaborated but only feebly and incoherently voiced here and there and it is also strange that the Śayya is sometimes taken as a mere verbal excellence but at the same time it rightly insists upon what is called inevitability of words and ideas as the foundation of poetic expression. The older views on *Pāka* mentioned by Vāmana appear to make a similar approach but greater uncertainty and confusion prevail. The term *Pāka* meaning literally

ripeness or maturity is employed by Vamana with reference to the delightful effect of what he calls Śabda paka or maturity of words resulting from what he considers to be the best mode of diction namely the Vaidarbhi Riti. He describes Śabda paka as that attaining which the excellence of a word quickens and in which the unreal appears as real. This description would lead one to believe that Vamana's Śabda paka is nothing more than mere verbal proficiency (Śabda vyutpatti) in which sense some later writers would like to take the term. But Vamana further explains that the Śabda paka occurs when the words are so chosen that they cannot bear an exchange of synonym. It is clear that this view makes Paka almost identical in its connotation with Sayya. We find therefore that some later writers formulate Śabda paka as the perfect fitness of word and its sense but in conformity with the prevailing view about the essentiality of Rasa they speak rather vaguely of Artha paka or maturity of sense of various kinds brought about by the different taste of different sentiments. Rāja śekhara's name compilation of earlier views on the subject is interesting and deserves reference as illustrating how undecided aesthetic ideas were and how inconstant the use of aesthetic terminology. The passage runs thus. The Ācāryas ask what is Paka? Maṅgala says it is maturity (Pāṇama). What again is maturity? ask the Ācāryas. Maṅgala replies it is the skill in the use of noun and verbs. Hence it is verbal excellence (Saudābdya). The Paka is fixedness in the application of words say the Ācāryas. It is said [by Vamana : 3.15] "The insertion and deletion of words occur so long as there is uncertainty in the mind when the fixity of words is established the composition is successful. So the followers of Vamana say. The Paka is the aversion of words to alteration by means of synonyms. Therefore it is said [by Vamana loc. cit.] The specialists in the propriety of words have called that Śabda paka in which the words abandon the capability of being exchanged (by

less, the whole discussion furnishes interesting evidence of an early tentative attempt to explain the essential character of poetic expression

This brings us to the first systematic approach to the problem made by the so-called *Ālaṅkāra* School of *Bhāmaha*. *Udbhata* and *Rudraja* from which starts the earliest known formulation of a definite theory of poetic expression. Although as a theory of expression the *Ālaṅkārika* view was subsequently discarded for its insufficiency, the concept of *Ālaṅkāra* persisted and its utility was acknowledged throughout the history of Sanskrit Poetics. It is, therefore, important to consider and understand clearly the concept of *Ālaṅkāra* in its various aspects as the *Viśeṣa* or speciality of the *Śabda* and *Artha*.

mous with the term *Alamkara*. As a collective designation, it doubtless denotes the poetic figures as such but it also connotes a deviating strikingness of expression which underlies all individual poetic figures and forms their distinguishing characteristic. It is thus the fundamental principle of figurative expression, but since Bhamaha regards the figurative expression to be the only proper expression of Poetry the *Vakrokti* becomes the distinguishing characteristic of poetic expression and the essential principle of Poetry itself. Bhamaha does not define *Vakrokti* which term like the term *Alamkara* was perhaps already traditionally established but in speaking of it in connection with the figure *Atisayokti* he perhaps implies in it the *lokatikranta gocara i vacah* which he expressly mentions as a characteristic of *Atisayokti*. As explained by Abhinavagupta and developed by Kuntaka the qualification perhaps implies a heightened form of expression a certain imaginative quality which constitutes a poetic figure and as such distinguishes poetic speech from the matter of fact speech of everyday life. All poetic expression involves some kind of expressional deviation which constitutes its charm. Bhamaha's *Vakrokti* signifies this expressional deviation proper to Poetry, but since examining the whole field of poetic expression Bhamaha finds the *Alamkara* or poetic figure omnipresent in it as a means of realising this deviation his *Vakrokti* becomes the essential principle of an *Alamkara* and necessarily of Poetry itself.

Although Dandin uses the term *Vakrokti* only once in a significant passage as a collective designation of individual *Alamkaras* or poetic figures and thus far agrees with Bhamaha he does not yet apply it to the essential poetic quality underlying an individual poetic figure or individual *Alamkara*. On the other hand he applies the term *Alamkara* itself generically to the attribute apparently of word and sense which produces beauty in Poetry the *Kavya sobhakara Dharma* of *śabda* and *Artha*. Even though he does not define the term *Kavya sobha* or poetic beauty he agrees with

Bhāmaha that the entire Vānīyā or poetic speech is comprehended by Vakrokti or figurative expression, with the only exception of the first or primary figure the so called Svabhāvokti or natural description. The reservation made with regard to Svabhāvokti is not found in Bhāmaha. It cannot be said that, like Kuntaka, Bhāmaha entirely rejects it, he mentions it with the guarded remark *ni kecit pracakate*. In so far as natural description involves strikingness of expression, it would be admissible but Bhāmaha would not then consider it separately it would be included in the scope of his Vakrokti as figurative expression.¹

Although Dandin would employ the term Alankāra as the essential poetic attribute of Śabda and Artha and the beautifying principle of poetic expression, he would not take the individual Alankāras or poetic figures as the sole or essential means of the beautifying principle. He elaborates a theory of two modes (Marga) or kinds of poetic diction which he calls respectively Vaidarbha and Gauda and finds that the so called excellences or Gunas (like sweetness or lucidity) form their essence. Dandin therefore employs the generic term Alankāra meaning poetic embellishment to designate both the excellences or Gunas on the one hand and the specific poetic figures on the other commonly known as Alankāras and admitted as such by Bhāmaha. The concept of Guna is not new having been mentioned by Bharata but it is considered in a new context, it is, however,

1 Kuntaka rejects the figure Svabhāvokti on the ground that it consists of mere unadorned description of physical objects. But the poetic intuition of a physical fact even if unadorned being not the same as a matter-of-fact statement or description. Dandin and others rightly take it into account. We have shown elsewhere (in the article entitled Bhāmaha's Views on Guna) that both Bhāmaha and Dandin betray an uneasiness over the character of the figure Bhavika and do not know whether to classify it as a Guna or Alankāra. They vaguely realise that it involves an aesthetic fact which concerns the sustained intuition of the poet and find it difficult to pack it within their limited and formal scheme of Guna and Alankāra.

neither properly defined, nor its relation to the old concept of *Alaṅkāra* exactly determined. Dandin only tells us that the *Guna* is an *Alaṅkāra* belonging to the *Vaidarbha Mārga* exclusively, while the poetic figure is an *Alaṅkāra* which is common to both the *Mārgas*. Thus, it appears that the *Guna* in his opinion, forms the essence or essential condition of what he considers to be the best poetic diction, but the so called *Alaṅkāra* or poetic figure, on which the *Alaṅkāra* School of *Bhāmaha* laid exclusive stress is not the special characteristic of any specific diction, for it may reside in all kinds of diction. Every *Guna*, according to Dandin, is an *Alaṅkāra*, but he states nowhere that every specific *Alaṅkāra* is a *Guna*.

Vāmana further develops the rather indefinite ideas of Dandin regarding *Alaṅkāra* and *Guna*. He follows Dandin in taking the term *Alaṅkāra* both in its denotation and connotation, but he draws a more rigid line of distinction between *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra*. He states at the outset that Poetry is acceptable on account of *Alaṅkāra* and he is careful to explain that the term *Alaṅkāra* should be taken here not in the specific sense of poetic figure, but in the general sense of poetic beauty. He, therefore lays down sententiously that *Alaṅkāra* is beauty (*saundaryam alaṅkāraḥ*). He also explains that the term *Alaṅkāra* or embellishment is primarily synonymous with the act of embellishing but in the secondary instrumental sense it is applied to that which embellishes or the means of embellishment. In all this he is evidently developing Dandin's teaching, and like Dandin, but more clearly, he does not make the presence of poetic figures like simile and metaphor, an essential condition or requisite, as he does with respect to the presence of *Gunas*. The *Guna* is defined as an essential characteristic of *Rīti*, which term *Vāmana* employs for Dandin's *Mārga*. The *Rīti* being, in his opinion, the essence of Poetry, the *Gunas* are those characteristics which create the beauty of poetry, *kāvya śobhāyaḥ kartāro dharmah* a function which is assigned by Dandin to both

the Gunas and the so-called Alamkaras or poetic figures. The Alamkāras in his opinion are such means of embellishment as serve to heighten the beauty thus created by the Gunas *śud-atīśaya-hetavaḥ*. The Guna therefore being the *sine qua non* of poetic expression is described as Nitya implying that the Alamkāra is Anitya. The Guna is the Dharma of Riti which is the soul (Atman) of Poetry while the Alamkāra is apparently the Dharma of Śabda and Artha which constitute its body. In other words the Alamkāra without the Guna cannot by itself produce the beauty of Poetry which the Guna can do without the Alamkāra. Although Vamana declares at the outset that the term Poetry applies to such word and sense as are beautified by Guna and Alamkāra (*kavya śabdo vāṃ guṇālamkṛtayoḥ śabdārthayor vartate*) yet the Guna which is rigidly differentiated from Alamkāra is taken as the essence of poetic expression in his system.

Although like Bhamaha and Dandin Vamana acknowledges the omnipresence and utility of Alamkāra as a means of poetic expression he yet elaborates after Dandin a theory of Riti-Guna to explain the Visesa of Śabdārtha-sahitya. He defines Riti as Viśiṣṭa-pada-racana or particular arrangement of words and explains the Visesa or particularity of arrangement as consisting of the Guna realised in varying degrees in various kinds of Riti. Whether the idea of Riti like that of Pravṛtti of Bharata was evolved from geographical association and named Vaidarbhi, Gaudī and Pañcali accordingly but was afterwards standardised with reference to the subject it is clear that in Vāmana's system it is synonymous with the literary mode displayed in various distinguishable types of poetic diction realised by the unification of certain well defined excellences such as sweetness and lucidity which are called Gunas. The Alamkāras on the other hand like simile and metaphor are no doubt means of poetic expression but they are merely striking turns of word and sense which have a subsidiary value.

From this brief review of the growth of the fundamental concepts of *Alaṅkāra* and *Guna-Riti*, it is clear that both the *Alaṅkāra* and *Riti* Schools start with *Śabda* and *Artha*, word and sense and find their *Sahitya* to consist of the poetic *Vidēśa* of *Alaṅkāra* and *Guna Riti* respectively as the essential *Dharma* of *Śabda* and *Artha*. While these early theories rightly call attention to a certain extraordinary quality in the relation of word and sense in poetic expression which distinguishes it from ordinary expression their inadequacy from the aesthetic point of view is evident. Their acute analysis of outward form and technique, with which they mainly concern themselves, is admirable, but they forget that the explanation of mere verbal and ideational arrangement is not sufficient for explaining the fact of poetic expression. Mere enumeration of categories of rhetorical embellishment or of so-called literary excellences do not adequately explain as to why they embellish or why they are excellent. As the *Dhvani* theorists rightly criticise these earlier views do not correlate outward poetic expression to the inner content of poetry, nor do they as *Kuntaka* rightly points out, correlate poetic expression to the individuality of the poet to the *Kavi-svabhava*.

It is true that the *Alaṅkāra* School employs the term *Alaṅkāra* to connote the fundamental characteristic or principle of the beauty of poetic expression but in actual theory and practice it is applied to the objective beauty of poetic form realised by certain decorative devices known as poetic figures. The poetic expression, in this view is chiefly figurative or rhetorical expression. Even if *Bhāmaha* speaks of *Vakrokti* as an essential principle of poetic expression he does not define it nor does he elaborate the idea in all its implication, while his successors *Udbhaṭa* and *Rudrata* never mention the term nor discuss the principle. The attempts of these exponents of the *Alaṅkāra* School are limited to a systematic classification of poetic expression into fixed rhetorical categories and from this formal treatment their

works have the general appearance of technical manuals comprising a collection of definitions, illustrations and empirical canons elaborated for the benefit of the aspiring poet. Poetry is regarded, more or less, as a mechanical series of verbal devices, in which a desirable sense must prevail, and which must be diversified by means of certain tricks of phrasing which consist of the so-called poetic figures and to which the name *Alaṅkāra* is restricted. These theorists approach the fact of expression or embellishment as a positive or accomplished fact, just in the same way as a scientist approaches a physical fact, to be methodically collected in their greatest possible variety analysed with acute scholastic acumen, and grouped in fixed classes and types. In other words, they devote their effort chiefly to the working of the rules and means formulas and categories of external production into an exact system and this practical or pedagogic outlook must have received a great impetus from the highly developed analytic enquiry into the forms of language made by the normative grammarians. Like the grammarian and the scientist, who label and classify ever new series of facts the Sanskrit *Alaṅkāra* pretending to find universals calculates the particular species of expression from the original four ornaments of Bharata to one hundred and twenty five of Appayya Dīkṣita, but considering the inexhaustibility of individual poetic expressions they may be easily renewed to an infinite number while the universals of a formal analysis are of doubtful theoretic value for explaining the principle of concrete individual expression itself.

The aesthetic insufficiency of rhetorical categories was however very speedily perceived but the theories which were advanced against mere rhetoric did not entirely reject it. On the contrary, a reserve was made regarding its utility and its principles were carefully preserved. When Vamana declared the essence of poetic expression to be the *Riti* by which he meant nothing but a specific arrangement of words characterised by the so-called "qualities" or *Guṇas* he did not

advance the speculation much further nor did his predecessor Dandin to whom Poetry was nothing more than a series of words determined by a desired sense. Both agree that the words should have a Vyavacchana Vistāra or particular arrangement but this Vistāra consists not only of a special disposition (Rita) but also of ornamentation (Alaṅkāra). Dandin gives indeed an extended interpretation of the term 'ornament' applying it to anything which lends 'beauty' (Sobha) to poetry and including in its scope the figurative devices as well as modes or grades of arrangement of word and sense. Vamana substantially agrees with this view when he defines ornament as beauty itself but with regard to the means of realising this beauty he draws a sharp distinction between particularities of arrangement and the mere figures of poetic speech as essential and accidental means respectively.

It must however be made clear that the term beauty Sobha or Saundarya which is taken as the test of poetic expression is not clearly defined. There is no exposition of its character even if its means are described and detailed. But it appears to have no other far fetched meaning than that of the logical external effect realised by a carefully worked out adjustment of word and sense which avoids damage to flaws by adopting primarily the so-called literary qualities and secondarily the rhetorical figures for heightening the effect thus produced. Whatever attempt later theorists like Kuntaka might have made to place the concept on a better aesthetic footing or in whatever sense later writers might have employed it, there can be no doubt that the term Rita in Dandin and Vamana signified nothing more nor less than a specific arrangement of word and sense a mere combination in varying degrees essentially of clearly defined qualities like perspicuity or smoothness and incidentally of equally clearly defined rhetorical figures like simile or metaphor. It has no reference to the organic expressive activity of the poetic intuition which Kuntaka calls Kavi vyapara nor is it made equivalent in this sense to the Western concept of 'style' as

the expression of poetic individuality. The *Riti* as understood by these early theorists is capable of technical formulation, and as such the so called literary qualities of 'simplicity', 'vivacity' and so forth become only generic or specific categories for labelling particular aspects of the aesthetic activity, they do not explain the true character of the activity itself. The so-called *Riti* and its constituent literary qualities properly designate the different degrees in the development free or less free of the expressive activity and are thus aspects of successful or less successful expression. When completely successful we have the expression itself. The so called *Dosās* or flaws designate embarrassed activity ending in failure and are thus aspects of unsuccessful expression. From the aesthetic point of view this success or failure of expression may also be termed beauty or ugliness. But the beautiful as the perfect expression does not possess degrees. If ugliness does complete ugliness as complete negation altogether ceases to be ugly for it loses its contradiction and is no longer an aesthetic fact. The consideration of expression itself therefore is important rather than a scholastic definition and classification of its different degrees of success or failure of freedom or bondage.

The distinction again which the *Riti* theorists draw between *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra* lacks a proper aesthetic foundation. They find that both impart beauty to poetry that is both are parts or means of perfect expression. Some like Daṇḍin said that there was little difference between the two as means of producing beauty the one being a generic and the other a specific term. Some said that they differed but slightly the *Guna* being the *Dharma* of the collocation of word and sense as a whole and *Alaṅkāra* of *Śabda* and *Artha*. The view was also proposed that the *Guna* was *Śobha* *hetu* and *Nitya* while the *Alaṅkāra* was useful for extra beauty *Śobhatīśaya* *hetu* and *Antya*. All these theorists realised only this that both *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra* imparted beauty but they did not understand the vital question as to what in Poetry did they impart beauty. They failed to perceive that *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra* in what-

ever sense they are used are only relative terms and that they imply a *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra*. Vamana, no doubt, stumbled upon something more than *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra*, upon what he calls *Riti*, but Ānandavardhana rightly points out, the *Riti* theorists thereby only dimly perceived the real nature of the essence of Poetry which cannot be the mere objective beauty realised by *Riti-Guna* and *Alaṅkāra*. The distinction again, between literary qualities and rhetorical ornaments as essential and non essential may be of some use in logical or normative analysis but not in aesthetic realisation, for, given a particular expression the qualities are as much integral parts of it as figures of speech. The expression should be taken not as a mechanic but as an organic whole in relation to the poetic intuition. As each individual expression automatically selects its own appropriate qualities and ornaments it cannot be definitely laid down that a particular expression should possess this and should not possess that. If expression is expression, it is successful, there cannot be any question of intermediate degrees of success in aesthetic estimate. Kuntaka therefore rightly criticises that there can be no classification of *Riti* into good bad or indifferent types. Nor can qualities or ornaments be categorically attached, since such expression is not a fixed and generic but a variable and individual fact. Kuntaka therefore rightly says that the concepts of *Riti*, *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra* can only be justified if they are related to the *Kavi-karman* or *Kavi-svabhava*, to the imagination or individuality of particular poets.

The poetic expression is capable of infinite diversity in accordance with the infinite diversity of poetic individuality. Dandin wisely declares that speech is diversified in its multifarious mode of expression and admits the impossibility of labelling and classifying all modes of poetic expression with fixed and unalterable characteristics, but maintaining that the sub-varieties are incalculable he distinguishes two broad or extreme types, namely, *Vaidarbha* and *Gaudī*. While his successor Vamana proposes three types adding *Pāñcālī* as inter-

mediate, and recommending the *Vaidarbhi* as containing all the literary qualities, subsequent writers add *Lāṭi*, *Āvantika*, *Magadhī* and so forth. But the attempt to exhaust and stereotype the entire poetical output within the clear-cut bounds of ready-made modes and fixed qualities on the basis of more or less formal analysis like the similar attempt of the *Alaṅkāra* School to classify and label the entire poetic expression into fixed rhetorical categories, is sure to prove unconvincing as the theoretic basis of poetic expression. Neither Dandin's nor Vāmana's differentiation of individual *Ritis* and *Gunas*, therefore, is found as the criticism of *Mamaka* and others shows exhaustive and consistent. These varieties of *Riti*, with their constituent *Gunas*, are really instances of complete and incomplete expression erected into definite universal types, probably (as the names imply) on the basis of empirical observation of localised usages. But, as *Kuṭiaka* shows, the *Riti* cannot be a *Deśa dharma* as localised usage, nor a *Vastu dharma* as an inherent attribute of word and sense, but a *Dharma* of *Kavi svabhāva* or the character of the poet, depending upon the nature of his poetic intuition, upon his *Śakti* (poetic power), *Vyutpatti* (culture) and *Abhyāsa* (practice). In this sense the *Riti* becomes synonymous with the manner of individual poets and not with prescribed or universalised modes or grades, and all aspects of expression can be comprehended in it. But since the manner of expression varies with various poets, it is of infinite kind. It can be classified under broad types, but the definition and classification are susceptible to infinite but unprofitable, multiplication.

II

From what we have said, it is clear that by drawing attention for the first time to the aspects of poetic activity indicated by the 'qualities' or *Gunas*, the *Riti* theorists may be regarded as having gone a step further than the mere

Ālaṃkārikas but the speculation in its halting formalism touches only the fringe of the aesthetic problem. By their very attempt at systematisation the Ālaṃkārikas recognised the existence of certain facts of poetic expression namely, its so-called embellishment or extraordinariness as aesthetic facts, the Riti theorists went further and believed that these facts are reducible to a definite principle, but both of them failed to realise that this principle is not an external category but a category of the spirit. It should have been clearly understood that every single expressive fact stands by itself as the result of a particular poetic intuition under a particular stimulus. Such facts may be grouped generically by the inductive process but the continuous variation of individual poetic expression results in an irreducible variety of expressive facts. Each poet has his own mode of expression characteristic of his particular intuition in a particular case, and with such differentiation the classification of 'modes', like the classification of ornaments, would be endless without reaching any definite theoretic principle of expression.

The Dhvany theorists who came into prominence in the next stage consequently declared that the true character of Poetry was imperfectly understood by those who took cognisance only of word and sense (*Dhvanyāloka* : 7), but, curiously enough their own theory finds its origin in the conventional manner in the analysis of language and its meaning. The influence of the grammaticological concept of the *Sabīta* of *Śabda* and *Artha* was still acknowledged and the new theory of Dhvani was started on the analogy of the older theory of *Spheṇa*. Ānandavardhana speaks of his own system as being founded on the authority of the grammarians to whom he pays an elegant tribute as the first and foremost theorists *prathame vidvāṃsah*. From grammarians and logicians, the Dhvani theorists acknowledged the functions of Denotation (*Abhidha*) and Indication (*Lakṣaṇa*) of words the former giving us the literal sense, and the latter on the incompatibility of the literal sense a

further secondary but allied sense. But this was not all. They went further than the grammarians and logicians by contending that this did not exhaust the entire significance of Poetry. They pushed the analysis to the positing of another function of word and sense, another characteristic of poetic expression, namely Suggestion (Vyanjana) which gives a deeper sense never directly expressed but depending upon the poet's particular purpose in employing the word in its obviously denoted or indicated sense. This purpose or Prayojana being always unexpressed can be arrived at only by the process of suggestion but it constitutes the essential charm or peculiarity of poetic expression. Here for the first time the poet's purpose is brought into the consideration of the product of the poet's mind and an unexpressed sense (Dhvani) is acknowledged beyond what is directly expressed but we shall see presently the analysis is still empirical and concerns itself with the form rather than with the essence.

The Dhvani School in its analysis of the essentials of Poetry found that the content of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The one is that which Sabda and its denoted or indicated Artha gave us, that which is expressed in so many words, whether directly explicit or metaphorically implicit, the other is not expressed but suggested springing from what is thus expressed or indicated. The unexpressed or suggested part is not something vague but it is distinctly linked up with the expressed. It is manifested by a peculiar power of suggestion called Vyanjana inherent in word and sense and is set forth as a fact of aesthetic experience and distinguished from the concept of mere Vacya or denoted sense of poetry. To the grammarians and learned writers it perhaps seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of Poetry was that which was not even expressed. On the other hand some form of symbolical speech in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words was always in vogue and the poets had been more or less

partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent symbol or allegory. But suggestive poetry, according to the new theorists, is something more than the merely metaphorical or figurative on which the Alamkara and the Riti Schools placed so much emphasis. The metaphorical or allegoric however veiled, is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such, but the suggested in Poetry is always unexpressed and is, therefore, a source of proper charm or strikingness by its very capacity of concealment, which, however, is not concealment in the sense in which an enigma is. The Dhvani School thus postulates that the unexpressed or inexpressible is the very 'soul' or essence of all good Poetry; it is called into being by a particular function of suggestion inherent in word and sense, while such means of expression as the Gunas and Alamkaras of earlier schools are mere means or attributes which receive their justification for employment as such from this inner content of poetry.

The inner content of Poetry is undoubtedly a fact of aesthetic experience, being the poetic intuition itself, but to distinguish or bifurcate the content and expression as two separate, though intimately connected entities, is formal analysis and not aesthetic experience. The new theorists, no doubt clearly perceive that the consideration of the ornamental fitting out of words or of the literary qualities of structure are not enough to solve the problem of poetic expression. They clearly demonstrate that the so called ornaments or qualities have no absolute value but depend upon the character of the particular utterance. In recognising all this they sailed very closely along the coast but they hardly succeeded in making an effective landing. The theory rendered great service by rightly emphasising that the literal sense alone was not sufficient but that it should lead to the deeper poetic purpose embodied in the suggested sense of Poetry. But the analysis still concerned itself with the intellectual rather than the intuitive aspect of poetic ex-

pression, with the understanding of its ideas only as empirical facts. The unexpressed in this case has no reference to the individual poetic intuition, but is universalised as a mode of thought, and being bound up by definite links with fixed and mechanical symbols of the expressed, it becomes as much a fixed and mechanical symbol as any rhetorical or qualitative category. It is no wonder, therefore, that the attempt resolved itself into the same empirical and normative method of elaborately distinguishing and classifying hundreds of varieties of the unexpressed, and even when the unexpressed was generically grouped into an unexpressed matter, an unexpressed ornament or an unexpressed sentiment, corresponding to the old mechanical grouping of descriptive, ornamental or sentimental composition, the speculation only labelled and pigeon holed certain generic or specific aspects of the poetic function without exhausting or explaining the function.

It is not enough to say that the unexpressed is the essence of Poetry or analyse into groups the varieties of unexpressed meaning, for Poetry in reality is expression, which contains in itself what is obviously expressed, as well as what is implicitly suggested. In aesthetic experience, as opposed to the merely logical analysis, it is impossible to separate the unexpressed and the expressed, for both of them together make up the being of poetic expression. The poet's "purpose" which embodies the unexpressed, is undoubtedly important, but it is not meant by these theorists to be co-extensive with poetic intuitivity, which is rich in unified images rather than in disintegrated thought or meaning in its power of intuitive expression rather than in presenting this or that concept or idea. The expression is the actuality of the intuition, the so-called expressed and unexpressed forming its indissoluble constituents undistinguishable in the organic whole. It is true that Sanskrit theory recognises that in order to be poetical, language should be generically semantic, but it forgets that the language of Poetry must be taken as the language of poetic intuition and not of logical intelligence, as an

aesthetic and not an intellective fact. The scholastic bipartition between the unexpressed and the expressed therefore, is useful in grammatico logical analysis, but it hardly helps us in understanding the significance of Poetry. The whole constitutes Poetry and not a part, it avails us little in externally analysing what in its internal unity cannot be analysed, there is no exteriority and interiority in poetic expression which is one and indivisible. The attitude finds a parallel in one of the disastrous errors of modern philosophy, namely, the Cartesian mistake of regarding body and mind as separate substances from which all the insufficiencies and perplexities of the 'mind body problem' flow and render clear thinking of the subject difficult. The poet's purpose' in poetry again is unnecessarily and narrowly segregated from the word and its meaning when the poetic purpose in its true sense is the word and the meaning themselves in their unity. This is the real meaning of the *Sahitya* of *Śabda* and *Artha* in poetic expression. It should be admitted that by the unexpressed is pre eminently intended the poetical and not the logical or ethical meaning but the poetic intuition knows of no dualism between word and its meaning between itself and its expression for the content here is form and form is content. In attempting to combat the science of word and sense the new theory appears to have preserved the same tradition in a fresh garb inasmuch as it starts with the same pre-occupation with word and sense with the same pre-supposition that a word or its sense is a natural mechanical fact or symbol which can in the manner of a scientific fact be grouped in class & types or categories.

The *Dhvani* theorists however did an important service by directing attention to an aspect of Poetry which had so far been imperfectly understood or entirely ignored in Sanskrit poetic theory. Hitherto speculation had been busy with the consideration of poetical ornament or structure, and it was thought enough if by these means certain definite ideas were expressed in a definite manner. But it was realised

impression (Vasānā), being derived from actual experience of life or from inherited instincts. On reading a poem which describes a similar emotion, this latent emotion is suggested by the depicted factors, which, being generalised or impersonalised, cease to be called ordinary causes but become extraordinary causes in Poetry. The ordinary causes, therefore, being generalised or impersonalised by the suggestive power of word and sense, do not refer to particularities. Rāma or Sitā is no longer Rāma or Sitā as an individual lover or his beloved, but is presented as the lover or his beloved in general. In the same way, the emotion suggested, which is the source of the relish is also generalised, the love of Rāma or Sitā being presented as love in general, and in this generalised form it is possible for the reader to relish the emotion, even though it is not his own inasmuch as the impression is already latent in his mind. The emotion (Bhava) is generalised and relished as a sentiment (Rasa) also in the sense that it refers not to any particular reader but to readers in general. The particular individual while relishing it as a reader, does not think that it is his own personal emotion, and yet it is relished as such nor does he think that it can be relished by him alone but by all persons of similar sensibility. It is also not the personal emotion of the poet, for it is divested of all personal interest and presented in an impersonalised form. The natural emotion, whether of the poet or of the hero, becomes a poetic sentiment, and the natural causes become poetic causes. The relish partakes, no doubt, of the nature of cognition, it is nevertheless different from the ordinary forms of the process inasmuch as it involves an imaginative or poetic process of idealisation, which has the power of stirring the latent emotional impressions of the reader's mind into a relishable condition of enjoyment. The resulting relish, therefore cannot be identified with the constituent factors, for at the time of relish the factors are not experienced separately, but the whole appears as Rasa, which is thus simple

it is very similar to but not the same as, the state of true enlightenment which comes only to the knower who, no longer on the empirical plane, transcends completely and permanently the sphere of pleasure and pain. As such, this state of aesthetic delectation is not capable of proof because its cognition is inseparable from its existence, or, in other words it is identical with the experience of itself. The only proof of its existence is its relish itself by the man of aesthetic sensibility, the *Rasika* or *Sahrdaya*, the ideal connoisseur of Poetry, to whom alone it is vouchsafed. The reader must reproduce in himself what the poet has produced.

It is clear that the theory demands the existence of the aesthetic intuition, or capacity of enjoyment of what it calls poetic bliss, and the presupposition of latent impressions is only an aspect of this demand. Those who do not possess this intuition can never relish this spiritual state. There is plenty of people in this world who do not appreciate Poetry, and the theorists are merciless in their satire on dull grammarians and mere dialecticians, who are incapable of attaining the aesthetic attitude. It is the *Rasika* or *Sahrdaya* alone, who by his own intuition can identify himself with the intuition of poetic creation (*tanmayibhavana yoga*) and thereby obtain its true relish (*Rasa*). It must be understood that although the word 'relish' or 'taste' renders the word *Rasa* literally, it does not imply, apart from the reader's reproduction of the poet's production any conscious ethical valuation: good or bad taste. It implies an experience similar to what we understand when we speak of relishing or tasting food but this realistic description must not at the same time drag it down to the level of natural pleasure because by its aloofness and serenity it is lifted into a personal impersonal blissful state of mind. The word 'Stimmung' used by Jacobi may give us the nearest approach but the *Rasa* is not a mere highly pitched natural feeling or mood but indicates pure intuition which is distinct from an empirical feeling.

It is clear that however blissful the aesthetic enjoyment as conceived by these theorists may be it must be distinguished from the enjoyment of natural feelings and the theory does not fall into the mistake of aesthetic hedonism which sees no difference between the pleasure of Poetry and that of easy digestion. No doubt the conventional classification of generic and specific feelings is accepted but they are given as constituting the material or stimulus of Poetry. They may form the substratum (Sthāyī bhava) or concomitant (Vyabhicārī bhava) of the poetic sentiment (Rasa) but they are not identical with it. Just as in the unity of spirit one cannot talk of cause and effect so in the unity of Rasa the separate natural feelings say of love grief or horror which may form its constituents are never experienced but the whole appears as a single and indivisible aesthetic sentiment of bliss from which every trace of the constituent empirical pleasure or pain is obliterated. In other words love grief or horror is no longer experienced as love grief or horror in their disturbing poignancy but as pure aesthetic sentiment of blissful relish evoked by the idealised poetic creation. This fact is borne out by the common experience that after keenly feeling grief in a play on the stage the spectator says I have enjoyed it. He may shed tears but Viśvanatha explains clearly that tears constitute no proof that pain is felt for the tears that are shed by the spectator are not those of pain but those of sentiment which causes a melting of the mind as a result of the nature of the particular aesthetic enjoyment. Hence in a devotee as Jagannatha observes tears arise on the contemplation of the deity when the religious feeling is raised to a serene state of similar enjoyment. The intuitive bliss arising from idealised poetic creations should therefore be distinguished from the experience of natural feelings and from all natural experiences of life as something *Alaukika* as something impersonal disinterested or supernormal.

It follows that the question of the so called qualities

and ornaments Guna and Alamkaras which loomed so large in previous theories must be revised from this standpoint. The previous speculation recognised that both Guna and Alamkara imparted beauty to Poetry but since they went no deeper than Śabda and Artha expressed word and sense they could not answer the vital question as to what in poetry they imparted beauty. The inability arose from their not realising that Guna and Alamkara are relative terms and that they must be related to a Guna and Alamkara. The analogy is maintained that Poetry like a man has two separable constituents body and soul. The Vācya vacaka the form of poetry the expressed word and sense however important, constitutes its body or Śarīra. Of some soul Atman in Poetry Vāmana had a dim idea for he stumbled upon something more than Guna and Alamkara upon what he calls Riti. But the Dhvani theorists point out that the Riti is still regarded as Vācya vacaka caritra betu or means of external embellishment of word and sense and the essence of Riti being according to Vāmana a certain normatively standardised collocation of the Gunas it becomes a redundant concept. Some idea of Rasa was still there from the time of Bharata but Bhāmaha and Dandin would regard it an aspect of Alamkara. Vāmana as that of Guna the form of Poetry being alone considered important. But the Dhvani theorists found that behind the Vācya vacaka the Śarīra of Poetry the most important thing is the Ānāṁ behind what is directly or figuratively expressed by word and sense the most essential thing in Poetry is what is unexpressed but distinctly suggested. This in their opinion is not Ānā or Śarīra body but the Ānā Śarīra Atman or soul of Poetry. What is suggested as Ānā may take the form of a matter (Vastu) or that of a poetic figure (Alamkara) but in most cases it is a sentiment (Rasa) which becomes the most important suggested Ānā.

This being clearly formulated that Poetry must have an Ānā a Guna and Alamkara in order to have Guna and

Alamkāra, the problem of differentiation of Guna and Alamkāra came, as a matter of course, to be solved. So long as the Śarira or outward form of Poetry alone is accepted and everything recognised as its beautifying element, there can be no tangible difference between Guna and Alamkāra as fruitful concepts. If, on the other hand, the poetic sentiment involved in the composition is accepted as the Ātman or essence, distinct from the Śarira, there can be this differentiation that the Gunas like the qualities of a man's soul, pertain to the Aṅga named Rasa, and the Alamkāras like ornaments on a man's body, to the Aṅga called Vacya-vācaka. Both the Guna and Alamkāra are, thus interpreted in a new sense, and justified by being brought in effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a composition. The mere verbal or structural form of a work cannot, except by way of analogy, be said to possess the qualities, say, of sweetness or energy, unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is sweet and vigorous. The Gunas, as they make up the verbal form, are aspects or attributes, the real cause is Rasa, even as the soul of a man and not his body, is the true cause of virtues like heroism. Pressing the analogy further, it is held that the Alamkāras or poetic figures adorn words and meanings which constitute the body of Poetry, although through word and sense they may embellish the underlying soul of sentiment indirectly, but not invariably. Where there is no Rasa, they result in mere charmingness of expression. It is clear that these considerations simplify the classification and useless multiplication of Gunas and Alamkāras, and the Ratis, being a combination of specific Gunas, is no longer necessary as a separate concept. Although secondarily the Gunas concern Śabda and Artha (just as Alamkāras primarily concern them), the Gunas, and not Alamkāras, are taken primarily as the Dharmas or attributes of Rasa. Words and ideas, for instance, which have the power of suggesting the quality of sweetness (Mādhurya) of particular Rasas, are not by themselves sweet, but in relation to the Rasa we call them sweet. The mental

activity involved in the enjoyment of *Rasa* is the sole criterion of a particular *Guna*; and in this sense only three *Guṇas* are justified. The *Mādhurya* or sweetness is supposed to consist of a melting (*Druti*) of the mind, appropriate to the erotic and pathetic sentiments; the *Ojas* or energy is a form of brilliant expansion (*Vistāra*) of the mind, suitable to the sentiments of heroism, horror and fury; while the *Prasāda* or perspicuity, proper to all sentiments, is an aspect of pervasion of the mind (*Vyāpti*), necessary for quick apprehension. The *Guṇas*, as attributes of *Rasas*, are thus *Citta-vṛttis*; and the three conditions of the mind, namely, melting, expanding and pervading, which accompany the relevant poetic sentiment, are made the basis of only three pertinent *Guṇas*.

The *Dhvani* theorists undoubtedly mark an advance in explaining that the so-called *Guṇas* or qualities of composition are not mere tricks of sound and sense but should be considered in vital relation to the underlying poetic sentiment. The consideration of structure as such, therefore, is not necessary, and the distinction between qualities of sound and sense is, from this standpoint, meaningless. The activity of the spirit involved in aesthetic enjoyment can alone justify them. In all this the *Dhvani*-theorists show themselves conversant with the true nature of poetic expression. But since poetic expression knows of no dualism between word and sense, just as there is no real dualism between body and soul, it is meaningless, from the aesthetic point of view, to draw an absolute distinction between the so-called quality and ornament. The poetic intuition automatically chooses its expression, which is only the externalisation of the spiritual activity, and which is, therefore, not a mechanically fixed fact but a part and parcel of that activity. The differentiation of the various means of externalisation as qualities or ornaments may have an useful or practical value, and a doctrine of technique may be evolved, but since poetic expression is a variable and individual fact with individual poets, no fixed laws of means and ends can be laid down for universal appli-

cation. If we say that a poet has a new technique, we really mean to imply that the new technique is the poem itself. A vital poetic intuition cannot have a prescribed technique of expression, for the simple reason that it is an intuition of which the expression is the actuality, it is not a volitional effort about which alone we speak of means and ends, nor is it an intellectual concept which can be logically or universally formulated. As the poetic intuition differs in each poet, according to his psychic organism and the nature of the stimuli acting upon it, there is bound to be endless kinds of expression which are individual and concrete, which have their own standards, spheres and means in each case and which cannot repeat themselves. It does not, for instance, help us to understand Kālidāsa's poetry by merely understanding that it fulfils the prescribed requirements of 'qualities' or 'ornaments' or even of arrangements of words with a view to suggest this or that sense, for his poetry is not what it is by its mere conformity to these formal requirements. The technique of the poet is his poetic conception itself, it may express itself in an ornate or simple manner, sweetly or harshly, expressively or suggestively, as is suitable to itself. It may be a failure or a success, but there can be, theoretically speaking, no question of standardised means, of good, bad or indifferent technique. What is appropriate to itself is its own technique. Even the ordinary man never believes in the manufacturing of ready made poetry. No technique can be universalised and the enumeration of technical means can never be exhausted by formal treatment. It may serve the practical purpose of supplying information about means, materials or groups of stimuli, or even the logical purpose of exposition but it possesses no theoretic value for the understanding of the nature of poetic creation.

The Dhvani theorists were not unaware of all this, although following older rhetorical convention they did not bring out all its aesthetic implications. Ānandavardhana himself declares that the ways of poetic expression are infinite (*anantā hi vāg*

vikalpak) but he does not fully realise that since there is no end of poetic individuations it is futile to distinguish or elaborate rhetorical and qualitative categories. He is however, right when he says that only the broad rule can be laid down that whether they are qualities or ornaments they must follow the import of the poetic intuition which in his theory is the aesthetic sentiment of *Rasa* intended by the poet and if it is necessary to accept the older conventional categories of rhetorical figures and literary qualities the only rule that should govern their employment is their appropriateness to the particular *Rasa*. Anandavardhana therefore lays down very clearly that there is no other circumstance which leads to the violation of the *Rasa* than inappropriateness and that the supreme secret of *Rasa* consists in observing the rules of appropriateness. For each poetic intuition there exists its appropriate expression and the theory of Propriety or *Anvaya* alone should explain and justify it.

This in general outline is the theory of *Dhvani* and *Rasa* finally reached by Sanskrit Poetics. The chief value of its contribution lies in its recognition already foreshadowed by *Bhaṭṭa Nayaka* of the poetic sentiment as a fact of internal aesthetic experience and of its process of idealisation from a natural feeling (*Bhava*) to a poetic emotion (*Rasa*). In this the theorists undoubtedly approach the very core of the aesthetic problem and solve the question of *Śabdārtha sahitya* in a novel way. But unfortunately the startling limitations still remain and prevent a proper development of mere rhetoric into aesthetic. Because of these limitations it cannot be maintained that they have said the last word on the subject or said it clearly and consistently, but they have certainly dealt with some of its fundamental aspects very ably. A right exposition is given indeed of the aesthetic enjoyment resulting from the idealised creation of Poetry and incidentally of the general nature of poetic idealisation but the question is still approached from the standpoint of the reader or critic the *Samajika* or *Sahridaya* and the problem of poetic intuition

series of verbal rules and modes to govern infinite cases of particular and variable poetic expression ; for each creative fact is an individual occurrence which must be judged by itself.

The process of idealisation is also not fully and properly explained; it becomes a kind of abstract enjoyment of abstract symbols by ignoring the concreteness of poetic intuition and creation. The idealisation is not mere generalisation ; even when he has an intuitive image of it, the poet never leaves the concrete. His Rāma or Sītā, however idealised, is not a mere abstraction, and the poetic sentiment, however serene, is never divested of its warmth, colour and vivid reality. Again, the theory maintains that feelings alone can be raised to the state of aesthetic relish by the idealising capacity of poetry ; but there is no adequate reason why the poetic intuition of a descriptive matter, or even of a mere ornamental idea, cannot become an aesthetic fact or *Rasa*. Just as the experience of feeling as feeling is not aesthetic intuition, so is also not the perception of matter or idea as such ; they are only cases of the practical or logical forms of mental activity. But as soon as mere matter or idea, like mere feeling, becomes a part of the poetic intuition, it becomes a form of its spiritual activity, an aesthetic fact, capable of being equally well relished. It is not enough to say that a matter or ornament may be suggested ; it is necessary to recognise that matter or idea can in poetic creation stand on the same footing as the feeling, on which alone stress need not laid. In emphasising sentimental poetry and distinguishing it from the descriptive or the ornamental, the Sanskrit theory falls back upon the old error of confusing the form with the essence. Nevertheless, in spite of its imperfections, the theory of *Rasa* is a highly important contribution to poetic speculation. It indicates that the Sanskrit theorists were certainly aware of the aesthetic problem, even though they did not tackle it consistently in its entirety, contenting themselves, as they did, by treating it only in some of its aspects.

It was Kuntaka who, for the first time, divested the concept of Sāhitya of its mere grammatical associations of Pada, Vākya and Tātparya, and defined it as a definite poetic quality or relation, brought about by the poetic imagination, the Kavi pratibhā or Kavi vyāpāra. The Sāhitya is not, in this sense present either in the Śāstra or in the ordinary utterances of the world, but is seen in Poetry only, it is not the mere union of the expressor and the expressed, the Vācaka and the Vācya, but the union has a special beauty in Poetry; and the determination of this speciality is the problem of Poetics. Kuntaka, therefore, holds that Śabda and Artha united together or equipoised is Poetry (*dvau sammilitau kāvyam*). It is meaningless to emphasise either Śabda or Artha, (*na śabdasyaiva ramanīyata vācīkasya kevalasya kāvyatvam, na py arthasya*) to call one Abhyantara and the other Bahya (*dhāyo'pī pratītilam iva tātām, tad vid ahlāda kāraṇam vartate, na punar ekaśmin*), but what is more important is that a special kind of Sāhitya is meant (*kāvīnā vācīkām eva sāhityam abhipretam*), by which mere language blooms into Poetry. This Vācīkya, in his opinion, is displayed in a composition (Bandha) characterised by Vakra Kavi-vyāpāra and causing Tad-vid-āhlāda. The Vācīkya, therefore, consists of an extraordinary deviation from the common mode of speech, and this extraordinariness depends upon an imaginative turn of words and ideas, which he calls Vakratva, Bhaṅgi-bhaṅgi, Vācīkya, or Vicchitti, which causes a higher and unworldly pleasure (Āhlāda) or pleasing charm (Camatkāra) to those who appreciate Poetry (Tad vid). He further explains that this Vakratva vācīkya or Bhaṅgi vācīkya rests upon the conception (Pratibhā) of the poet or on his skill (Kauśala) or on an act of imagination on his part which is termed Kavi-vyāpāra or Kavi karmāṇ. Kuntaka analyses and classifies all poetic expression from this point of view, but what is important to note is that he puts a clear emphasis on the imaginative power of the poet, and considers it to be the source of the characteristic charm of

poetic expression. He refuses therefore to accept the orthodox splitting up of poetic expression into exterior or interior, considering poetic expression as one and indivisible. Whether the *Sāhitya* of *Śabda* and *Artha* be the *Viśeṣa* of the outward garb or the inner content, of the *Śāstra* of *Vācya* *vācaka* or the *Ātman* of *Rasa-dhvani*, it is the poet's peculiar way, the work of his imagination, the *Kavi vyāpāra* which makes the particular poetic expression what it is, that is the *Viśeṣa*.

In his analysis of poetic expression Kuntaka attempts to develop further the idea of *Vakrokti* vaguely present in *Bhāmaha*, and systematises the views of those who laid stress on the so called *Alaṅkāra* or poetic figure as the essential feature of Poetry, but in the course of his investigation he appears to have indicated, if not fully developed, certain poetic principles which go beyond the sphere of formal analysis. By *Vakrokti*, which Kuntaka considers to be essential in poetic expression, he apparently thinks of figurative forms of speech, for which he often uses the phrase as a collective name, but in reality this is not the entire significance of the term meant by him. Poetry to him is embellished sound and sense, the embellishment being chiefly (but not exclusively) the figurative device known as *Alaṅkāra* in the narrow sense, and as this is the only ornament possible and essential he repudiates the views of those who disregard figurative expression as accidental or non-essential. But here he does not stop. He uses the term *Alaṅkāra* also in the larger sense of poetic beauty, not only as the fundamental principle of figurative expression, but also of all poetic expression generally. To this he gives the name of *Vakrokti*, and comprehending under it all forms of poetic expression, he attempts a fresh interpretation of the problem by re-thinking and re-arranging under this conception the accepted ideas of *Riti* *Guna* *Rasa* *Dhvani* and *Alaṅkāra*.

All this may still be formal analysis, but in his conception of *Vakrokti*, Kuntaka shows himself cognisant of the aesthetic problem. He well understood that art could not be the

medium of philosophical or scientific concepts, and insisted upon a clear distinction between Śāstra and Kāvya, between intellective and imaginative work, by stating that words and ideas of the Kāvya differ from those of the Śāstra. He also maintains rightly that expression being the most important thing in Poetry, the poetic speech is an extraordinary deviation from the ordinary mode of common speech, thereby distinguishing artistic expression from the merely naturalistic. This extraordinariness depends on a certain imaginative turn to words and ideas, which he calls *Bhaṅgī-bhāṇiti*, peculiar to poetic expression and abhorrent of matter-of-fact expression, and which in his system goes by the name of *Vakratva* or *Vicchitti*. He also explains that this *Vakratva*, for which another name is *Vaicitrya* or strikingness, is the charm of expression of the *Vidagdha*, the literary man of taste, who must be distinguished from the *Vēdvat*, the mere scholar; and it is his pleasure (*śad-vid-āhlāda*) which is the supreme test of Poetry, as something which is not *Laukika*. He further lays down that this expression depends, as we have seen, upon the intuition of the poet (*Pratibhā*), or in his skill (*Kauśala*), or on an act of imagination on his part, which is termed *Kavi-vyāpāra* or *Kavi-karman*, but which, being indefinable, is not defined or explained.

It is obvious that Kuntaka is one of the few theorists who put a clear emphasis on the imaginative power of the poet and consider it to be the source of the characteristic charm of poetic expression. He regards embellished speech as Poetry, but holds that the source of this embellishment, even if it consists of poetic figures merely, is the poetic imagination. He, therefore, draws a distinction between what may be called a speech-figure, on the one hand, and the so-called poetic figure, on the other. In a formal scheme of Poetry they may correspond; but in a poetic figure, because it is poetic, Kuntaka discovers a specific differentia, which consists of a peculiar or deviating turn of expression (*Vakratva*), resulting in a characteristic strikingness (*Vaicitrya*).

or Vicchitti) and depending on the imaginative activity of the poet (Kavi pratibha nirvaratitva). The so called poetic figures of orthodox Poetics are admissible only when they possess this peculiar charm of poetic imagination and expression the word charm apparently meaning nothing but that which gives it its poetic peculiarity. Kuntaka therefore holds that embellishments do not belong to poetry that is to say they are not added externally but that poetry is embellished speech itself the particular embellishment depending on the poetic imagination.

Kuntaka thus supplies a deficiency in the teaching of the Dhvani theorists who ignored all embellishments unconnected with the suggested sense as mere Vag vikalpa or Ukti vaicitrya. To them the ornamental expression of poetry was detachable external and non essential addition but Kuntaka gives a new interpretation of such Ukti vaicitrya and justifies the poetic ornaments as such. If they are a part of poetic expression they have a right to be considered for they form thereby the expression itself. If the poetic imagination justifies them as a source of beauty the question of their connexion with the suggested sense or of their essentiality or non essentiality need not arise they being themselves essential. In Kuntaka's view therefore poetry is always embellished expression as distinguished from plain and matter of fact expression of sciences and scriptures and embellishment in the general sense is always a characteristic of poetic expression. The embellishment comprehends in its specific sense the whole domain of rhetorical figures (which Kuntaka includes in the particular province of Vakya vakrata) if they are justified by the poetic imagination and become poetic figures thereby. It may also include the qualities (Guna Riti) mere matter (Vastu) or the so called unexpressed (Dhvani) including the suggested sentiment (Rasa) if as form or material they become a part of the poetic imagination and expression. The skill of the poet can and does exhibit various forms of Vakrokti in the arrangement of

letters, in the base or termination of words, in the words themselves, in their gender, number and synonym, in their sense, in a sentence, in a particular topic or in the composition as a whole, and all these necessarily comprehend what earlier theories elaborated as *Guna Riti*, *Alaṅkāra*, *Dhvani* and *Rasa*. Thus, Kuntaka gives an extended interpretation to *Bhāmaha's Vakrokti*, by which Kuntaka connotes and denotes the same thing, namely, the extraordinary form of imaginative expression. He makes Bhamaha's somewhat inchoate suggestion of heightened speech more definite by referring it to the poetic imagination. It is, therefore, inaccurate to suppose that Kuntaka accepts merely figurative expression as the denotation of *Vakrokti* for he brings within its comprehensive scope all known kinds of imaginative poetic expression. The inaccuracy arises from the apparent emphasis which Kuntaka puts on figurative expression but in reality his *Vakrokti* means much more than that.

It is a pity that Kuntaka's explanation of poetic expression was never seriously noticed nor fully developed by orthodox writers. Had it not been so it might have been possible to arrive ultimately at a clear idea of the nature of poetic creation—an aspect of Sanskrit Poetics which has been ignored by Sanskrit theorists. But later writers even if they neglect Kuntaka's work into unmerited oblivion appear to have accepted directly or implicitly, his idea of a poetic figure and applied his test of poetic imagination to their own analysis of individual rhetorical figures. We have seen that though Kuntaka regards the so called poetic figures as particular forms of speech (*Abhidhā prakāra viśeṣa*) he would yet find some specific differentia in them which would make them admissible namely, *Vakratva* or *Vaicitrya*, which is a peculiar turn of expression (*Bhaugī bhāṣitī*) depending on an act of imagination on the part of the poet (*Kavi vyapāra*). The elements therefore which go to make up the being of a poetic figure or rather convert a speech figure into a poetic figure are *Vaicitrya* or *Vicchitti-viśeṣa* and *Kavi pratibhā*.

nirvartitavya. In other words, Kuntaka maintains that a form or mode of expression becomes a poetic figure or *Alaṅkāra* if the fertile imagination of the poet lends a peculiar charm to it. This analysis is accepted by Ruyyaka, and, following him, by most writers of later times. Ruyyaka, for instance, does not elaborate a doctrine but implicitly takes the charm brought about by the productive imagination of the poet (*Kavi pratibhā*) to be the criterion of a poetic figure. Thus, he thinks a form of expression involving the logical *Anumāna* would not *prima facie* constitute the figure *Anumāna*, it should involve a poetical, and not merely logical, *Anumāna*. Similarly, the doubt involved in the figure *Saṁdēha* should be not an ordinary doubt but a poetic doubt. Hence, Mammata lays down sententiously that the poetic figure is strikingness itself (*vaicitryam alaṅkārah*). In these and similar cases, the question is not one of a mere form of speech, in which nothing is given but the bare thought, it must be the expression of the poetic imagination. Jayaratha who comments on Ruyyaka's work, cites the authority of Kuntaka in this respect, and informs us that it is not possible to define this poetic charm (*Vicchitti* or *Vaicitrya*), inasmuch as it is of infinite variety, being identical with the play of individual poetic imagination which is infinite in scope, the infinite individuation of the poetic imagination having been already admitted by Anandavardhana as well as by Kuntaka. Jagannātha, therefore, defines it generally by saying that this charm is nothing but the poetic imagination with reference to the power of poetic production.

In the same way, Kuntaka acknowledges the concepts of *Marga* and *Guna*, but finds fault with the empirical classification and nomenclature of *Ritis* and *Gunas* adopted by the *Riti*-theorists. He attempts to reinterpret the theory of *Rīti* from the point of view of poetic power. He objects to the naming and differentiating of *Ritis* after different localities, for one would then be forced to admit infinite number of *Ritis* as there is an infinite number of countries. In his

opinion a particular Riti cannot be established as a *Deśa dharma* for it does not depend upon regional characteristics or upon special customs of a particular place but upon the poetic power (*Śakti*) culture (*Vyutpatti*) and practice (*Abhyasa*) of a particular group of poets which can never conform to mere geographical distribution. He objects also the classification of Ritis into good bad and middling on the ground that the proper diction can be only one namely the best no matter of whatever type it is. Kuntaka believes that if different kinds of Ritis are to be admitted as *Kavi prasthāna bheda* then the character of the poet the *Kavi svabhāva* alone should furnish the criterion of their distinction. He admits that this *Kavi svabhāva* is infinite but generally speaking he thinks that there can be three main types. In one class of poets their natural poetic power finds an unhampered scope while in others the art is chiefly decorative and factitious. These may be taken as the two extreme modes of composition which he calls *Sukumara* and *Vicitra Marga* respectively but there may still be a third class of poets who would like to steer a middle course and favour a mixed style called *Madhyama Marga*. Kuntaka therefore admits the Riti to a distinct place in his system but adopts a different basis of classification and nomenclature in accordance with his fundamental idea of *Kavi vyapara* or *Kavi pratibha*. Here for the first time the Riti is brought in direct relation with the poetic individuality and is understood distinctly as its expression. It is taken as poetic style in the sense in which it is understood by Western criticism. Kuntaka is fully aware that style is neither definable nor classifiable being infinite in variety and subtle in difference according to the particular poetic intuition in a particular case but his object in mentioning these three cases is perhaps to indicate certain broad types of poetic temperament. We shall revert to this question presently but it is clear that by taking the poetic imagination into consideration Kuntaka was able for the first time to assert however imperfectly

that the question of personality is of the utmost importance in any theory of Poetry

It will be seen that these speculations are of the highest value in calling attention to the creative imagination which has been so far practically neglected by Sanskrit Poetics but which Kuntaka may be said to have discovered for the first time. If the Dhvani theorists explained the poetic intuition in the *Samayika* with respect to the aesthetic enjoyment of poetic creations he left out of consideration the question of poetic intuition with reference to the poet himself. In other words they considered the reader's power of reproduction but not the poet's power of production. Kuntaka for the first time posed the question by maintaining that we should on the contrary start with the creative imagination of the poet himself of which the poetic expression or creation is the actuality. If Kuntaka had resolutely pursued his investigations further on this line he could have formulated a proper aesthetic study but he still shows himself a victim of rhetoric in a different form. The scholastic tendency was almost universal and proved a difficult barrier to the understanding of the true nature of the problem. This was so in Kuntaka because while he discovered the importance of the poetic imagination he could not have the credit of developing its implication for the entire aesthetic question. He applied it chiefly to the analysis and classification of figurative and cognate expression. He had an inkling of the truth for instance when he spoke of poetic speech as a kind of expression other than that represented by scientific or popular speech. In making the distinction he spoke indeed of the poetic imagination but he could not clearly see that *was* much as the intellective and the intuitive were both aspects of the spiritual activity the distinction is not absolute. It depended simply on the nature of the poetic intuition. There is no absolute distinction again aesthetically between the *utpatti* and the *create* for both may equally become kinds of poetic expression or better

that is to say, not the haphazard unity of diverse kinds of personality but the intrinsic unity of the work as the synthetic expression of one poetic personality.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we search in vain for a clear discussion of the character and function of the poetic imagination in the whole range of Sanskrit Poetics. Even though Kuntaka recognises it, his Kavi karman limits itself mainly to a normative analysis of empirical canons, and makes his Poetics ultimately assume a verbal and formal character, in which his fundamental idea is lost. His Vakrokti degenerates into a kind of Kavi praudhokti of later writers. No doubt, most writers solemnly affirm the necessity of Pratibhā or poetic imagination, but Pratibhā in their theories themselves does not assume any important rôle, nor is its character or function clearly determined. This imperfect understanding is also shown by what the Sanskrit theorists often say about culture (Vyutpatti) and practice (Abhyāsa) in relation to the poetic imagination (Pratibhā). It is true that the fact of poetic representation is preceded by various kinds of knowledge, which, like feelings or physical facts, act as a stimulus or material. As adventitious aids to the externalisation of poetic intuition, they have a relative value, and a cultural background is involved in all good poetry. In so far as this is acknowledged, the Sanskrit theorists justly remark that culture and practice should assist innate poetic power. But, protesting their belief in the poetic imagination they sometimes go further and speak of "making a poet into a poet". Rudraṭa for instance, expresses the opinion that poetic power is not only inborn but also capable of attainment. It is, therefore, prescribed that the poet should be an expert in a long list of arts and sciences and make himself proficient in various kinds of poetical exercises. This demand is in conformity with the learned atmosphere in which Sanskrit Poetry at one time came to flourish and which made Poetics assume a scholastic character. In actual practice, no doubt, the gifted poets aspired to untrammelled utterance, but the general tendency in an epoch

an undoubted aesthetic acumen by always emphasising that the poetic activity in its essence is independent of intellectuality utility and morality. Although they do not discuss the question they tacitly distinguish the poetic activity from the intellectual or the practical and give evidence of a strong common sense by never confusing a poetic with a scientific or didactic work the Kāvya with the Śastra or the Nīti. It is curious indeed that these theorists expend a great deal of abstract and intellectualist erudition on a cold and monotonously inflated rhetoric, and yet they enjoy poetry as poetry and hardly ever think of the moral end or the intellectual gain. It is clearly indicated that poetry is not a mass of popularised truth nor a manifestation of empirical pleasure and pain from the ethical point of view but that it conveys a state of the mind in its intuitive purity which can be reproduced in an idealised form in the reader's mind. In Sanskrit therefore there never developed an intellectualist Poetics which valued Poetry for the knowledge it brought and regarded it as a semi-science, nor was there a practicalist Poetics which emphasised such practical forms of human activity as have an utilitarian hedonistic or moralistic end in view.

But the failure to explain and justify poetic expression purely by the poetic imagination is seen in the vacillation and uncertainty of the various attempts to discover a rigid definition of poetry. We have seen that the earlier writers wisely leave the question alone contenting themselves with the bare mention of Śabda and Artha as the ingredients. Following them the later writers take the Śabdārtha śahitya in unbroken tradition as essential requisite of poetry, but they attempt to qualify it by the enumeration of certain standardised characteristics or Viśeṣas as Alankāra Guna Riti, Dhvani or Rasa. But they could not entirely divest the Śabdārtha śahitya of its grammatical and logical associations and erect it into a purely poetic concept. They forget all about the poetic imagination and concern themselves more or less with a normative analysis and classification of general formulas

and categories in order to explain what is an individualised occurrence with each poet. The failure to understand that the poetic intuition differs in different poets in different circumstances led them to make a vain effort to find one universal definition of Poetry one abstract and invariable formula for what admits of infinite individual and concrete variations to determine logically what in its essence is non-logical to immobilise the mobile by throwing a bridle on the neck of Pegasus. Both the approach and the method are not correct. The theorists devote themselves with great zeal to collect analyse and classify methodically after the manner of natural sciences a series of single facts into general principles. Such an empirical attitude admits indeed aesthetic occurrences but nourishes a delusion that like facts of natural sciences they can be grouped formally into classes and types. In the course of their investigation the theorists amass calculate and measure the greatest possible variety of such aesthetic facts formulate laws means modes and models but as they progress they always discover new facts which require fresh adjustment. In this they fail to realise that as each expression is unique and indivisible that artistic facts in their unified concreteness cannot like physical facts be mechanically divided and subdivided, nor can they like intellectual facts be logically comprehended by abstract universals. Such an attitude reduces Poetics to the rank of a formal discipline like Logic and most of its piteous perplexities arise from this outlook. The theorists unfortunately forget that a work of art is an intuition that intuition is individuality and that individuality never repeats itself nor conforms to a prescribed mould. They believe thus not in unity but in the duality of imagination and expression thereby splitting up what is organic into mechanic parts. They hardly recognise that word and sense as symbols are inseparable from poetic intuition and as such they are not fixed and mechanical but mobile and elusive. Poetry should be taken as a living discourse among diversely ex-

pressive organisms and not as an embalmed collection of dead abstractions capable of scientific dissection. Good sense has always refused to accept a normative formulation of poetic expression. No one except a poor speaker or versifier speaks or writes by rules and no one believes that it is possible to lay down such rules of speaking or writing well. For the real poet as for the real speaker there is hardly any armoury of ready-made weapons; he forges his own weapons to fight his own particular battles.

If these investigations of Sanskrit theorists are meant to explain the principle which lies at the root of Poetry they can never do so completely and successfully by merely analysing and classifying aesthetic facts and categories without taking into account the poetic imagination which makes them what they are. Let it not be supposed that we wish to deny or minimise the usefulness of such analysis and classification from the scientific or scholastic point of view: what we want to stress is that they fail to establish their claim to explain the intuitive activity involved in poetic creation. As logical concepts or natural facts, they are admissible and are of practical value but they hardly have importance for aesthetic explanation. They are like labels to a thing rather than the thing itself. In the true sense the elaboration of such series of laws is a negation of art itself. By their universality they negate its accidentality; by their abstraction its empiricity; by their mechanism its organic character. Thus Sanskrit Poetics attempting to solve the riddle of Poetry did hardly solve it but delighted itself with the pleasure of abstract thought and formal calculation. Nevertheless these aberrations and insufficiencies are at the same time attempts to reach the truth and in the midst of unlifted shadows one does often perceive a running thread of silver lining. Even if the Sanskrit theorists could not because of initial handicap arrive at the final goal they still had a clear glimpse of it. Like the mystery of God's creation the mystery of the poet's creation is unfathom-

able, and struck with wonder and admiration, one can only say

*kāṣṭhābhiḥ śābda-gocaram
sphurantam ardesu padesu kevalam |
vadaḍbhut angaḥ sphuṭa roma-vikṛiyair
janasya tuṣṇim bhavato'yaṁ anjalih ||*

BHĀMAHA'S VIEWS ON GUṆA

Of all early writers on Sanskrit Poetics Bhāmaha appears to be the most puzzling in the attitude he adopts towards the Guna doctrine. The only passage in which he employs the term *guṇa* is that in which he defines (ed Trivedī iii 52-53)¹ the poetic figure Bhāvika as

*bhāvikatvam itī prahuh prabandha viṣayaṃ guṇam
pratyakṣaṃ na dṛṣyante yatrārtha bhūta bhāvināḥ ||
citrodattodbhutarīhatvam kathayāḥ svabhīnitata
śabdānakulata cetī tasya hetum pracakṣate ||*

These verses come practically at the end of the chapter on the classification and definition of poetic figures (*kāvya-lāli-kāras*) and *prima facie* the Bhāvika coming in this context, should be taken as such. Dandin also follows (ed Rāṅgacārya ii 363-65)² the same procedure regarding the treatment of the Bhāvika repeats the first line of the above definition amplifying it still further in his own way and agrees with Bhāmaha in designating the Bhāvika as a *prabandha viṣaya-guṇa*. Udbhaṭa follows Bhamaha generally in this respect (ed Banhatti vi 6 p 79)³ and defines it almost in the same way, but he appears to regard it more or less as a specific poetic figure and omits the qualification *kathayāḥ svabhīnitata* as well as the designation *prabandha viṣaya-guṇa*. These definitions⁴ are obviously meant to be wider than that of a simple poetic figure in the course of which the Bhāvika is

1 The reference is same in the Kāshī Sanskrit Series edition but in the edition of Naganātha Sastry (with Eng. Trs., Tanjore 1927) it is iii 53-54.

2 ii 364-66 in both the Bombay Sanskrit Series edition and the edition of Premacandra Tarkavagiṇī (Calcutta 1881).

3 p 73 in Nāṇaya Sagar Press edition (Bombay 1915).

4 We are not concerned here with later definitions of the Bhāvika as a definite poetic figure.

dealt with by these writers. It is a characteristic which is said to belong to and pervade the whole composition (*prabandha vyapto gunah* as Tarunavacaspati puts it) and it does not (as a poetic figure would apparently do) restrict itself to a part of a composition i.e. it is not *eka deśika* as Jayamaṅgala on *Bhaṭṭi*¹ xii 1 explains it. It is thus difficult to regard it as the elements of the definitions themselves also show as a limited figure of speech, it should not only be *pada gata* or *vākya gata* but also like *rosa* of later writers *prabandha gata*. In spite of a certain novelty or obscurity of the conception it is clear that the theorists were reluctant or uneasy about treating it as an ordinary poetic figure and therefore defined it in somewhat wider terms at the conclusion of their treatment of such figures². The theory appears also to be reflected in practice. If we are to accept the assurances of the commentators (Jayamaṅgala and Mallinatha) the whole of canto xii of the *Bhaṭṭi kavya* should be taken as an illustration of the *Bhāvika* as a *prabandha guna*. It is remarkable also that the *Bhāvika* is not mentioned by Vamana as a poetic figure nor is it included by him in his elaborate scheme of *Gunas*. Dandin also would not include it in the list of his ten *marga gata Gunas* or in their *viparyayas*.

The position is somewhat puzzling. The clue is furnished by the probable supposition that the *Bhāvika* like the *Svabhāvokti*³ involves the implication of an aesthetic factor to which it must have been difficult to assign a place in a clear cut scheme of *Gunas* and *Alaṅkaras*. The *Bhāvika* is defined by Bhāmaha generally as a vivid representation of past and future objects as if they are directly perceptible to the eye the vividness of the representation depending on the conditions that the theme must have a picturesque strange

1 The word *prāhuh* in the definition of Bhāmaha and Dandin may indicate that the view was probably traditional and was accepted implicitly without much discussion.

2 See my *Sanskrit Poetics* ii p. 62, f. n.

and exalted significance and therefore capable of being enacted well and that the words employed must have a consistency. Dandin's definition¹ is more circumstantial, but it is more illuminating. The Bhāvika is said to consist in the mutual favourableness of all the parts of descriptive matter, in the non employment of redundant or useless qualifications in describing things in their proper places and in so arranging the expression that the intended depth of the theme comes out clearly. These are matters of detail, but the most important point in Dandin's definition which brings out the essential conception is the statement that the Bhāvika is so called because it is *bhāviyati* and that the *bhāva* is the intention or rather the inward conception of the poet (*lavay abhiprayah*) which controls the details and resides in the poem as a whole, and not merely in its isolated parts. This *bhava* should not be taken as the technical emotional element which Pratibhacanduraja commenting on Bhamaha's phrase *svabhavitata* would apparently read into it by the interpretation *śṅgara samvattata*². No such significance is supported by the recognised commentators (Tarunavacaspatis, *Hṛdayani-*

1. *bhāvikaḥ prabandha viśayaḥ gūṇaḥ |*
bi āvāḥ kavye abhī prāyaḥ kavaye āvidhī saṁśrūtaḥ ||
parasparopāśritva hī sarveḥ tī vasiḥ parivāṇaḥ |
vīśeṣānāḥ hī vyaṁśī ānāḥ ākṛtā sthāna-vaṇṇaḥ ||
vyaktur aḥ kṛama bāhāḥ gambhīrasyāpi vāstunah |
bhāvavattam idāḥ sarvaḥ iti tad bhāvika hī viduḥ ||

The variant reading in the second line is *kavye vasya vyavasthīti* in the Madras edition for *kavaye āvidhī saṁśrūtaḥ*. In the first line *tad bhāvikaḥ* : *prāyaḥ* (Cal. ed.) and *bi āvāḥ hī tam iti prāyaḥ* (Madras ed.)

2. It is probably in view of such misconceived interpretation that Bhoja at a much later time includes the Bhāvika among his twenty-four *śabda-guṇa*s (i. 75) as the conduct of a sentence according to its underlying emotion or sentiment (*bhāvato vakyaḥ itih*) a definition which has been copied by Vidyānātha in his scheme of 24 *Guṇa*s modelled on that of Bhoja although his *Artha-guṇa* Bhāvika is *sabhi prayokṣa viṇyāsa* in a narrow sense (i. 86).

the other hand the view referred to by Bhamaha is implied in the tradition which Rudraja's *Riti* and the *Dhvanikara* & *Saṅghaṭana* follow in later times. The only plausible inference that can be made from this is that Bhamaha was probably aware of some theories which approve of *Mādhurya*, *Ojas* and *Prasada* in poetic composition (in what character it is not clear but presumably as *Gunas* of the exponents of the *Riti* theory) chiefly on the basis of the desirability of long compounds but either he was indifferent to their literary value or did not think it worth while to treat them as distinct or separate elements of poetic expression.

It is remarkable indeed that Bhamaha does not think it necessary to connect as the *Riti* theorists have since done the *Gunas* with *Riti* which term itself (or the term *Marga* which Dandin employs) is never used by him and which conception even if it was known to him does not appear to have been seriously entertained. Nor like Bharata does he view the *Madhurya* etc. as independent *Kavya* *gunas*. Bhamaha refers indeed in another context (1.31.35) to *Vaidarbha* and *Gaudīya* *Kavyas* (and not expressly to *Ritis* of those names familiarised by Dandin and Vamana) in which some theorists of his time have apparently discovered differences of manner and treatment but from his remark it is clear that he himself would not pay much attention to the alleged differences. If Bhamaha was aware of some theory of *Riti* or its classification he did not apparently subscribe to it nor did he think it necessary to attach as much importance to it in his treatment of Poetics as Dandin did. This is an attitude which is intelligible in view of his belonging to a different tradition of thought which emphasised the interest and importance of those embellishments of poetic speech which are known as *alankaras*. As a corollary from this it follows that although Bhamaha was aware of some characteristics of poetic expression such as *Madhurya*, *Ojas* and *Prasada* which were defined and related as constituent excellences of *Riti* by the *Riti* theorists and regarded by them as essential elements of poetry

betrayed disapproval they had still to take the mode of the Gaudas into account presumably because it had attained a commendable position and found favour in an equal degree with a class of writers and readers. It seems therefore, that even long before Banabhatta and Dandin the Gaudas exhibited a distinctive literary diction of their own,¹ which side by side with the widely accepted Vaidarbhi had an established tradition incapable of being completely ignored. Just as Bengal strove politically in these centuries against the constant aggression of Magadha, Thaneshwar and Kashmir to maintain its independence it attempted in the literary sphere to withstand the domination of the almost universally accepted Vaidarbha mode of expression and succeeded in establishing its originality.

These references are important in literary history because they supply undeniable evidence that by the 7th and 8th centuries there must have grown up in Bengal a Sanskrit culture which attained such importance as necessitated the recognition of its characteristic method of expression. Apart from the lucubrations of Bhamaha and Dandin Vamana

1 In the absence of proper data it is impossible to determine when the distinction between Vaidarbha and Gauda modes was first recognised. H. Jacobs (*Malavajñi*, pp. xvi-f) suggests that the simpler Vaidarbha style was a reaction against the older and more elaborate Gauda style and came into existence probably in the 3rd century A.D. It is possible to argue on the contrary that the Gauda style which asserts itself more and more in the later Kavya was itself a symbol of further development exhibiting a tendency towards greater elaboration. Both the standpoints ignore the possibility of the two styles developing concurrently as rival modes. The controversy of the rhetoricians makes it probable that both the Ritis developed side by side and entered into a competition for mastery—Bharata in his *Nāṭya Śāstra* (ed. Grosset iv 26) speaks of four dramatic modes or Pravytis viz. Avantī, Pañcellā, madhyamā, Dakṣiṇatyā and Odra-magadhā, the last of which is expressly stated to have been employed in the eastern provinces including Anga, Vanga, Paundra and Nepala (x v 45-47) there being no special Gaudī Pravyti.

THE ĀKHYĀYIKĀ AND THE KATHĀ IN CLASSICAL SANSKRIT

The distinction made between the *ākhyāyikā* and the *kathā* by writers on Sanskrit Poetics is well known. We propose in this paper to consider how far the prescriptions of the rhetoricians apply to the few existing specimens of the *ākhyāyikā* and the *kathā* by Subandhu and Bāṇabhaṭṭa, and what light, if any, they throw on the development of these species of prose composition in Classical Sanskrit.¹

The oldest writer on Poetics who deals with this matter appears to be Bhāmaha, who draws a rigid distinction between the *ākhyāyikā* and the *kathā*. Bhāmaha lays down (1 25 9) that the *ākhyāyikā* is a literary composition (1) which is written in prose in words pleasing to the ear (*śravya*) and agreeable to the matter intended (*prakriānukūla*), (2) but which may contain metrical pieces in *vaktra* and *aparavaktra* metre, the object of these verses being to give a timely indication of future happenings in the story,² (3) which should have an exalted substance (*udātṭārtha*) with some characteristics supplied by the poet's imagination as a special mark,³ and

1 The reader need scarcely be reminded that the Sanskrit theorists define poetry so as to include any literary work of the imagination, and absolutely refuse to make rhyming or verse an essential.

2 The text reads (ed. Trivedī, BSS liv, 1909) *vaktraṁ cāpara-vaktram ca kale bhāvyartha śaṁsī ca*. Śaṁkara, quoting this verse in his commentary on the *Harṣa-cārita* (on 11 10), reads *kāvye bhāvyārtha śaṁsī ca*.

3 The reading, which is apparently corrupt, is *kaver abhīpraya kṛtāḥ kathānaḥ kṛtāḥ anukūla* "marked by certain narration created by the intention of the poet." Premasandra, quoting this half verse in his commentary on the *Kavyādarśa*, reads *kaver abhīpraya kṛtāḥ anukūlaḥ kathā*, introducing a grave variant and connecting it with the *kathā*. But it is not intelligible how he connects the next line in Bhāmaha (*kanya haraṇa* etc.) with the *ākhyāyikā*. From the text as it stands in Bhāmaha both these lines should rightly go with the *ākhyāyikā*, and not with the *kathā*—and for this we have the authority of the text of the *Agni-purāṇa* which appropriates one of these lines.

having for its theme the abduction of a girl (*kanyā harana*), a fight (*saṃgrama*), a separation (*vipralambha*) and the (final) triumph (*udaya*), apparently of the hero, (4) in which an account of his own deeds¹ is given by the hero himself, and (5) in which the story is divided into several pauses called *ucchvāsas*². In the *kātha* on the other hand there are no *vāktra* or *aparavāktra* verses, no division into *ucchvāsas* and the story should not be narrated by the hero but by some one else. It may be written in Sanskrit or in Apabhraṃśa³ which indicates by implication that the *akhyayikā* should always be composed in Sanskrit.

Dandin appears to criticize and reject all these fine distinctions which in his opinion are not essential but more or less formal requirements. He states that some people would

1 *īṣṭam ākhyāyate tasyām nāyakena sva-cessitām* where the word *īṣṭa* is connected with *sva-cessitā* may indicate "actual history or facts of experience as opposed to invented fiction". This should be read with Bhāmaha's prohibition of self-revelation by the hero in the *kātha*. In the *kaṭi* Bhāmaha pointedly says: what noble man flaunts his own merits? It may be asked in this connexion how is it that Bhāmaha allows the hero to narrate his own exploits in the *ākhyāyikā* to which this objection also apparently applies? To obviate this seeming inconsistency we should suppose that since in the *ākhyāyikā* what is narrated consists more or less of facts of actual experience the hero (who is the narrator) cannot be suspected of self-boasting but since the *kaṭi* is more or less an invented story this trait of vanity should not be allowed in the hero and therefore some other person should be the narrator.

2 The word *ucchvāsa* (lit. breathing out) indicates a pause for breath and so it is a name for a chapter which constitutes the pause for the narrator who cannot be supposed to tell the story "in one breath" but should recount it in an easy manner with necessary pauses.

3 The linguistic forms according to Bhāmaha for literary compositions are Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa (1.16) but it is not clear what Bhāmaha means by the last term. Daṇḍin gives a definite connotation to this term as the language of the Abhiras and others in the *lāvya* but in the *śīṣa* it is a name applied to all languages other than Sanskrit (1.16).

distinguish between the *ākhyāyikā* and the *kathā* by maintaining that in the former the narrator is the hero himself, in the latter the hero or some one else (*nāyakena itarena vā vācya*), on the ground that the discovery of one's own merit is not a fault in one who is only stating what is true (*bhūtiārtha-saṁśay*). Dandin disagrees with this opinion, and holds that the fact that the hero or some other person is the narrator is not a real ground of distinction, and it is not strictly observed in current poetical usage (*anyamo dṛṣṭah*), for sometimes in the *ākhyāyikā* the narrator is found to be some person other than the hero.¹ Secondly, Dandin urges that the employment of specific metres like the *vaktra* and *aparavaktra* need not be rigorously binding in an *ākhyāyikā*, for they may (like *śrjā* and other metres) incidentally occur in the *kathā*. Thirdly, the designation *ucchvāsa* is sometimes found indeed applied to the divisions of an *ākhyāyikā* like the term *lambhaka* in the case of the *kathā*, but nothing can be concluded from this. Fourthly, themes like the abduction of a girl, fight, separation, or triumph are not special characteristics of these prose compositions, for they are also found in the *sarga bandha mahākavya*.² Fifthly, special marks due to the inventive power of the poet³ need not be a fault else-

1 As in the *Harṣa carita* as Taruṇa vācaspati in his commentary points out.

2 Dandin is here intentionally misunderstanding Bhāmaha. No doubt these themes are found in the *mahākavya* but Bhāmaha probably means that while these things are subordinate in other species of poetic composition they should be prominent in the *ākhyāyikā*.

3 This special 'mark' (*cakṣa* or *anaka*) is interpreted by commentators old and new (Taruṇa vācaspati and Premacandra) as signifying the trick of using special words (like *śrī* at the end of Māgha's poems, *lakṣmī* in Bharavi, *anuraga* in Pravarasena, etc.) to indicate the end of a canto (*bandhacakṣa*). But perhaps this remark of Dandin connects itself with Bhāmaha's remark that the *ākhyāyikā* may sometimes bear the marks of the poet's inventive power (*kaver abhipraya kṛtāḥ kathanaḥ kṛtāḥ anakāḥ*), and refers to the invented episodes or parts in the matter of fact *ākhyāyikā*.

where (i.e. in a *kathā*) for there is no limit as to the means which a poet may adopt for the attainment of his purpose. And lastly Dandin expressly says that the *kathā* may be composed in all languages as well as in Sanskrit for the wonderful story of the *Bṛhat kathā* is said to be written in the *bhūta bhūṣa* ¹

We are not concerned here with the much discussed question whether these remarks of Dandin are directly levelled (as they probably are) against Bhamaha in particular but we should note that while Bhamaha makes a sharp distinction between the two species Dandin does not admit this distinction, and considering the admittedly *a posteriori* nature of these earlier works on *Alaṅkāra* it is not improbable that their respective conclusions were based upon the observance of current poetical usage which they analyse and in which an explanation of this divergence of view should be sought.

Let us now turn therefore to Bana's *Harṣa-carita* and his *Kadambari* which are respectively designated by the author himself as an *akhyāyikā* and a *kathā* and see how far the teachings of these two earliest theorists are illustrated by these two typical works or whether their conclusions were based upon some other prototypes.

The *Harṣa-carita* begins with twenty introductory stanzas in the *śloka* or *anustubh* metre concluding this preliminary part with a verse in *jagadī*. These verses contain an obeisance (*namaskṛiya*) to Vyasa and to the deities Śiva and Pārvatī and dwell upon poets and poetry generally incidentally praising great poets and poems of the past. After briefly stating the merits of an *akhyāyikā* (ll. 20) the author praises king Harṣa devotion to whom supplies the motive of his literary composition notwithstanding the existence of great works and authors in the world.

1. By which term Dandin implying the Pāṇḍit Prākrit shows himself conversant with the legendary account of the origin of this work.

After this comes the prose story of which eight *ucchvasas* remain. That the chapters were entitled *ucchvasas* by the author is indicated by the obvious pun in śl 10. With the exception of the first every *ucchvasa* begins with a pair of stanzas which give an indication of what is to follow. The metres of these verses are fairly uniform, consisting generally of *arya* with the single exception of a stanza in the *śloka*-metre in *Ucchvasa* iii.

In the prose part we have a detailed account of the poet's family extending from the first to the third *Ucchvasa*: his youth, introduction to the court and manner of his reception there, his return to his native country and relation of the story of king Harṣa to his relatives. Thus the main story begins with the third *Ucchvasa* and continues to the eighth where it breaks off.

It may be noted that the prose narrative contains some verses in different metres, of which one (ed. NSP 1918 p. 125) is expressly stated to be in the *vākṛa* metre, while four (pp. 18, 78, 125, 159) are similarly stated to be in the *apara vākṛa* metre. The other verses contained in the prose narrative are in *vasanta tilaka* (ii p. 54), *śardula vikṛita* (ii p. 69), *arya* (ii p. 86, iv p. 140, vi p. 185), *śṛṅghara* (iii p. 93) and *śloka* (v p. 153); the last two *Ucchvasas* containing no verses at all.

Before taking up the *Kadambarī* we may briefly indicate the nature of the other (and perhaps earlier) *kutā* in Sanskrit viz. Subandhu's *Vasavadatta* which is apparently referred to by Bana himself in his *Harṣa carita*. This work begins with twelve introductory stanzas in *arya* with an obeisance to Sarasvatī, Kṛṣṇa and Śiva, some praise of good poets and a statement of Subandhu's authorship. The prose story is immaterial for our purpose, but it may be noted here that we do not get this form of the story of *Vasavadatta* elsewhere, the particulars of it being probably due to the inventive genius of the poet. There is no interruption or pause in the narrative and no division into chapters, nor

are there *vaktra* or *apara-vaktra* verses although some metrical pieces in *arya śikharinī śardula vikrūḍita* and *śragdhara* occur thrice. The tenor of the story is more or less peaceful love being the prevailing sentiment, and there is no *saṁgrāma* or *kanya harana* (as in Bhamaha's *akhyayika*) unless Vasavadatta's being carried away to the Vindhya mountains be construed as an instance of the last theme.

The *Kadambarī* the story of which is too well known to require recapitulation here is similar in form but perhaps less complicated in plot. The prose narrative which is continuous is introduced by some verses in *vaṁśastha* which contain an obeisance to Brahma Śiva and the author's guru Bhatsu some remarks on the effects of good poetry and an account of the author's race and family. The tenor of the story is similarly peaceful with love as the prevailing sentiment and is not based upon any known *itihāsa* the main plot being probably an invention of the poet.

Taking the *Harṣa-carita* as a typical surviving specimen of the earlier *akhyayika* (its date being the first half of the seventh century) we find at once that while it conforms in some points to the requirements prescribed by Bhamaha it cannot yet be taken to typify exactly the *akhyayika* described by him. The work is written in agreeable prose with verse adjuncts but the *vaktra* and *apara vaktra* verses contained in it are merely topical and do not fulfil the requirement that they should indicate the tenor of the plot this work being done by the pairs of verses (generally in *arya*) prefixed at the beginning of each chapter. The story is indeed *udattartha* being the history of a great king and is regularly divided into *ucchvāsas* but it does not touch the themes of *kanyā harana* etc., and it is difficult to see what special mark of the poet's inventive genius it bears inasmuch as it professes to be the actual life history of a royal personage narrated by an eye witness. But the most important point to note in this connexion is that it does not conform in

the essential characteristic laid down by Bhamaha that the narrator must be the hero himself

Taking these facts into consideration it will not be wrong to draw the conclusion that the prototype of Bhamaha's *akhyāyikā* was probably not the *Harṣa carita* of Bāṇa but some other work which has not come down to us. From Bhamaha's treatment we may however, conclude that in spite of some controversy in his time on this point two kinds of prose narratives respectively known as the *akhyāyikā* and the *kathā* existed which could be differentiated from each other on very important points. Apart from merely formal requirements Bhamaha's analysis makes it clear that the *akhyāyikā* in his time was more or less a work of the nature of an autobiography where the narrator is the hero himself who recites the facts of his own experience and who (as interpreted by Dandin) cannot therefore be accused of self-boasting unworthy in a noble personage. Bhamaha indeed allows some scope for poetic invention and introduction of interesting themes to prevent its being a bare recital of facts but the prevailing tendency to matters of fact is emphasized by Bhamaha as the distinguishing mark of the *akhyāyikā* as contrasted with the *kathā*. Bhamaha's description of the *kathā* on the other hand is purely negative (excepting his injunction as to the language to be employed) but it appears by implication that the *kathā* as distinguished from the *akhyāyikā* was more or less of the nature of a fiction an interrupted story or narrative where the narrator should be some person other than the hero. With respect to subordinate points viz. the presence of *vākira* and *apara vākira* verses and division into *ucchvāsas* Dandin certainly evinces a great deal of common sense in rejecting these formal requirements as essential features. But they do not appear to be altogether immaterial and the animus with which the earlier theorists enter into the controversy can be understood if we consider that some of these formal differences find an explanation in the respective differences in the general character of these two

species. The real issue involved in the *ākhyāyika* however is not whether the name of the chapter should be *ucchāsa* or whether the kind of metre employed should always be *vaktra* and *apara vaktra* but the fact that it is essential that the *ākhyāyika* should be divided into well defined pauses or chapters while the *kathā* should be continuous narrative and that certain verses (possibly inserted at the beginning of each chapter) should foreshadow the tenor of the chapter following. The pauses in the *ākhyāyika* as already pointed out were necessary because the hero who is himself the narrator should be allowed to recount his story in an easy manner while the appearance of the indicative verses is excluded in the *kathā* by the fact of its being an uninterrupted narrative. The semblance of reality which the appearance of the hero as the narrator adds to the *ākhyāyika* is similarly out of place in the *kathā* where the poet or some other person should be allowed to weave out the narrative. This was in general the conception of these two species of prose composition in the time of Bhamaha. The *ākhyāyika* was more or less a serious composition dealing generally with facts of actual experience with an autobiographical or semi-historical interest while the *kathā* was essentially a fictitious narrative—which may sometimes (as Dandin contends) possess an autobiographical form but whose interest chiefly resides in its invention. The *ākhyāyika* declined in later times and did not keep strictly to the characteristics detailed above but the *kathā* although it was well defined (after Bana's works) in Rudrata was less touched by changes in form and substance even from Subandhu's time.¹

1 As his definition of the *kathā* did not undergo much material change in the course of its history Bhamaha's somewhat general characterization is applicable to Subandhu's *Vata-adatta* as well as to Bana's *Kādambarī* but it is possible that the latter was not the prototype contemplated by him just as the *Harjuncāla* was not the prototype of his *ākhyāyikā*. This would corroborate the date of Bhamaha as a younger contemporary of Dharmakīrti (as conjectured by Jacob in *Sb. der Pres. s. Alad.* xxiv).

When we come to the *Agni purāṇa* which more or less uncritically copies the dicta of Daṇḍin and other authors¹ we find however the influence of Bana's works reacting upon the theorists and making them change their definitions to suit the new conditions. According to the *Agni purāṇa* we have in the *akhyayika* (1) a praise of the author's family (*karṭṭr vaṃśa prasaṃsa*) in prose (2) themes like abduction of a girl, fighting, separation and other untoward incidents (*vipattayah*) (3) division into *ucchvasas* (4) presence of *curnakā*² or of *vaktra* and *aparavaktra* verses (5) a brilliant diction exemplifying the excellence of *ritis* and *vytis*. In the *kātha* on the other hand (1) there is the praise of the poet's family in verse (2) there may be an episode or another story (*kāthantaram*) introducing the main story (*mukhyasārtha vataraya*) (3) we have pauses or *paricchēdas* but sometimes there may be divisions called *lambhaka*³ (4) *caturpadi* verses may be introduced in each *garbhā*⁴. This is practically the conventional enumeration but with a marked difference the most important point being the *karṭṭr vaṃśa prasaṃsa* and the use of the *kāthantara* which are omitted in the discussion of earlier writers but which are admitted here (and more pointedly in Rudraṭa) probably through the influence of Bana's works.

Rudraṭa differs very noticeably from the older writers in his treatment and it may be generally said that he has accepted and generalized the characteristics of Bana's two works as to universal rules governing the composition of the

1 This point regarding the nature of the *Alaṅkāra* section of the *Agni purāṇa* is not cited in *Sanskrit Poetics* cited above pp. 107-4.

2 Vāmana defines (1.3.23.5) *cūrṇa* (one of the sub-divisions of prose dictation) as *anū-dhānā-lalita-padam* (delicate words and no long compounds) *śleṣa-lāpṛāṇa* being the reverse.

3 Read *bhaṭṭa* ed. *vā lambhaka* is *kāṭ* for *blaved* *vālambhaka* *Avacis* in the printed text.

4 The *Agni purāṇa* speaks of *kāṭ* as *kaṭhā parikāṭā* and *kaṭhā nāṭ* for which see *Locana* p. 141 (which adds *sakāṭa kāṭ*), and Hemacandra who defines various other sub-species (pp. 339-40).

kātha and the *akhyaika* respectively. According to him, we have in the *kātha* (1) an introductory *namaskriya* in verse to the *devas* and *gurus* and a statement of the author's family and the motive of his authorship, (2) the prose narrative, written in Sanskrit (or in verse in other languages) in light alliterative words the plot including *pura varnana* etc. (as in the case of the *utpada kavya* xvi 3) (3) a *kāthantara* at the beginning, which is immediately connected with the main story, (4) a theme consisting of the winning of a girl (*kanya labha*) which being the main issue, the sentiment of love is developed fully in it (*vinayasa sakala frugara*). In the *akhyaika* on the other hand (1) we have the *namaskriya* to *devas* and *gurus* in verse together with an incidental praise of older poets a confession of the poet's own inability and a statement of his motive in writing notwithstanding these drawbacks which motive may spring from the poet's devotion to a particular king his addiction to the praise of other people's merits or from some other special causes, (2) the story should be written in the manner of a *kātha* but emphasis is put on the injunction that an account of the poet himself and his family must be contained in it, written in prose and not in verse, (3) there are divisions into *ucchyāsas* and two *arya* verses should occur at the beginning of each chapter excepting the first.*

It will be seen at once that these characteristics detailed by Rudraja apply fully and strictly to the cases of Dana's two works. Rudraja along with the author of the *Agni purana* gives interesting remarks concerning the introductory stanzas all the peculiarities of which are minutely observed in the

* Some matters of detail are added viz. on the occasion of a doubt concerning a past incident or an incident not witnessed by the speaker (*parolita*) or concerning a present or future object the poet in order to dispel the doubt should let someone cite in the presence of the doubting person one or two of the poetic figures *anyokta samāsocta* or *śleṣa* and the metres employed in these cases should be *dryā aparā vaktra puṣpadgra* or according to circumstances metres like the *mālīnī*

ment, and this throws into relief the general character of Sanskrit prose *kathā* as an invented love story, which approaches the nature of romantic fiction. Ānandavardhana, who deals with prose composition only topically (p. 141) in connexion with his discussion of *saṁghaṭanā* (condition of compounds in diction), appears to recognize this point. He says that in the *kathā* we have the same kind of diction as in the *ākhyāyikā*, but in the former the rules relating to *Rasa* should be observed (iii 8) implying thereby this peculiarity of the delineation of *Rasa* (especially *śṛṅgāra*) as its principal concern. To Abhinavagupta, on the other hand, who accepts the older convention, the two species are interesting only from the point of view of form, the *ākhyāyikā*, in his opinion, being characterized by *ucchvāsas* and *vaktra aparavaktra* verses, and the *kathā* being entirely devoid of these. Hemacandra (p. 338) follows the same convention, but admits Daṇḍin's criticism (as do most later authors) regarding the narrator and the linguistic form, and pointedly quotes the *Harṣa carita* and the *Kādambarī* as typical instances. He agrees with Rudraṭa however that the *kathā* may be wholly in verse, citing an unknown *Līlāvālī* as an example. Viśvādhara does not deal with the question at all, and to Viśvanātha the *kathā* is unknown. The latter speaks of *gadya* and *padya kāvya* citing the *Kādambarī* and the *Raghu vaṁśa* as instances, while the definition of the *ākhyāyikā* is attempted, as in the case of Abhinavagupta's definition, mainly from the formal point of view. Viśvanātha, the latest writer who devotes some attention to this question, merely puts Rudraṭa's generalization in a precise form, and his treatment shows that the older distinctions were already forgotten, and the new types evolved on the basis of Bāṇa's works had firmly established themselves. But like Rudraṭa, Viśvanātha emphasizes *sarasa vastu* as the substance of the *kathā*, although he is silent with regard to the question of the subject matter of the *ākhyāyikā*.

Thus we can distinguish two or three well defined stages in the growth of the *kathā* and the *ākhyāyikā* in classical Sanskrit

The earliest forms of these as we have seen are noticed by Bhamaha, and their characteristics may be summarized thus

Akhyāyika (1) The subject matter gives facts of actual experience, (2) The narrator is the hero himself, (3) The story is divided into chapters called *ucchvāsas* containing indicative *vaktra* and *apara vaktra* verses, (4) Scope may be allowed to poetic invention and the themes may embrace subjects like abduction of a girl fighting separation, and final triumph, (5) It should be written in Sanskrit

Katha (1) The subject matter is probably an invented story (2) The narrator is some one other than the hero, (3) There is no division into *ucchvāsas* no *vaktra* or *apara vaktra* verses, (4) It may be written in Sanskrit or in Apabhramśa

These characteristics do not apply strictly to Bana's two works which however begin to influence the theorists a little later, and we find a destructive criticism of these fine distinctions as early as Dandin. The new *akhyāyika* and *katha* which arose in later times and which find themselves modified from the older types partly on the model of Bana's two works are distinctly authorized by Rudraja who generalizes the characteristics of Bana's two works into rules of universal application. The characteristics may be given thus

Akhyāyika (1) The subject matter gives facts of actual experience (2) The narrator need not be the hero himself, (3) It is divided into chapters called *ucchvāsas* which should (excepting the first) open with two stanzas preferably in *ariṣ* indicating the tenor of the chapter in question (4) It possesses a metrical introduction of a literary character

Katha (1) The subject matter is a story generally a love story for the most part invented by the poet, (2) The narrator should be some person other than the hero who may sometimes take that rôle (3) There is no division into chapters (4) It should have a literary metrical introduction

This practically stereotypes the two species in Sanskrit literature and as a natural result of this fixing of the characteristics the *akhyayika* and the *kathā* declined to such an extent that most later theorists do not think it necessary to dilate upon the question.

THE DHVĀNIKĀRA AND ĀNANDAVARDHANA

Ānandavardhana has been assigned by Bühler and Jacobi to the middle of the ninth century, on the strength of *Rājataranginī* v 34, which makes him one of the ornaments of the court of Avantivarman (A D 855-84). The statements of Kalhana, no doubt, must be accepted with caution, but it is unlikely, as we shall see from several other considerations, that the tradition in Kashmir, thus embodied in the *Rājataranginī*, regarding a famous author, should have maintained a false or unfounded account. We are pretty certain of the time of Abhinavagupta Ānandavardhana's commentator, for, as he himself states, his commentary on the *Īśvara pratya bhūṣṇa* was written in A D 1014-15, while his *Krama śloka* was composed in A D 991. This would certainly place him towards the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century. Now, from Abhinavagupta's remarks at the end of his *Locana* commentary on Uddyotakī and in of the *Dhvanyāloka*, it appears that the study of this famous work was traditional in his family, and that his commentary was composed (ed Nirṇay Sagar Press, p 60), as a rejoinder to another, named *Candrikā* written by one of his predecessors in the same *gotra* (*candrikā kārāḥ tu paśhutaḥ ity-alanī pūrva varīṣyath sahā vādēna bahunā* p 185, ii) *alanī nija purvaja sagotraśh sakam vādēna*, p 123, etc), and four times in his commentary (pp 123, 174, 185, 215) he discusses or controverts the views of this earlier commentator, who is specifically referred to as *Candrikā-kara* at pp 178 and 185¹. This would certain-

1 This *Candrikā* is also referred to in a punning verse at the beginning of Mahimabhāṭṭa's *Vyakti vārika* (i 5) *dhvanyālokaḥ sarvaśhahane śkhalitum vāṇyah padē padē saḥabham | rahasena yat pravṛttā prakāśaḥ candrikādy adṛṣṭiḥ* on which the commentator, probably Ruyyaka remarks *candrikā jyaṣṭha dvayā vicarana-grantho'pi* (ed NSP p 1).

ly allow some generations to lie between Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, and would negative completely Pischel's contention that in three passages Abhinavagupta speaks of Ānandavardhana as one of his teachers. These passages occur at pp 37, 183, and 214 of the printed text, and a perusal of them with reference to their context will convince anyone that the honorific word *guru* in the text may either refer to Ānandavardhana, not literally but figuratively, as *paraṅparā-guru*, whose work was held in esteem in his family (cf Jacobi, *WZKM* iv, pp 237-8), or (which is more likely) the reference is to one or other of Abhinavagupta's teachers, such as Bhaṭṭa Tautā, Lakṣmanagupta, or Bhaṭṭendurāja, who are spoken of pretty often in this commentary, as well as in his *Tantrāloka* and his commentaries on the *Nāṭya-śāstra* and the *Parātrāsika*. Again, Kāyapa states that he wrote his commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Devī-śataka* (ed Kāvya-mālā, Guccaka ix) in about A D 977, so that by the end of the tenth century Ānandavardhana was well enough established in fame to have two such learned commentators. It may also be pointed out that Rājasekhara, who lived about A D 880-920, mentions and cites Ānandavardhana by name in his *Kāvya-mimāṃsā* (p. 16), and this should certainly clear up any doubt as to the authenticity of the date assigned by Kalhana and accepted by Buhler and Jacobi.

Several works have been ascribed to Ānandavardhana, but what immediately concerns us is the celebrated work on Poetics known as *Dhvanyāloka* (also called *Kāvya-āloka* or *Sahajdayāloka*), of which or a part of which, he is reputed to be the author. This work may be divided into two parts, viz (1) *Kārikās*, consisting of verses and treating of *dhvani*, and (2) the *Vṛtti* or exposition, generally in prose with illustrative verses, of the *Kārikās*. Now the question has been raised whether the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* are of the same authorship or should be attributed to different authors.

Abhinavagupta and after him several writers on Poetics carefully distinguish between the *Kārikākāra* and the

Vṛttikara implying thereby that the former is a different and older writer. In several places in his commentary he seems to oppose distinctly the Vṛttikara and the Karikakara and to refer to them respectively as such viz)

Samucttaśiṅh prakāṣaṇa-dvarena parameśvara saṁmukhyaṁ karoti vṛttikarāḥ (p 1)

Nanu dhvani svarupam bruma iti pratijñaya vacya pratīyamānākhyau dvau bhedaḥ arthasya iti vyākhyābhūdhane ku samgatih karikaya ity aśankya samgatim kartum avataraṇikam karoti (p 12)

Ata eva mula karika sakṣat tan nirakarānāṛthā na śruyate vṛttikṛt tu nirakṛtam apī prameya samkhyā purāṇa ya kanyāthena tat pakṣam anudya nirakaroti (p 59)

Dvitiyoddyote karikakaro vantara vibhagam viśeṣa lakṣaṇam ca vidadhad anuvada muklena mula vibhagam dīvidham sūcitavan Tadasayanusarena tu vṛttikṛd atraivoddyote mula vibhagam avocat sa ca dvividha iti (pp 59 60)

Vṛttikarāḥ samgatim uddyotasya kurvāna upakramate evam ity adī Prakāṣita iti maya vṛttikareṇa sateti bhavaḥ Na caitan mayoktam apī tu karikarābhīprayena ity aha tatreti (p 69)

Anyā pakṣam duṣṭatvena hṛdi mūḍhajābhījātvaḥ sa pakṣam purvaṁ darśayati vṛttikarāḥ (p 71)

Karikāpy abhīprāya dvayenaiva yojya Na kevalam prathamābhīpraye prathamā karikāṛthā-dṛṣṭāntābhīprayena yā khyeyam evam vṛtti grantho pi yojyah (p 78)

Vṛttikāro vakṣyamāṇa karikābhīprayam darśayann aha (p 85)

Prakṛanta prakara dvayopasamī āram tritīya prakara sūcā namī caṅkenaiiva jātnena karomity aśayena sadharaṇam avataraṇa padam prakṣipati vṛttikṛt (p 104)

Uktam eva dhvani svarupam tadabhasa viveka hetutaya karikakaro nuvadaśīty abhīprayena vṛttikṛd upakaram dādāti (p 122)

Yas tu vyacasje vyangyūnām vastvalanikara rasanam muḥhena iti sa evam praśavyah etat tatvat trī bhēdatvam na kari

*kāḥkārena kṛtam vṛttikārena tu darśitam Na ca idānīm vṛtti
kāro bheda prakāṣanam karoti, etc (p 123)*

*Kārikākārena pūrvam vyatireka uktam. Na ca sarvathā
na kartavyo'pi tu bibhatsādau kartavya eveti paścād anvayah
Vṛttikārena tvanvaya pūrvako vyatireka iti śailīm anusartum
anvayah pūrvam upāttam (pp 130 1)*

Darśitam eveti karikākāreṇeti bhūta pratyayah (p 138)

*Yadyapy arthananta mātre hetur vṛttikārenoktas tathāpi kari
kāḥkārena nokta iti (on iv 3, ed S K De reprinted below), etc*

All these passages are important, especially the last four in which Abhinavagupta tries to reconcile the conflicting views expressed by the Kārikāra and the Vṛttikāra. It is to be noted that Abhinava generally applies the epithet Granthakṛt to the author of the Vṛtti and Mūla granthakṛt to the author of the Kārikā (e.g p 135). An exceptional weight attaches to the testimony of Abhinavagupta, whose opinion assumes a special importance when we consider that he did not live very far apart from Ānandavardhana himself, and that in his family, the study of *Dhvanīlōka* was handed down as a kind of traditional heritage.

If, however, the common authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti be posited, then one would expect to find complete agreement of opinion between the two. On the other hand, it seems that the system as given in its bare outline by the Kārikākāra in his concise verses has been considerably expanded, revised, and modified by the Vṛttikāra, and many problems not discussed or even hinted at by the former are elaborately treated of by the latter. In one place, for instance (p 123), Abhinavagupta clearly points out that the classification of *dhvani* according to *vastu*, *alamkāra*, and *rasadi* is not expressly taught in any Kārikā although after the manner of all faithful commentators he attempts in his own way to reconcile this inconsistency. Indeed, it would seem that Ānandavardhana attempted to build up a more or less complete system of Poetics upon the loosely joined ideas and materials supplied by the Kārikās and his success was so

marvellous that in course of time the Kārikakara receded to the background completely overshadowed by the more important figure of his formidable expounder and people considered as the Dhvanikara not the author of the few memorial verses but the commentator Anandavardhana himself who for the first time fixed the theory in its present form. It may also be pointed out that the term Dhvanikara came gradually to be used in the generic sense of 'the creator of the Dhvani theory' and therefore indiscriminately applied by later writers to Ānandavardhana who though not himself the founder of the theory came to receive that credit for having first victoriously introduced the system in the struggle of the schools.

It is not surprising, therefore that in the verse ascribed to Rājaśekhara in Jahlana's *Sukti muktavali* Ānandavardhana is regarded as the founder of the Dhvani theory. Similarly Samudrabandha (commentary on the *Alamkara sutra* p. 4) passing in review the five schools of Poetics before Ruyyaka mentions Anandavardhana as the founder of the fifth or last Dhvani school. This would also explain the two groups of apparently puzzling citations from the *Dhvanyaloka* met with in the works of later writers in which they either confuse or identify Anandavardhana with the Dhvanikara (On the one hand we have several *Kārikas* cited under the name of Ānandavardhana while on the other several passages which occur in the *Vṛtti* are given under the name of the Dhvanikara¹). This confusion was so complete in later writers that even in the latter part of the eleventh century Mahimabhaṭṭa who professed to demolish the new

1 See for instance Kṣemendra *Aucitya v cara-caracēd* p. 134=*Dhvanyaloka* iii 24 Hemacandra *Alamkara-cudamanī* p. 26=Valla bhāṣya § bhāṣāśāvalī no. 157=*Dhvanyaloka* i 4 Govinda Thakura *Kāvya-pradīpa* p. 16=*Dhvanyaloka* p. 221 Viśvanātha *Sahitya-darpana* ed. Roer p. 108=*Dhvanyaloka* p. 130 Jayaratha *Alamkara-lata* i ii p. 19=*Dhvanyaloka* p. 11 Kōmarasvamin *Ratnāvalī* p. 64=*Dhvanyaloka* iii 3 etc.

theory by his fierce onslaught in the *Vyakti viveka*, quotes from the Kārikā and the Vṛtti indiscriminately under the generic appellation of the Dhvanikāra. In the same way Kṣemendra, in the last quarter of the eleventh century, and Hemacandra, in the first quarter of the twelfth, make Ānandavardhana responsible for Kārikās III 24 and I 4 respectively, while still later writers like Govinda, Viśvanātha and Kumārasvamin regard Ānandavardhana himself as the Dhvanikāra, to whom the Kārikā as well as the Vṛtti is attributed. Mammaṭa, generally a careful writer, distinguishes Ānandavardhana from the writer of the Kārikas, whom he styles Dhvanikāra or Dhvanikṛt (pp 213 and 214, 3rd ed Bomb Sans Series 1917), but in one place (p 445) he apparently falls into confusion and ascribes to the Dhvanikāra a verse which probably belongs to the Vṛtti:

If the Dhvanikāra, the supposed author of the Kārikā, is thus distinguished from Ānandavardhana, the author of the Vṛtti, the question naturally arises—who was this Dhvanikāra, and what date should be assigned to him? It is clear from Abhinavagupta's remarks that the Kārikākāra was an older writer although his name or date is nowhere given either by Abhinavagupta or Ānandavardhana. It seems likely that even in the ninth and the tenth centuries his name was already forgotten, although tradition of his authorship still remained. Jacoby, in the learned introduction to his translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* and following him, Harichand Sastri in his *L'Art Poétique de l'Inde*, pose the question very ably, without, however, furnishing a precise solution. Sovani's hypothesis (*JRAS*, 1910 pp 164-7) that the name of the unknown Kārikākāra was Sahṛdaya on the ground that one of the alternative names of the work itself is *Sahṛdayāloka* and that the use of the words *sahṛdaya* and *laya-sahṛdaya* at the end of chapter IV of the *Dhvanyāloka* and in the beginning of Abhinavagupta's commentary is significantly corroborative, is hardly convincing. For it is well known, as Harichand points out, that the word *sahṛdaya* (lit a man

with a heart) is used in innumerable places in *Alaṅkāra* literature as in the verses in question to designate a man of taste a judge of literary beauty a connoisseur of *Rasa*. *Anandavardhana* himself discusses *sahṛdayatva* at some length in his *Vṛtti* (p 160) and *Abhinavagupta* arrives at a concise definition of a *sahṛdaya* thus (p 11) *yeṣāṃ kavyanuśilāna bhyasa vaśad viśadibhūte mano mukure varṇanāya tanmatyā bhāvāna योग्यता ते हृदया सम्वृद्ध्यद्वाहं saṁvṛddhyāh saṁvṛddhyāh* a definition which became so much standardized that *Hemacandra* does not scruple to copy it literally in his *Alaṅkāra cūdamanī* (p 3). Similarly *Mammata* begins his *Kavya prakāśa* [Bomb ed p 10] with a reference to *kavi* and *sahṛdaya* who are thus distinguished by *Viśvādharma* in his *Ekavālī* (p 21) *kavyaṁ kṛtūṁ vidantī vindatā itī kavya vidatī kavayāḥ saṁvṛddhyāś ca vetti vindatyor āvṛttīya grahaṇat parī phurataḥ prakṛti śleṣasya mahimnubhīḥṣyante* and both *Mammata* and *Viśvanatha* declare that the *sahṛdaya* alone can have a true perception of *Rasa* in poetry. It is needless to multiply instances to establish a point which is pretty familiar to every student of *Alaṅkāra* literature but they would go to disprove without any doubt *Soman's* conjecture that with *sahṛdaya* we arrive at the name of the unknown writer of the *Kaṭikāś*.

The fact is that we have as yet hardly any material to decide the question finally. But it seems likely that the *Dhvanikāra* was a much older writer than *Anandavardhana* for even in *Abhinavagupta's* time his actual name seems to have been forgotten. (It is quite possible as *Abhinavagupta* seems to imply and *Jacobi* tries to make out that this unknown *Dhvanikāra* was a contemporary of *Manoratha* who is placed by *Kaṭhāna's Rājataranginī* (iv 496 and 671) in the reign of *Jayapīḍa* and his successor *Lalitapīḍa* i.e. in the first part of the ninth century (about A.D. 780-823) but there are difficulties which seriously stand in the way of our arriving at a definite decision on this point. While discussing the various theories which deny the existence of *Dhvanī* *Anandavardhana*

quotes a verse anonymously with the remark *tatha canyena kṛta evatra ślokaḥ* upon which Abhinavagupta in his gloss remarks *tatha canyena itī granthakṛt samāna kala bhaviṇā Manoratha namna kavina*. Now if we suppose that by *granthakṛt* Abhinavagupta means Anandavardhana then Manoratha who is thus made a contemporary of the latter lives in the last part of the ninth century i.e. much later than the date assigned to him by Kalhana presuming of course that both the Manorathas are identical persons. If on the other hand we suppose that *granthakṛt* refers as Jacobi conjectures to the anonymous Dhvanikāra we are confronted with the fresh difficulty that by the term *granthakṛt* Abhinavagupta invariably means Anandavardhana (pp. 12, 37, 90 etc.). To remove this difficulty we must suppose either (1) that Kalhana is wrong as Pischel argues in assigning Manoratha to the reign of Jayapīḍa and Lalitapīḍa, (2) that the two Manorathas were not identical persons or (3) that Abhinavagupta himself has confused the Karikakāra with the Vṛttikāra. As there are no definite means of deciding any one of these equally plausible propositions and as the acceptance of the one or the other of these would lead to widely different results the question cannot be regarded as satisfactorily settled and the attempt to make the original Dhvanikāra a contemporary of the Manoratha of Kalhana does not seem to be at all plausible.

It would seem, on the other hand that the Karika's date back to a much earlier time than the first quarter of the ninth century in which the Dhvanikāra is placed by Jacobi as a contemporary of Manoratha. The allusion to Manoratha and the apparent discrepancy in Kalhana's statement need not trouble us nor need we challenge the otherwise trustworthy testimony of Abhinavagupta for it is quite reasonable to suppose that the Manoratha under discussion is perhaps a poet who was Abhinavagupta says contemporaneous with Anandavardhana and therefore quite a different person from the well known Manoratha of Kalhana. This is perhaps a

much simpler explanation than straining the word *granthakṛt* to mean the *karikakara* in the face of Abhinavagupta's own distinct indication to the contrary and in this way we are not affected in the least by Kalhana's *Manoratha* with whom we have nothing to do. If on the other hand we place the *Dhvanikara* in the time of Kalhana's *Manoratha*, this would only leave a bare margin of two generations between the *Karikakara* and the *Vṛttikara*. But a careful study of the *Dhvanyaloka* would show that a longer time must indeed have elapsed between the author and the commentator in order to make room for a period of scholastic exposition of the former of which undoubted traces are preserved to us in the few memorial verses—*parikara śloka*s (pp 34 130 137 147 163) *sa ṅgraha śloka*s (pp 87 223) *samkṣepa śloka*s (pp 44 74 243)—incorporated by Ānandavardhana in his *Vṛtta* which therefore is not likely to be the first of its kind. These śloka's are a sort of recapitulation stanzas which are adduced by the *Vṛttikara* from unknown sources sometimes to explain the meaning of the *Karikas* but more often to amplify and supplement them. A *samkṣepa śloka* as its name implies is a verse which sums up and utters a theory in a condensed and crystallized form. A *parikara śloka* is thus explained by Abhinavagupta (p 34) *parikarārthaḥ karikārthasyudhukavāpavī kartum ślokaḥ parikara-ślokaḥ* and referring to two *sa ṅgraha śloka*s he remarks (p 223) *evam śloka dvayena sa ṅgrahārtham abh dhāya bahu prakaraṇa pradarśikām lāriḱā i poṣhati*. Again in a rather long digression (pp 81 f) Ānandavardhana repudiates other explanations of *Dhvani* implying thereby that already before his time such attempted explanations had found champions whose opinions he thought worth refuting. The space of one or two generations as conjectured by Jacoby between the original conceiver of the theory and its first great expounder between its first dogmatic formulation and its deeply thought out exhaustive and classical exposition hardly suffices to make these intermediate controversial activities appear intelligible. The assumption

commends itself, therefore, that a longer period must have intervened to allow the theory to struggle through divergent opinions and establish itself authoritatively, so that in Ānandavardhana's time it could already look back upon a long past during which people had obviously progressed in the way of explaining it and had succeeded in bringing it, through various degrees of opposition and support, to a position of considerable authority. And a century later, in Abhinavagupta's time, even the name of the Dhvanikāra appears to have been lost, although the tradition of his authorship of the Kārikās—a tradition which in the next century almost disappeared—still lingered.

If Ānandavardhana gave the final authoritative shape to the Dhvani theory (only the details of which were worked out by Abhinavagupta and others) the anonymous Dhvanikāra, who must have lived at least a century before his Vṛttikāra, was not its absolute creator. This is made clear by the first Kārikā, which tells us that the theory was already taught by earlier thinkers, and that there existed even at that time at least three divergent views about the nature of Dhvani:

*kāvyaśyātmaṁ dhvanir ity budhair yaḥ samāmnāta-pūrvas
tasyābhāvān jagadur apare bhāktam aḥis tam anye/
kecid vūcūḥ sthutam aṣṭaye tattvam ucus tadīyaḥ
tena brūmah sahrdaya-mānaḥ prīṭaye tat-svarūpam/!*

Ānandavardhana explains *samāmnāta pūrvah* in this verse as *paramparayā yaḥ samāmnātah*, and if we are to take Abhinavagupta's gloss on *paramparā* we understand that the theory came down in unbroken tradition, if not explained in particular books (*avicchinnena pravāhena tair etad uktam, vinapi viśiṣṭa-pustakeṣu vivecanād ityabhiprāyaḥ*, p. 2). This implies without doubt that the school existed from a very early time, and some unknown writer in the dim past gathered together, summed up, and fixed the theory in a form which obtained considerable literary esteem for his work and the honoured but somewhat vague appellation of the Dhvanikāra for himself. But

his name and fame in course of time was eclipsed in their turn by those of his great Vṛttikara who succeeded in establishing the theory for all time and to whom posterity began to ascribe not altogether undeservedly all the honours of his predecessor so that one of the latest writers on Alaṅkāra Kumārasvamin (*Ratnagana* p 288) glorifies him with the curious but significant epithet—Dhvanyacarya¹

DSOS : 1920

1 For a more recent discussion of the question in all its aspects see P. V. Kane History of Sanskrit Poetics (prefixed to his ed. of the *Saṁkhyā-darpaṇa*) 3rd Ed. Bombay 1931 pp 154-90

ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S TREATMENT OF SARĠGHATĀNĀ

The term SarġghatĀnĀ is not defined, but we are told that SarġghatĀnĀ is of three kinds, namely, AsamĀsĀ, Madhyama-samĀsĀ and Dirgha samĀsĀ. It is thus a kind of collocation of words, depending on the absence or presence, in varying degree, of compounded forms. It thus corresponds roughly to Rudraġa's idea of Riti.

Older writers like Udbhaġa (as implied by Abhinavagupta) are said to have held that while Alamkāras belong to Śabda and Artha themselves, the Gunas pertain to Śabdārtha sarġghatĀnĀ, the former being of the Avayava and the latter of the Avayavin. As Ānandavardhana takes great pains to show that this view is not correct, it is clear that the concept of SarġghatĀnĀ was already conventionally established, even if there was perhaps no systematic thinking or exposition of it.

Ānandavardhana establishes that the real Āśraya of Guna is Rasa, and not Śabdārtha, nor Śabdārtha sarġghatĀnĀ. If Gunas are sometimes spoken of in relation to Śabda, this is done only through Upacāra, just like talking of heroism existing in a hero's physical frame.

What then is the relation of SarġghatĀnĀ to Guna, and in what way can the SarġghatĀnĀ be said to suggest Rasa? If Rasa is the Niyāmaka of Guna, what then is the Niyāmaka of SarġghatĀnĀ? These are some of the problems which Ānandavardhana discusses.

Some writers hold that SarġghatĀnĀ and Guna are not different, while others hold that they are different. The latter set of writers, again, differ among themselves. Some say that Guna is the Āśraya of SarġghatĀnĀ, and others (like Udbhaġa) think that SarġghatĀnĀ is the Āśraya of Guna. Considering these views, Ānandavardhana points out that if Guna and SarġghatĀnĀ are taken to be identical, or if Guna is said to de-

pend on Saṁghaṭana as its Āśraya there is the danger that like Saṁghaṭana which is Aniyata viṣaya the Guna will also become Aniyata viṣaya. But we know that the Guna being forms of Citta vṛtti (of *Druti Vistara* and *Vikāśa*) have their definite scope (Viṣaya) in relation to particular sentiments or Rasas i.e. g. Madhurya in Śṛṅgāra and Karuṇa Ojas in Raudra and Adbhuta. The Saṁghaṭana on the other hand being dependent on mere compounding of words or Samāsa cannot be said to have any defined scope, as for instance it cannot be said that Dirgha samāsa occurs only in Raudra it may occur also in Śṛṅgāra similarly Asamāsa Saṁghaṭanā is not restricted to Śṛṅgāra but it is found also in Raudra. Hence Saṁghaṭana is Aniyata viṣaya but Guna is not so the Rasa is the Niyamaka of Guna but it is not the Niyamaka of Saṁghaṭana. The Guna and Saṁghaṭana therefore are not identical nor is the Saṁghaṭana the Āśraya of Guna.

It may be objected that if Gunas are Śabdaśraya even through Upacara they are also Saṁghaṭanāśraya since there is hardly any Śabda which is not in the form of collocation i.e. Asaṁghaṭita. It is replied that this is not a necessary consequence. Even Asaṁghaṭita Śabda or mere Varna can through Upacara be the source of Guna. The Saṁghaṭana is Aniyata and indefinite things cannot be the Āśraya of Guna. By Upacara therefore it may be said that Guna is Śabdaśraya but never Saṁghaṭanaśraya (which is Anitya Śabdaratha collocation) even by Upacara.

The critic may object that Saṁghaṭana is not always Aniyata for even if it is admitted that no particular Saṁghaṭana is found in Śṛṅgāra there is a Niyama with regard to Ojas inasmuch as Asamāsa Saṁghaṭana is not suitable to Ojas. The reply to this is that the notion that Ojas involves Dirgha samāsa is only a traditional error and that there is Ojas in such verses of Bhaṭṭa Narayana as *yo yāh śasiram* even though there is no Dirgha samāsa. The Ojas Guna depends on the Dīpti of the mind which can be brought about with

equal effect by *Asamāsa* and *Durgha samāsa*, and it does not depend upon mere *śabdārtha* collocation.

The *Guṇa* primarily belongs to *Rasa*, which is its *Āśraya* ; but since words and their collocation can also suggest *Rasa*, the *Samḡhaṭanā* can also do so, provided it takes the accompanying *Guṇa* as the *Āśraya* (*mūdhuryādīn guṇān āśraya rasān vyankti*). The *Samḡhaṭanā*, therefore, is *Guṇāśraya* , it varies with the *Gunas* , it suggests the *Guṇa*, and through them the *Rasas* to which the *Gunas* pertain.

From the point of view of *Rasa*, therefore, there is *Niyama* only as regards the *Guṇa*. For it alone *Rasa* is *Niyāmaka*. From the standpoint of *Rasa*, *Samḡhaṭanā* has no *Niyama*, i.e. the *Rasa* is not a *Niyāmaka* of *Samḡhaṭanā*, since the rule that certain kinds of *Samḡhaṭanā* concern certain *Rasas* is often violated. But since *Samḡhaṭanā* can also be *Rasa* *vyāñjaka*, what is the *Niyama* which controls it? It cannot be that *Samḡhaṭanā* has absolutely no *Niyama*. Its *Niyama*, we are told is the more comprehensive *Aucitya* of the context, the *Aucitya* of *Vaktr*, *Vācya*, *Viśaya* etc., which determines the suitability of *Samāsa* *vṛtti* in particular cases. But since these circumstances also constitute the *Niyama* of *Rasa* and, through it, of *Guṇa*, there appears to be some confusion of thought on this issue. Anandavardhana appears to think that the same comprehensive, even if somewhat vague, *Niyāmaka* of *Aucitya* appears to regulate both *Rasa* (and consequently *Guṇa*) and *Samḡhaṭanā*.

It is clear that if *Guṇa* is accepted as explained by Anandavardhana in relation to *Rasa*, the *Samḡhaṭanā* is, more or less, a superfluous concept, the *Samāsa* *vṛtti* being a constituent of the *Guṇa* in their variety. His concern is perhaps not to set forth a theory of *Samḡhaṭanā*, but to show that the views of earlier writers on the older concept of *Samḡhaṭanā* is not justifiable, and if it is to be accepted at all, it must be recognised that it is dependent on the *Guṇa*, and admissible only as such, its only *Niyāmaka* being the law of propriety of the context. Later writers, therefore, who generally follow the scheme of

Poetics standardised by Ānandavardhana, almost ignore Saṁghajana as such. Mammata makes only a passing reference to Saṁghajanā in the same strain, in his chapter on Guṇa, Viśvanātha brings in Saṁghajanā in his somewhat peculiar exposition of Rīti (*pada saṁghajanā rītiḥ rīteḥ saṁghajanā viśeṣatvat*) which last concept was considered redundant by Ānandavardhana but in which Viśvanātha following Rudraja, makes Samass vṛtti, a *sine qua non*. Viśvanātha, however, who belongs to the new school and whose approach to poetry is quite different rather uncritically accepts Udbhaṭa's view expressed in the dictum *saṁghajanā dharmāḥ guṇāḥ*¹

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1 See *Dhanyaloka* (i) 61-64

THE RASĀRNAVĀLĀMĪKĀ OF PRAKĀŚAVARṢA

Students of Sanskrit Ālāṃkāra-śāstra are indebted to Pandit V. Venkatarama Sharma of the University of Madras for publishing in the *IHQ*, vol v, pp 173f the text of Prakāśavarṣa's *Rasarnava* along with an extensive account of the work in English. During a week's stay in Madras in 1924 I had an opportunity of examining an imperfect manuscript-copy of the work in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library (which Pandit Venkatarama appears also to have utilised), but, as I could not devote much time to it, my examination was necessarily cursory, and the brief account which I gave of it in *BSOS*, iv, pt 2, p 283 was not only incomplete but incorrect in one particular in the description of the work. Pandit Venkatarama has now published the text, as well as a fairly full account, from two manuscripts, and I must thank him for the correction he has made of my error, but I still find from a careful study of the published text that I was not mistaken in regarding this work as a comparatively late composition belonging to a period probably later than that of Bhoja.

The Madras MS gives the work of Prakāśavarṣa in five chapters, the first four of which deal with Guna, Doṣa and Ālāṃkāra, and the last (incomplete) with Rasa. Venkatarama Sharma claims that the *Rasarnava* is "the earliest work on Poetics after the *Naṭyaveda*" of Bharata, and that 'Prakāśavarṣa must have flourished before Bhāmaha and Dandin and after Bāṇabhaṭṭa, i e., between 650 A C and 750 A C". But it appears, however, that the learned Pandit is entirely on the wrong track in his views about Prakāśavarṣa's relation to Bhāmaha and Dandin. Apart from the very elaborate treatment of Guna, Doṣa and Ālāṃkāra which one can hardly expect in such a presumably early work, there is a distinct reference in it to Dhvaṇī, and in most of his definitions and apparently

novel classifications Prakāśavarṇa appears to follow very closely the school of opinion which is represented in Sanskrit Poetics by the work of Bhoja. If Pandit Venkatarama had closed his Bhamaha and Dandin and opened his *Sarasvatī laṅhābharana* he would have at once found out the source of most of Prakāśavarṇa's information and would have seen that like Bhoja Prakāśavarṇa does not hesitate in appropriating and copying verses from Dandin and Bhāmaha—a procedure which appears to have misled his editor.

I have already attempted to shew in my *Sanskrit Poetics* ii pp. 261f. that Bhoja like the author of the *Alaṅkāra* section of the *Āgṇī purāṇa* follows a tradition of thought and speculation which is different in many respects from that of the earlier established writers on Poetics although his work is essentially an eclectic compilation which conforms to the teachings of no particular orthodox school but gathers its material from all sources. The importance given to *Rasa* in conformity with the general standpoint of the earlier *Rasa* and *Dhvani* schools (in spite of a somewhat elaborate treatment of *Guna*, *Doṣa* and *Alaṅkāra* which are not directly correlated to *Rasa*) as well as the presence of verses culled from different older writers (especially Dandin and Bhāmaha) need not surprise us in such a work. Prakāśavarṇa's *Rasarnava* is marked by the same features and he shows the same reverence to Dandin and Bhāmaha whose works supplied to him as to Bhoja a large number of unacknowledged quotations and ideas. The very fact that he refers to and quotes from a Bhāmaha or a Mahābhāmaha (although these quotations are not to be found in Bhāmaha's known work) precludes us apart from every other consideration from placing Prakāśavarṇa before Bhāmaha.

Coming to the subject matter of the work itself one can see at once that there is a close agreement in the definitions and classifications of *Guna*, *Doṣa* and *Alaṅkāra* between Bhoja's *Sarasvatī laṅhābharana* and Prakāśavarṇa's *Rasarnava*. No doubt Prakāśavarṇa here and there adds to or

rejects a Guna or an Alamkāra from the enumeration of Bhoja. Thus of the 24 śabda gunas mentioned by Bhoja Prakāśavarṣa accepts 22, leaving aside Gati and Praudha mentioned by Bhoja and to the 24 Arthalamkāras of Bhoja Prakāśavarṣa adds four more. Apart from such legitimate additions and modifications the Gunas Doṣas and Alamkāras in Prakāśavarṣa are named defined classified in the same way and mentioned almost in the same order (but for exigencies of metre) as in Bhoja. But the agreement is more than that. The definitions and classifications are mostly copied *verbally* by Prakāśavarṣa from Bhoja. Some of the classifications and definitions are peculiar to Bhoja mentioned by him for the first time and some are mentioned by no other rhetoricians. All these are also copied by Prakāśavarṣa. It would be futile therefore to compare Prakāśavarṣa's treatment with those of Bhamaha and Dandin and it is not surprising that Pandit Venkatarama has found more points of confusing divergence than agreement in such a procedure.

As the *Sarasvatī kaṇṭhabhāraṇa* is a well known and easily available text, it is not necessary to cite here all the points of agreement occurring throughout Prakāśavarṣa's *Rasarnava* wherever the topics dealt with are common to the two works. But a few typical instances may be adduced here in support of the statements made above. The general scheme and classification of Gunas and Doṣas are almost identical in Bhoja and Prakāśavarṣa and the same ideas and terminology are employed throughout. The division of Doṣas into three classes (as relating to *pada vakya* and *vākyaartha*) which is accepted by both is indeed much older but while Bhoja for the sake of a certain symmetry and uniformity of treatment enumerates sixteen Doṣas respectively of *pada vakya vakyaartha* Prakāśavarṣa accepts from them only fourteen *pada doṣas* fourteen (but really fifteen) *vakya doṣas* and sixteen *vākyaartha doṣas* using nearly the same nomenclature and almost identical definitions. We give them here in

parallel columns so that the striking agreements as well as the slight differences will be clear at a glance

*Bhoja*¹

1 *Pada doṣas* (16 in number)

asādhu (śabda śāstra viruddham yat)

aprayukta (kavibhir na prayuktam yat)

kaṣṭha (padam śruter asukhadam)

anarthaka (pada pūrṇa matrartham)

anyartha (rudhi cyutam padam yat)

apūṣṭārtha (yat tu tuccha bhūdhayan syat)

asamartha (asamgatam padam yat)

aparātita (prasiddham śāstra eva yat)

kleṣṭha (durt anyartha-sambhūtiḥ)

gūḍhārtha (aprasiddhārtham prayogam)

neyārtha (sva saṁketa-prakīrtartha)

samśayādha (na yat padam niśchayakṛt)

Prakāśavarṣa

1 *Pada doṣas* (14 in number, slightly different order)

asādhu (śabda śāstra viruddham yat)

aprayukta (na prayuktam kavindran yat)

kaṣṭha (śravana durbhagam)

anarthaka (pada pūrṇa mātṛam yat)

[To this really corresponds Pkv's asamartha see below]

apūṣṭārtha (tuccha-śūnyā kṣiptam)

asamartha (yad baddham rudhi varṇa vyatikramāt)—cf Bhoja's anyārtha

aparātita (śāstra eva prayuktam yat)²

kleṣṭha (paramāryena cāsthasya sucakam)

gūḍhārtha (aprasiddhārtha sambaddham)

neyārtha (svayam kalpita saṁketa)

sasamśaya (yatrarthantara sambandha)

1 The references are to the Kavyamala edition (Nir Sag Press Bombay 1925) of Bhoja's *Sarasarī Saṁgrahāṅga* but A. Borooah's edition (Calcutta 1884) has also been consulted

2 The reading actually is *śāstras* *yuktam yad* (with lacunae)

Bhōṣa

vīpatita (viruddhārtha
prakalpanam)
aprayojaka (avīśeṣa vidha
yakam)
deśya (avyutpattimat
padam)
gramya—(a) aślīla or
asabhyā tha (b) amaṅga
la and (c) ghṛṇavat 3
kinds

Prakāśavarṇa

aprayojaka (vivakṣita pra
meyasya nopakāra)
deśya (deśa rudhī gatam
padam)
gramya—(a) asabhyā (b)
amaṅgala and (c) ghṛṇa
kāra 3 kinds

The agreements are no less close and striking in the case of *vakya-doṣas*

2 *Vakya doṣas* (16 in num
ber)

śabda hina (apaśabdavat)

krama bhraṣṭa (arthah
śabdo va yatra na
kramah)¹

viśamdhī (viśamhito virupo
va yatra samdhī h)

punaruktimat (padam pa
darthaś cabhinna yatra)

vyākṛta (mitho yasmān
vibhaktiṇām asaṅgath)

saṅkṛta (vakyaantara
pada r mīśram)

apada (vibhinna prakṛt stha
di pada yukti)

2 *Vakya doṣas* (14 in num
ber but really 15 slightly
different order)

śabda hina (bhīna bhaṣa
padaviddham)

krama bhraṣṭa (śabdārtha
vyutkramo yatra)

viśamdhī (viruddha samdhī
mīśramdhī)

punaruktimat (tadṛk pada
padārthanām nibandhe)

vyākṛta (aneka pada
saṁtana vyahata smṛti
bhīna padam yojana
yatra)

saṅkṛta (vakyaantara
padam mīśram)

1 This is the reading of A. Borsook's text: the Kavyamala edition reads a śīla śabdo vā yatra tatkrāntah

Bhoja

vakya garbhita (vakyanantara
sagarbham yat)

bhinna liṅga (yatropama
bhinna liṅga)

bhinna vacana (yad bhinna
vacanopamam)

nyunopama (nyunam upa
mana viśeṣanāḥ)

adhikopama (adhikam yat
pūnas tath āyat)

bhagna chanda (yac chan
dobhaṅgavād vacah)

bhagna yati (asthane vira
tir yasya)

2 śarīra (kriyā pada vibh
nām yat)

a rītimat (guṇapam drśyate
yatra śleṣadinam vipar
yayah) 9 kinds accord
ing as each doṣa is
a viparyaya of each
of the corresponding
9 guṇas with the ex
ception of samadhi

Those who are not yet convinced by these instances will find the scheme and classification of *vakṣarthā doṣas* even more strikingly close

3 *Vakṣarthā doṣas* (16 in number)

apartha (samudayārtha
śūnyam yad vacah)

vyārtha (gatārtham yat,
yac ca śyan nisprayojā
kam)

1 The text reads *aprayojanam*

Prakāśa arsa

[vakya] garbhita (vakya
ntara sagarbham yat)

bhinna liṅga (aliṅgatvād
upamanopameyayoh)

bhinna vacana (yasmin
vacana vaiṣamyam upa
manopameyayoh)

nyunopama (nyūnam upa
maya viśeṣanāḥ)

adhikopama (viśeṣanādhik
aupamyam)

bhinna vṛtta (chando lak
ṣaṇa hīnam) 2 kinds
tad varṇa yatī bhedenā
dvidha

khama (kriyā virahitam
vakyaṁ)

śleṣadī guṇa hīnam—10

kinds in the same way
as in Bhoja but sama
dhi guṇa is included

3 *Vakṣarthā doṣas* (16 in number)

apartha (samudayārtha
śūnyam yat)

vyārtha (yad aprayojakam¹
yac ca gatārtham)

Bhoja

ekārtha (uktyabhinānartham)

śaśaṁśaya (śaśaṁśadbhā-
rtham)apakrama (vākyaṁ yat tu
krama bhraṣṭam)khinna (jātyādyuktāvanir-
vyūḍham)atimātra (yat sarva lokāṁ
tārtham)paruṣa (yat tu krūrārtham
atyartham)virasa (apraśtuta rasaṁ
yat)hinopama (hinaṁ yatropa-
mānam syat)adhikopama (tad eva yas-
minn adhikam)asatśrīśopama (yat tv atulya-
opamānam)aprasiddhopama (aprasid-
dhopamānaṁ yat)niralaṁkāra (yad alaṁ-
kāra-hinam)

aśīla (aśīlārtha-pratīti kṛt)

viruddha—3 kinds (a) pra-
tyakṣa viruddha (b)
anumāna-viruddha and
(c) āgama viruddha each
of which again is of
three kinds—9 kinds
in all

*Prakāśavarsa*ekārtha (uktyabhinānār-
tham)¹śaśaṁśaya (yatārthe yasya
na niścayah)apakrama (paurvāparya-
viparyayah)khinna (jātyādyuktāvanir-
vyūḍham)²atimātra (lokāṁta ivārtho
yah)paruṣa (ati krūras tu vākya-
arthah)

virasa (apṛākṛta rasam)

hinopama (hinaṁ yatropa-
mānam syāt)adhikopama (yatropama-
nam adhikam)visatśrīśopama (atulyam
upamānam cet)aprasiddhopama (aprasid-
dhopamānaṁ cet)niralaṁkāra (alaṁkāra
vivarjitam)aśīla (yad asabhyārtha
sambaddham)

viruddha—3 kinds (a) pra-
tyakṣa viruddha (b)
anumāna viruddha and
(c) āgama-viruddha,
each of which again
is of three kinds, as in
Bhoja—9 kinds in all

1 The reading *ukṛtābhinānārtham* is obviously a mislection

2 The text has *anumanābhere*

It may be urged that most of these Doṣas and their descriptions will be met with in other writers and that in the definition and arrangement of Doṣas which are more or less standardised the verbal or other agreements need not be taken as absolute proofs of borrowing. But when we come to the treatment of Gunas the case is more convincing. It is well known that in spite of the influence of Dandin and his school as well as of the tradition of opinion followed in the *Alaṅkāra* section of the *Āgṇī purāṇa* Bhoja adopts a terminology and scheme of Gunas which are peculiar to himself and which differ in many points from those of his known predecessors but here also Prakāśavarṣa follows him pretty closely. To the orthodox ten Gunas of Śabda and Artha respectively of Vamana viz. *śleṣa prasāda mūdhyā samāta saukumarya arīḥa vyakti ojas kanti udarata* and *samādhi* (which are however, sometimes defined slightly differently by later writers who accept them) Bhoja adds *aurj tyā udātātā preyas susabdātā saukṣmyā gambhīryā satīkṣepa vīstara sammitatva bhavikāṭva rīti ukṣi gati* and *praulh* thus enumerating 24 Gunas in all which unique arrangement gives us perhaps the largest number mentioned by any author. Prakāśavarṣa accepts the nomenclature and definition of the first 22 almost verbally omitting *gati* and *praulh* from his list.

<i>Bhoja</i>	<i>Prakāśavarṣa</i>
<i>Śabda gur as</i> (24 in number)	<i>Śabda gur as</i> (22 in number)
<i>śleṣa</i> (su ślēṣa padātā)	<i>śleṣa</i> (yatra bandho u saḥ śī gāh)
<i>prasāda</i> (prasiddhartha padātvaṁ)	<i>prasāda</i> (prasiddhartha padā nyasah)
<i>samāta</i> (yan mṛdu prasphuṇṇamīśra varṇa bandha vādīnāḥ prātī a va gāmyena bhāṇanām)	<i>samātā</i> (bandho mṛdu sphuṇṇamīśra varṇa janmā na satīkārāḥ)

Bhoja

mādhurya (yā pṛthak-pada
tā vākye)
sukumāratā (anīṣṭhurāk-
ṣara-prāyam)
artha-vyakti (yatra saṁpūr-
na-vākyatvam)
kānti (yad ujjvalatvaṁ ban-
dhasya)
audārya (vikaṭākṣara-ban-
dhatvam)
udāttatā (ślāghyair viśeṣa-
nair yogah)
ojas (samāsa-bhūyastvam)
aurjitya (gādha bandhatā)

preyas (priyatarākhyānand-
caṭūktau)
susabdātā (vyutpattih sup-
tīnām yā)
samādhī (anya dharmā-
nām yad anyatrādharo-
panam)
saukṣmya (antah saṁjalpa-
rūpatvaṁ śabdānām)
gāmbhīrya (dhvanimattā)
vistara (vyāsenoktīh)
saṁkṣepa (samāsenābhi-
dhānam)
sammitatva (yāvadartha-
padatvam)
bhāvikatva (bhāvato vāk-
ya vṛttir yā)
gatī (krāmo yah syad
arohāvarohayoh)

Prakāśavarjya

mādhurya (arīhocita-vaco-
bandhah)
sukumāratā (akaṭhorākṣara-
-nyūṣah)
artha vyakti (saṁpūrṇa-
vākyatā)
kānti (bandhasyoyjvalatā)¹

audārya (bandha-vaikaṭ-
yam)
udāttatā (ślāghyair viśeṣa-
nair yuktam)
ojas (samāsa bhūyastvam)
aurjitya (bandha gādhat-
vam)
preyas (preyārtha-pada-
vinyūṣah)
susabdātā (yā subanta-
tīñantānām vyutpattih)
samādhī (anya-dharmasya
bhaved anyatra ropā-
nam)
saukṣmya (śabdānām antah
saṁjalpa rūpatā)
gāmbhīrya (dhvanimattā)
vistara (vyastam)
saṁkṣepa (abhidhānam
samāsenā)
sammitatva (yāvadartha-
padatvam)
bhāvikatva (bhāvābhivya-
ñjakā vāpī)

1 The text has lacunae here

Bhoja

riti (upakramasya nirva
hah)
ukti (viśiṣṭa bhanati ya
syāt)
praudha (ukteḥ praudhah
paripakah)

Prakaśavarṇa

riti (upakramasya nirvā
hah)
ukti (arthantarena¹ cartha
sya bhananat)

It is not necessary to dilate on this point further and mention the Artha gunas which betray similar parallelism. Prakaśavarṇa's discussion as to how Doṣas sometimes become Gunas which follows this topic closely copies from Bhoja. Indeed the borrowing goes on practically throughout the whole work. It is a pity that the Rasa chapters which give the name to the work are incomplete in Prakaśavarṇa's published text. If we had the whole of it we would perhaps have seen the same influence not only of the somewhat unique Rasa chapters of Bhoja's *Sarasvatī kaṇṭh abhirāga* but also probably of his much larger and more extensive *Śṛṅgāra prakāśa*. Coming to the treatment of the Alaṅkāras one finds that Bhoja's classification of figures as *bāhya abhyantara* and *bāhyabhyantara* is also accepted. In order to preserve a certain uniformity and symmetry of treatment (which is also noticeable in his classification of Gunas and Doṣas) Bhoja mentions six kinds each of *riti* *vr̥tti* *chaya* *mudra* *ukti* *bhanati* *gumphaṇa* *śayya* and *pañcīti* which are included in the treatment of Sabdalāṅkaras. Most of these are admitted and dealt with in the same way by Prakaśavarṇa but as in the case of Gunas and Doṣas he is eclectic with regard to the number he accepts in many cases omitting one or two kinds from the enumeration of Bhoja. Of the six Ritis of Bhoja Prakaśavarṇa accepts five omitting Magadhī to the four orthodox Vrttis Bhoja adds two more but Prakaśavarṇa mentions only five. Of the six kinds respectively of *mudra* *chaya* and *bhanati* again (which

1 The text has lacunar here which is supplied by the editor as *vinamāreṇa*

reproduced by Prakāśavarṣa¹. Again, Bhoja admits the philosophical idea of *upamāna* (as a means of knowledge) in a poetic figure of that name and distinguishes it as a figure from the more well known *upama*². This is a treatment peculiar to himself and is accepted by no writer on Poetics (so far as we know) except Appayya Dikṣita in his *Kimālayā nanda*. The figure *upamāna* as conceived and defined by Bhoja is also to be found in Prakāśavarṣa.

This wholesale similarity of phraseology and ideas occurring throughout in the two works (even in the matter of peculiar schemes and treatment of characteristic points) cannot indeed be explained as accidental coincidences, or mere repetition of standardised technicalities. It may be contended, however that what is said above does not necessarily prove that Prakāśavarṣa has actually borrowed from Bhoja for it is possible to hold that Bhoja might have modelled his bigger compilation upon the smaller manual of Prakāśavarṣa or that both of them belonging to the same tradition of thought probably drew upon the same source. All this may be argued, but it cannot be maintained that Prakāśavarṣa is a very early writer earlier even than Bhamaha and Dandin. The supposition however of Bhoja's borrowing from Prakāśavarṣa appears to be very unlikely. While Bhoja's work displays a systematic and elaborate treatment (in spite of its peculiar theoretic standpoint) reinforced by abundant wealth of illustrations which lifts it much above an average compilation. Prakāśavarṣa's work is nothing more than a short compilation of definitions and classifications. The *Rasarnava* has the appearance of having been a practical manual or text book, and as such it is not unlikely that it was compiled chiefly by wholesale

1 The definition is also copied by Vidyanaṭha who is one of the few writers who follow Bhoja's elaborate classification of Gunas although Vidyanaṭha accepts Dhvani as essential.

2 See *Sanskrit Poetics* : p. 14

appropriations from Bhoja's standard work with just a few pieces of supplementary information culled from other sources. In whichever way the question of borrowing be decided it is clear however that Prakāśavarṇa like Bhoja belonged to a tradition of opinion which is distinct from that of the established schools, and of which the earliest known example is to be found in the *Alamkāra* section of the *Agni purāṇa*. The date of this section at least of the *Purāṇa* cannot be fixed too early. Since it is not unaware of some theory of *Dhvanī* it is perhaps later but not much later than the *Dhvanjaloka* and probably belongs to the latter half of the 9th century A.D. Prakāśavarṇa must at any rate be later than this date. He must also have been later than Anandavardhana who established the *Dhvanī* theory in the struggle of the schools for Prakāśavarṇa like Bhoja is aware of the concept of *Dhvanī* and includes it as we have already seen in the *Śabda-guṇa-gaṇḍī*. The very elaborate treatment of *Guṇa* and *Doṣa* would by itself place him later than Dandin and Bhamaha upon whose scheme this treatment attempts in its own way to improve while the treatment of the *Alamkāras* in the same way supports and confirms this conclusion. The statements therefore that Prakāśavarṇa's *Raśnava* is the earliest work on Poetics after the *Nāṭyaveda* and that he must have flourished before Bhamaha and Dandin appear to be misconceived and uncritical.

Nevertheless the work is interesting and important as representing like Bhoja's work from which it presumably draws its material a peculiar line of speculation different in some respects from accepted views of the established schools of Sanskrit Poetics. As such its publication has been well deserved.

MAMMAṬA'S KĀVYA PRAKĀŚA

The *Kavya prakāśa* of Mammaṭa is one of the classic works on Sanskrit Poetics and Rhetoric which has always maintained a great authority and popularity throughout India*. There is perhaps no other technical work in Sanskrit which has been so much commented upon and so often edited. The number of commentaries so far discovered comes up to more than sixty and they count as their authors not only independent writers on Poetics like Ruyyaka and Viśvanatha but also authors having other literary interests like the Nāyayika Jagadīśa the grammarian Nag-śa the Smṛta and Mīmāṃsaka Kamalakara the Jaina Maṇikyacandra the Vaiṣṇava Baladeva and the Tantrika Gokulanatha.

* The reason for this great popularity lies in the fact that Mammaṭa is the first and foremost as well as the most typical writer of the new school of Poetics the Navyas, and his far famed work occupies a unique position in the history of Sanskrit Alamkāra literature. It is neither a very extensive nor a strikingly original work but in only one hundred and forty three *Karikās* and about six hundred and twenty illustrations it traverses the whole field of Sanskrit Poetics (with the exception of Dramaturgy) and combining as it does the merit of fulness with that of conciseness it sums up and explains in the succinct form of a brilliant text book almost all the previous speculations in the subject becoming in its turn the starting point of endless text books and exegetic works.

The history of Sanskrit Alamkāra covers a period of more than a thousand years but it is marked by several well defined stages. The dim beginnings of the discipline like the dim beginnings of most other branches of Indian speculation are hidden from us until we enter upon the first historic stage of its formulation in a more or less self conscious form in the works of Bharata and Bhaṃsa. Bharata's well known *Nāṭya śāstra* is principally concerned with dramaturgy music

and allied topics and deals with Poetics in so far as it applies to the theme in hand, but in Bhamaha's *Kavyalamkāra* we find for the first time an exclusive treatment of Poetics proper and a more or less systematic scheme of the subject which undoubtedly betoken a preceding period perhaps of several centuries of unknown beginnings. All that we can surmise of the unknown period consists of glimpses of rhetorical speculations such as we find in Bharata in the recorded opinions or stray references to pre-Bhamaha writers like Medhavya or in such schemes of *Alamkāra* as was presumably utilised by the earlier Kavya poets in general and by Bhaṭṭi in particular. This period begins with the enumeration and definition of only four poetic figures, ten *Gunas*, ten *Doṣas* and thirty-six Kavya *lakṣaṇas* mentioned by Bharata but it ends with the elaborate characterisation of thirty-eight independent poetic figures in Bhaṭṭi. But what is important to note in this period is Bharata's more or less standard exposition of dramaturgy and incidentally of *Rasa* which aesthetic element however is considered not particularly in relation to poetry and poetics but in connexion with drama and dramaturgy.

This is followed by a comparatively brief but exceedingly important period of great fertility and creative genius beginning with Bhamaha and ending with Anandavardhana in which we find most of the fundamental problems and concepts of Sanskrit Poetics discussed and settled in their general outlines. This fruitful and creative stage which covers more than two centuries and includes some of the great names in the history of the discipline gave rise to four distinct schools of opinion represented respectively by the *Alamkāra*, *Rīti*, *Rasa* and *Dhvani* systems. We have on the one hand Bhamaha, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṇa devoting themselves to the consideration of those decorative devices of poetic expression which are known as *kavyalamkāras* or poetic figures and confining themselves chiefly to a somewhat external art or theory of embellishment from which the discipline itself takes its name and its original tradition. Dandin and Vamana on

the other hand emphasise in poetry the objective beauty of representation realised by means of what they call *Marga* or *Riti* (roughly 'poetic diction') which consists of a harmonious combination of certain fixed literary excellences of sound and sense known as *Gunas*. Both these systems which respectively bring into prominence the elements of *Alamkāra* and *Riti* in poetry content themselves with the somewhat mechanical working out of the outward form of poetic expression, the advantages of which were considered sufficient for poetry. They point out the blemishes to be avoided and the excellences to be attained and describe elaborately the poetical embellishments or devices of literary expression which enhance its beauty so much so that the whole discipline came to receive the significant designation of *Alamkāra Śāstra* or the discipline of poetical embellishment.

Side by side with these early writers however, we have the commentators on *Bhārata* like *Lollāṭa Śaṅkuka* and *Bhaṭṭa Nayaka* who were bringing into prominence the aesthetic importance of *Rasa* the consideration of the poetic feelings and sentiments which should regulate the outward expression of poetry. Their exposition however concerned the dramatic art and their theories did not yet come properly within the sphere of Poetics which was entirely dominated by the systems of *Alamkāra* and *Riti* but we find them gradually influencing poets of rival persuasion who betray themselves more and more alive to the significance of *Rasa* in poetry. The bearings of this element however on poetry were not fully realised until the *Dhvanikāra* and *Ānandavardhana* came into the field and worked it up into their new system of *Dhvani*.

These new theorists headed by *Ānandavardhana* maintain that no system of Poetics like no system of Dramaturgy can ignore the moods feelings and sentiments as essential factors of poetry and must therefore find an important place for *Rasa* in its scheme. What was already established in the drama was taken over and systematically applied to poetry.

profoundly modifying as it did the entire conception of Kāvya. The Rasa came to be considered as the essence of poetry, and in order to harmonise it in the poetic theory the new school evolved a theory of suggestion or *Vyāñjana* as the means of its expression.¹ At the same time not fully satisfied with the working up of the concept of Rasa into their system the new theorists devoted themselves to a re-examination of the already accumulated ideas of *Alaṅkāra* and *Riti* with a view to correlate them to the new theory of *Dhvani* and *Rasa* and thus by synthesis evolve a comprehensive scheme of poetics.

(The *Dhvani* school in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the content of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The one is that which is expressed and includes what is given in so many words whether directly explicit or metaphorically implicit, the other is not expressed but suggested *springing* immediately from that which is expressed. The unexpressed or suggested part which is not something vague but is distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is manifested by a peculiar power of suggestion (*vyāñjana*) inherent in word and sense is taken to be the essence of poetry.) To grammarians and learned writers it perhaps seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of poetry was that which was not even expressed. On the other hand, some form of symbolical speech in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words was always in vogue and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegory. But suggestive poetry according to the new theorists is something different from the merely metaphorical which Vamaṇa had already amply recognised and on which the *Alaṅkāra* and the *Riti* systems had placed so much emphasis. (The metaphorical or the allegoric however veiled is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such, but (the suggested is always unexpressed and is therefore a source

of the proper charm of poetry by its very capacity of concealment. The Dhvani school postulates that the unexpressed or inexpressible which is the soul of all good poetry is called into being by a particular function of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings.

But the unexpressed manifested by the suggestive power of sound and sense may be an unexpressed matter of fact (*vasu*) or an unexpressed imaginative mood (*alamkara*) but in most cases it is an emotional state which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani school therefore took up the poetic feelings and sentiments (*bhāva* and *rasa*) as an element of the unexpressed and thus tried to harmonise the concept of *Rasa* with the theory of *Dhvanī*. Ānandavardhana distinctly says in one place (*Dhvanyāloka* p. 163) that his object is not merely to establish *Dhvanī* but also to harmonise it with *Rasa* already recognised in dramatic theory by Bharata and others. It was realised that poetry was not as Dandin thought the mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable words. Feelings and sentiments also play an important part in it. But the feelings and sentiments are in themselves inexpressible. We can give a name to them but naming a feeling or sentiment is not equivalent to manifesting it. At best therefore we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or communicate is not the feeling itself but the ground of the feeling or its excitant and attendant circumstances. With the help however of these expressed elements which must be generalised and conceived not in a personal (*laukika*) but in an impersonal (*alaukika*) form the poet can awaken in us through their inherent suggestive power a particular impersonal condition of the mind in which the relish of the natural feeling is possible as a poetic sentiment. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same feeling as for instance Rama whom he describes felt but by the suggestive power of the expressed circumstances of Rama his conduct and his associate the poet can call up a reflection of it and evoke in the reader's mind a similar mental condition in which the reader identifies

the predominant implicit factor, the outward expression being important as a means of pointing to this implicit significance. The analysis is comprehensive enough to include in its scope descriptive, ornamental as well as emotional poetry, but it is also perceived, if not directly stated that the emotional mood which the poet succeeds in suggesting to the reader's mind in the form of that delectable subjective condition of impersonalised enjoyment which is called *Rasa*, is of the highest importance in poetry. In a complete scheme no doubt, the *vastu dhvani* and the *alamkara dhvani*, tacitly recognised by older writers and practised by the poets, must also be justified and the *Dhvani* school could not at least from the standpoint of theoretic consistency, definitely make the suggestion of *Rasa* the exclusive end of poetry. But the central question to which attention is devoted by the school is as to how a composition should help the *Rasa* to expression, for it is repeatedly laid down that neither mere embellishment nor mere narrative but the suggestion of poetic sentiment should be the guiding principle of the poet in his composition of word and sense. In other words the school practically, if not theoretically, recognises that the *Rasa* should be the centre of gravity towards which everything else in a poem—*vastu riti*, *guna doṣa* and *alamkara*—should move, and stress coming to be laid upon the underlying poetic sentiment, the suggestion of *Rasa* came to prevail over other kinds of suggestion. The *Dhvanikāra* and *Ānandavardhana*, no doubt, wisely refrained from going into the extreme position of such later writers as *Viśvanātha* who regard the suggestion of the emotional mood to be the exclusive end of poetry even to the extent of ignoring the imaginative and the realistic, but the attitude of the *Dhvani* school towards the importance of *Rasa* tends practically towards such a proposition and probably inspires the later theorists to a further development of the theory out of itself into the inevitable extreme thesis that the *Rasa* alone is the essence of poetry. One of the triumphs of the new school was indeed the admission of the old idea

exponents of older traditions who appear to have been untouched by the implications of the Dhvani theory and stood apart in many respects from the school of Ānandavardhana. Able as they were, these attempts languished for want of support, and the more or less complete scheme of Poetics outlined in the *Dhvanyaloka* which wanted to harmonise and bring into a definite focus the scattered ideas of previous speculation, was worked out in detail by Mammata and his followers and was ultimately standardised as the finally dominant scheme. The success of Mammata's work was indeed so complete that the authority of the Dhvani school came to be unquestionably accepted by most later writers and the systems which emerged after Mammata could no longer be strictly regarded as entirely independent systems.)

(It will be seen from what is said above that the divergent currents of thoughts and tendencies in Sanskrit Poetics flowing in different directions through many centuries ultimately ran into one clear and dominant stream in the classical work of Mammata. In the progress of the discipline the Alamkara school proposed to confine itself to a theory of embellishment of expression consistently with what was probably the original tradition of the Śāstra, while the Riti school laid stress on the objective beauty of expression realised by means of diction which consisted of a harmonious combination of certain fixed literary excellences. The Rasa school, however starting with the consideration of the drama was responsible for introducing into poetic theory the subjective element of Rasa represented by feelings and sentiments. The Dhvani school headed by Ānandavardhana admitted the underlying truth of all these doctrines but elaborated a peculiar theory of suggestion in poetry, including the suggestion of Rasa to which all other poetic factors were correlated. It will be seen that a relative emphasis was laid by each of these schools on the different elements of Alamkara Riti (including Guna and Doṣa) Rasa and Dhvani.

respectively, and the currents of speculation thus flowed in different directions. It was however realised in the end that all these gleams of thought should be gathered into a focus and all these currents should be made to flow into one stream (Indeed one of the obvious objects of Anandavardhana's work was not only to define and establish the concept of *Dhvanī* in poetry but also to work up and rationalise into a synthetic and comprehensive system these accumulated ideas of his great predecessors.) A final and authoritative shape was given to Anandavardhana's work by Mammata who gathered up the results and uttered them in the convenient and concise form of a systematic text book.)

(The work was however destined to be more than a mere text book. It came to dominate the thoughts of generations of theorists and eclipsed by its thorough and systematic exposition even the masterly work of Anandavardhana on which it was chiefly based.) No doubt Jagannatha one of the latest but not the least important writers on Poetics speaks of the *Dhvanīkara* and Anandavardhana as the *ālamkārika saram vyavasthāpaka* inasmuch as the tentative efforts of earlier thinkers and the accumulated stock of recognised ideas are brought together and rationally adjusted in their work in a more or less complete system (but it was due greatly to the influence of Mammata that this *ālamkāra-saram* was finally standardised and raised to almost exclusive authority.) The period which followed is necessarily a stage of scholastic elaboration. With regard to matters of general theory or the main problems the majority of the post *dhvanī* writers who accept the final determination of Mammata as almost canonical find nothing that is new to set forth. they consequently fall back upon matters of detail which helped to satisfy their growing scholastic bent for fine distinctions and endless analysis. Here and there we come indeed across a few writers who do not entirely sacrifice independent thinking and sometimes we find a few isolated and straggling followers of the older school but most of the writers who come after

Mammata display indeed great scholastic acumen but hardly any remarkable originality or creative genius. It is also the age of numberless commentators and commentators on commentators who busied themselves with the hardly inspiring task of explanation, expansion or restriction of the already established rules and formulas. We have also the rise of a number of popular writers and text book makers who wanted to codify the discipline or simplify it for general enlightenment the lowest stage being reached when we come to numerous manuals and school books of comparatively recent times.

It is important however to note that even accepting in the main the general position of the Dhvani theorists some of the writers of the new school headed by Mammata are yet not entirely free from the influence of older schools. In spite of his adherence and support of the Dhvani theory Mammata himself could not for instance explicitly state *kavyasyatma dhvanir it* (that the soul of poetry is Dhvani) and he betrays a willingness to include compositions devoid of Dhvani within the meaning of the term *kavya*. He accepts after Ānandavardhana the great importance of Rasa in poetry but his well known definition of poetry *īd a-doṣaṃ śabdārthan saḡuṇa vanatamkṛtī punaḥ kvaṇī* (poetry consists in word and sense devoid of defects and possessing the excellences and sometimes devoid also of poetic figures) follows the time honoured custom of starting with Śabda and Artha and mentioning the Guṇa Doṣa and Alambhāra without however explicitly including Rasa as well as Dhvani. In the same way Ruyyaka follows Udbhata and Kuntaka extensively in the principle as well as the detailed analysis of poetic figures a question which was left untouched by the Dhvanikara and Ānandavardhana who had either dismissed the poetic figures as mere *vāg vikalpas* or considered them only as heightening the charm of the unexpressed in poetry. Viśvanātha again in declaring that poetry consists of a sentence of which the soul is Rasa betrays the unmistakable influence of the Rasa school and maintains the extreme position

regarding the exclusive essentiality of *Rasa dhvani* which was practically meant but wisely left unsaid by the authors of the *Dhvanyaloka*. Even one of the latest and most thoughtful writers of this group Jagannatha revives in a new form the old definition of poetry given by Dandin. This reactionary tendency is interesting as indicating that these post *dhvani* writers were not unconscious of the importance of earlier views and it cannot be said that even though they accept the authority of the *Dhvanyaloka* they are yet entirely content with its clear cut scheme. Rightly or wrongly they attempt to bring back old ideas in the elaboration of the new, and it is difficult for this reason to take these writers in a lump and affiliate them directly to the *Dhvani* school. It is better therefore to call them post *dhvani* writers who naturally recognise the new concept of *Dhvani* but who cannot be regarded as out and out supporters of all the details of the theory. It is also remarkable that most of these writers attempt to arrive at a precise definition of poetry a task which was left alone by the *Dhvanikara* but in doing so they probably meant to find out a comprehensive formula which would cover the old ideas as well as the new although it must be said that they succeed less often than they involve themselves in hopeless theoretical inconsistencies.

It is not surprising therefore that from the purely theoretical point of view Mammaṭa's definition of poetry was subjected to much criticism although his critics were writers whose own definitions were not entirely above such criticism. Viśvanatha, for instance, undoubtedly takes Mammaṭa's work as the basis (*upanyya*) of his own but begins his *Sāhitya darpana* with a vigorous attack on Mammaṭa's definition. He points out in the first place that the *Gunas* being merely properties of *Rasa* should not have been logically included in the definition of essentials which omits even a mention of the essential *Dhvani* and *Rasa*. In the same way no mention even negative

should have been made of the Doṣas in the definition. He holds that if faultless compositions alone are to be called poetry then some of the best poems will have to be given up inasmuch as it is almost impossible to keep clear of blemishes. Nor can it be said that faults mar only those particular words or their meanings in which they occur. For if they are faults at all bearing relation to the underlying sentiment in the composition they must mar the whole poem. Lastly he maintains that no reference even if negative to poetic figures ought to have been made in the definition as they are admittedly non essential. Jagannatha's criticism is more fundamental although he agrees with Viśvānatha as to the impropriety of including a reference to Guṇa Doṣa and Alarīkāra in the definition. He objects that a word and its sense are not what is denoted by poetry, for the universal experience that a poem may appeal without its meaning being understood shows clearly that a particular kind of Subdā alone constitutes poetry. Artha being secondary. If it is said that the essence of poetry lies in its capability of awakening a sentiment (Rasa) and inasmuch as a word and its sense possess this capability both constitute poetry then it may be replied that according to this too wide view musical tones and theatrical gestures will have to be called poetry. Some of these and other arguments appear no doubt fastidious and pedantic and have been met with equal ingenuity by the commentators and supporters of Mammaṭa but the whole controversy indicates not only the futility of arriving at a precise logical definition of poetry but also the difficulty of combining all the conventional elements in such a definition. The authors of the *Dhvanyaloka* probably realised this and carefully avoided the task for they content themselves with describing its general nature and its divisions an omission on which Mahimabhaṭṭa ridicules him by saying *kīṃ ca kavyaṣya svarūpaṃ vyutpādayitūkarurā matimatā jalolajagata eva sāmānjanyamlekṣyeta vyanṭi*

— But from what we have said above it will be clear that the apparent inconsistencies of Mammata's definition which are to be explained by a reference to the views of older schools are interesting from the historical point of view. They indicate the lurking regard which Mammata, belonging as he does to the new school, possesses for the views of such older theorists as Vamana. No doubt Mammata severely criticises and rejects Vamana's theory and classification of Riti, but the mention of Guna, Doṣa and Alamkāra in the definition apparently indicates that he would like to take them after Vamana as properties of Śabda and Artha and not of Rasa which is omitted from the definition. At the same time he defines the Guna and Doṣa as well as the Alamkāra later on in terms of their relation to Rasa, a procedure which is hardly justifiable if the essentiality of Rasa is not declared in the definition. On the other hand if it is maintained that Rasa is too well known and established a fact in poetry to require explicit mention, then the prominence of threefold suggestion and the division of poetry on its basis becomes inexplicable. The fact that Mammata accepts the Citra-kāvya (which develops no Rasa or Dhvani) grudgingly admitted by Anandavardhana and rejected by Viśvanatha, also indicates probably his unconscious leanings to the views of the Alamkāra school which were in conflict with his theoretical acceptance of the Dhvani doctrine in regard to the essentiality of Dhvani and Rasa.

(There can be no doubt, however, that in spite of such inconsistent attempts to incorporate the old stock of ideas Mammata comprehends both Dhvani and Rasa in his scheme by implication as well as by express treatment. Following up his definition Mammata begins with the discussion of the functions of śabda and artha incidentally establishing the function of suggestion (vyangjana) and the superiority of the suggested sense (vyangya artha or dhvani) and divides poetry into three classes viz. Dhvani, Gumbhata-vyangyā and Citra in relation to the suggested sense. This leads him to enumerate and exemplify

the various subdivisions of the three classes of poetry and in this connexion dilate upon the nature and theory of *Rasa* which is included in the scope of what is called the suggestion of imperceptible process (*asamlakṣya krama vyangya*) In this context he examines and rejects the views of Lolāta Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nayaka all of whom are said to have commented on Bharata's theory of *Rasa* and accepts the *vyākṛti vāda* which he ascribes to Abhinavagupta the great commentator on Anandavardhana's work as well as on Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra* Mention is made of the eight orthodox dramatic *Rasas* but the ninth the *Śānta* or the Quietistic sentiment is added apparently as relevant to poetry even if inadmissible in the drama

Mammaja then proceeds to discuss the *Guna* and the *Doṣa* not in relation directly to *śabda* or *Artha* as his definition would imply but in relation to the *r* subserviency or otherwise to the awakening of *Rasa dhvani* The *Gunas* as excellences of composition are interpreted not after Vamana but after Anandavardhana in a new sense and are brought into effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a work as qualities which serve to awaken and heighten its charm The verbal form of a work the expressed *śabda* and *Artha* cannot be said to possess the quality of energy or sweetness unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is vigorous or sweet The *Gunas* therefore may be taken as properties of *śabda* and *Artha* only in a secondary sense (*upacāra*) but they are in reality intimately related to *Rasa* even as virtues like heroism do not reside in the body but in the soul of man The verbal form the mere sound and sense produces the excellences only as a means or instrument the real cause is the *Rasa* just as the soul is the true cause of virtues like heroism in a man The same consideration applies also but more strongly to the case of the so-called poetic figures (*ālambanik rasas*) and their place in poetry should be justified only by their relation to *Rasa* They are likened to ornaments on a man's body as embellishments they adorn words and

meanings which constitute the 'body' of poetry. They thus serve to embellish indirectly, through word and sense, the underlying 'soul' of sentiment, but they do not do this invariably. If there is no Rasa they resolve into mere strikingness of expression (*ukti vaicitrya*), but even sometimes when the Rasa is existing they do not help it. In other words, it is maintained that the poetic figures can exist without the Rasa in the form of charming turns of expression, and even when the Rasa is present, they are not invariably necessary.

It should also be noted that Mammaṭa accepts, after Ānandavardhana, only three Gunas and maintains that combination of particular letters signifies particular Gunas. Thus, the three Ritis of Vāmana are resolved into three Gunas defined by himself, and the letters whose particular arrangements produce these three Gunas being almost the same as those given by Udbhaṭa respectively for his three Vṛttis (viz. Upanāgarikā, Paruṣā and Komalā). Udbhaṭa's three Vṛttis are roughly approximated to his own three Gunas. In this connexion Mammaṭa demonstrates with some care that it is not necessary to accept the sets of ten śabda-gunas and ten Artha-gunas of Vāmana, but that it is enough if we postulate three comprehensive literary excellences, viz., Ojas (energy), Prasāda (lucidity) and Mādhurya (sweetness). It is shown by a critical examination of Vāmana's Gunas that some of them can very well be included in the three defined above, that some discharge the same functions as the recognised poetic figures, that some constitute mere absence of defects while others are sometimes positive defects. Thus, Vāmana's Śleṣa, Samādhī and Udārātā are comprehended by Mammaṭa's Ojas, Vāmana's Arthavyakti is an aspect of Mammaṭa's Prasāda but it corresponds also to the Svabhāvokti Alankāra of Daṇḍin, Vāmana's Samatā, consisting of a certain uniformity of diction, is sometimes a fault, while Vāmana's Saukumārya and Kānti defined respectively as freedom from harshness (or inauspiciousness) and vulgarity is simply the reverse of such

defects as *Śruti kṣaṭa* and *Śruti duṣṭa*. These considerations simplify the classification of the *Gunas* and put a limit to their endless multiplication or differentiation such as one finds for instance in Bhoja's elaborate scheme of 24 *Gunas*. Mammaja therefore thinks that the distinction between *śabda-guna* and *artha-guna* is meaningless and the old differentiation resting on a mere adjustment of sound and sense should be superseded. As the *Guna* is an invariable property of the *Rasa* the mental condition involved in the relish of a sentiment should alone justify all classification of *Gunas*. Such a position warrants the acceptance of only three (and not two sets of ten *Gunas*) which are brought into intimate relation to the principal sentiment of a composition. Thus the *Ojas* is supposed to cause a brilliant expansion (*viśāra*) of the mind and resides in the sentiments of heroism, horror and fury, the *Madhurya*, residing normally in the erotic sentiment of love-in-union but also appropriate to and residing in successive degree in pathos, calm and love in separation is regarded as causing a softening of the heart (*drutī*), while the *Prasāda* proper to all the poetic sentiments is taken as the cause of a quick apprehension of the sense extending over the mind at once (*vyapti* or *vikāsa*) like a stream of water over a cloth or like fire on dry fuel. The three conditions of the mind viz. expanding, pervading and melting which accompany the different poetic sentiments are thus made the basis of the three *Gunas*, and even if these mental states are sometimes mixed up and lead to other mental conditions these latter effects are too many and too complex to be taken as the basis of further multiplication of fresh *Gunas*. This exposition of Mammaja follows and expands *Dhyanaloka* ii. 8-11, but it is possible that the original hint of association of these three mental conditions with the three *Gunas* was supplied by Bhaṭṭa Nayaka who speaks of the enjoyment of *Rasa* as being characterised by the mental states of expansion (*viśāra*), pervasion (*vikāsa*) and melting (*drutī*). Viśvanātha substantially agrees with

this view of Mammata but he objects that the Ojas etc are not the causes of but identical with the process of expansion etc

In his discussion of the defects (Doṣas) of poetry Mammata admits defects of words of sentences of meaning as well as of Rasa. But he prefaces this chapter of his work by the statement that since Rasa is the principal thing in poetry the defects of Rasas are the principal defects. The Rasa however depends upon the expressed word sentence and meaning the defects of these are also in reality defects of the Rasa. In other words the Doṣa like the Guna should be considered in poetry mainly in relation to the underlying sentiment. Although the poetic figures are are not in Mammata's opinion always necessary to poetry he yet rounds off his treatise with an elaborate analysis and illustration of figures of sound and sense (including a limited number of figures which are both of sound and sense) enumerating as many as sixty seven independent poetic figures. Here he accepts implicitly Kuntaka's principle of analysis of the poetic figures and applies it for the most part to the detailed examination of individual figures a procedure which is followed also by Ruṣṣaka Viśvanātha Appayya Dikṣita and Jagannātha. This topic was left untouched by the authors of the *Dhvanyaloka* but the principle which Kuntaka enunciated in his able analysis of poetic expression gained ground in later times and Mammata tacitly acknowledges that the elements which go to make up the being of a poetic figure consist of a peculiar turn of charming expression called *Vaicitrya* or *Vicchitti viśeṣa* and the peculiar conception of the poet which brings into existence the peculiar charm (*kavi pratibhā nirvartitvatva*).

{ From this brief and rapid summary of the principal topics of Mammata's work it will be seen that its value consists not in its originality but in the orderly concise and clear discussion of the main issues of Sanskrit Poetics and his definition as well as his general treatment attempts to cover almost all the

field of thought traversed by his predecessors. He quotes more than six hundred verses from various poets to illustrate his doctrines, and shows himself familiar with the works of almost all the distinguished writers on Poetics who preceded him. The great popularity and authority which the *Kāvya-prakāśa* has always enjoyed and which is indicated by the large number of commentaries on it, must be explained as due not to any creative genius or remarkable novelty of treatment, but to the systematic and lucid (albeit obscurities due to extreme brevity of exposition, necessitating commentaries) working out of the already recognised stock of ideas in the light of the new scheme put forward in the *Dhvanyāloka*.

Although exact dates cannot be determined it is possible to fix approximately the period of time in which Mammata flourished. The lower limit may be fixed with reference to two commentaries on the *Kāvya prakāśa*. The *Samiketa* commentary of Mamkyaçandra who belonged to the Kojika gana Vajraśakha, Rājagaccha of Guzerat, is expressly dated in Sathvat 1216 = circa 1159 A.D. The exact date of the other commentary, also called *Samiketa* by Ruyyaka is not known but we can ascertain from other sources that Ruyyaka probably flourished in the second and third quarters of the 12th century A.D. Mammata therefore cannot be placed later than the middle of the 12th century. The upper limit is more difficult to settle. But the nearest predecessor whom Mammata quotes is the Kashmirian Abhinavagupta who must have been still living in 1015 A.D., as this date is borne by his *Brhat Vṛtti* on the *Īvara pratyañipya*. Mammata also quotes from the *Nava sahasanka carita* of Padmagupta Paramala, a protégé of the kings of Dhara first of Muñja Vakpatiraja and then of his successor Sindhuraja at whose direction the poem appears to have been written within the first decade of the 11th century. In an illustrative verse (on the figure Udatta in chapter x) Mammata also refers to the liberality of Bhoja to learned men. This Bhoja is identified with the well known Paramara king Bhoja of Dhara the son and successor of Śa

dhuraja and nephew of Munja Vakpatiraja as well as the reputed author of *Sarasyatī kanṣhabharana*. It is curious however that in spite of his extensive references to his predecessors Mammaja does not appear to refer to this well known work on Sanskrit Poetics but this omission may have been due to the fact that Bhoja paid no allegiance to the Kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana. If, however the verse in question refers to Bhoja of Dhara who himself had literary predilections and was a patron of learned men then it would indicate that Mammaja could not have flourished earlier than Bhoja. Bhoja could not have ruled beyond 1055 A.D. From all these considerations we can roughly place Mammaja in the period between the middle of the 11th and the middle of the 12th century A.D. Allowing two generations to intervene between him and his commentator Ruyyaka we can approximately assign Mammaja's activity to the last quarter of the 11th and the commencement of the 12th century.

Mammaja's name itself and his title Rajanaka as well as Kashmirian tradition indicate that he probably belonged to Kashmir. A very late commentator Bhimasena in his *Sudhasagara* or *Subodhini* commentary (date in Samvat 1779 = 1722-23 A.D.) on the *Kavya prakāsa* informs us that Mammaja was the son of Jayyaja and had two brothers Kayyaja and Uvaja of whom Uvaja is taken to be the well known commentator on Vedic works. But this story is doubtful as Uvaja himself tells us that his father's name was Vajraja and not Jayyaja. The story relied upon by Hall and Weber that Mammaja was the maternal uncle of the author of the *Naiṣadha* may similarly be relegated to the region of fantastic fables which often gather round famous names.

The *Kavya prakāsa* has the appearance of a compact treatise which is carefully planned and systematically worked out but the unity has been called in question and enough evidence has been brought forward to show that *Kāṭika* and *Vṛtti* of nearly the whole work was indeed composed by Mammaja but

a small portion of the last chapter probably left incomplete by him was completed by another author whose name is given as *Alaka Alaja* or *Aliaja*. It is not necessary for us to enter here into the details of the question of the joint authorship of the *Kavya prakāśa* but it is now generally accepted on the indications given by some of Mammaja's commentators as well as by some manuscripts of his work that Mammaja composed the *Kavya prakāśa* up to the treatment of the figure *Parikara* (x 32), but the rest consisting of a small portion of the concluding chapter was composed by the author mentioned above. That the fact of joint authorship is skilfully concealed is supposed to have been alluded to in the concluding verse given in some manuscripts which apparently says that 'this way of the learned men different yet appearing identical is not strange for here the only cause is a properly constructed plan of combination'. It is possible to explain this statement as meaning that the work claims the credit of having skilfully removed by its systematic plan all conflict of opinions held by different authors on Poetics but most commentators early as well as late agree in finding here a hint implying that the work left incomplete by Mammaja was completed by some other person and that traces of joint authorship are cleverly obliterated. This view is distinctly expressed by an early commentator like Ruyyaka who himself a Kashmirian and living at a period not very remote from Mammaja must have been recording a well known tradition and in this view he is followed by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Someśvara, Narahari, Sarasvatītiṛtha, Kamalakara, Ānanda, Jayneśvara and other early as well as late commentators while some manuscripts of the *Kavya prakāśa* record the tradition in the colophon by mentioning the names of Mammaja and Alaja as joint authors. Rajanaka Ananda also a Kashmirian commentator is however more explicit and quotes a traditional verse which records Mammaja's authorship up to the topic of *Parikara Alakāśikara* (x 32) and attributes the rest to Alaja, *Aliaja* or *Alaka*.

This statement about the dual authorship of the *Kāvya prakāśa* receives confirmation from an independent source but the reference would indicate that Allāṣa had a hand not only in the 10th as the above tradition makes out but also in the 7th chapter of the work which deals with the topic of Doṣa. For this chapter on Doṣa nīrnaya is cited by Arjunavarmadeva who flourished in the first quarter of the 13th century in his commentary on the *Amaru śataka* with a distinct attribution of this chapter to Mammaṭa and Alakā or Alakṣa. Arjunavarman's remark while quoting the verse *prasāde vartasva* from *Kāvya prakāśa* vii 14 is clear enough *yathodahṛtam doṣa nīrnaye mammataalakabhyam* and it is not possible to take it as implying a general reference to the fact of joint authorship without particularly meaning collaboration of any special chapter. This has led some scholars to find traces of collaboration of Allāṣa in other parts of the work also but the question still awaits a thorough and careful examination.

Some late Bengal commentators among whom Mahāśvara Nyayalambikara is one would impute the authorship of the *Kārikā* (here called *Sūtra*) portion of the *Kāvya prakāśa* to Bharata and the prose *Vṛtti* alone to Mammaṭa while Bharata himself is said to have drawn upon the *Alamkāra* section of the *Agni purāṇa*. While the last assertion about the *Agni purāṇa* has no foundation in fact and is apparently prompted by the amiable but unhistorical imagination of later writers which delights in exalting the antiquity and authority of *Purāṇas* in general the suggestion of Bharata's authorship of the *Kārikas* is too unauthentic and fanciful to be accepted. Apart from the fact that the evidence of the text itself goes directly against such a supposition Mammaṭa's authorship of the *Kārikas* in general has been declared by Hemacandra in the first quarter of the 12th century and has been accepted by a series of important authors. The source of this tradition is probably the great reverence paid to the sage Bharata but it

may also be due to the fact that Mammata himself has made considerable use of Bharata's dicta as he has also drawn extensively upon Bhāmaha Vamana Udbhaṭa Rudraṭa and the *Dhvanyaloka* even to the extent of sometimes directly appropriating or paraphrasing well known passages or illustrative verses.

That the work of Mammata was studied extensively in Bengal is indicated not only by the popular printed commentary of Maheśvara Nyayalamkāra Bhāṭṭācārya but also by a large number of commentaries written by well known writers of Bengal which have not yet been printed. Among Bengal commentators one may mention the names of Jagadīśa Tarkapānānana Bhāṭṭācārya (*Rahasya prakāśa*) Gṛadadhara Cakravartin Bhāṭṭācārya (*Ṭīkā*) Jayarama Nyayapānānana (*Tilaka* or *Jayaram*) Devanātha Tarkapānānana (*Kavya kaumudī*) Ramanātha Vidyavācāspatī (*Rahasya prakāśika*) and Śrīkr̥ṣṇa Śarmaṇ (*Rasa prakāśa*) the last of whom describes Nyayalamkāra author of the *Adarśa* (i.e. Maheśvara Nyayalamkāra) as his Guru. Baladeva Vidyabhūṣaṇa the well known writer on Bengal Vaiṣṇavism also wrote a commentary on the *Kavya prakāśa* entitled *Sahitya kaumudī* but he belonged to Orissa and wrote under the patronage of Gajapati Prataparudra of Orissa. And yet Maheśvara Nyayalamkāra laments

काव्यप्रकाशस्य कृता गृहे गृहे

टीका तथाप्येव नर्धनं दुर्गमम् ।

The *Kavya prakāśa* has not been so often printed in Bengal as it has been in other provinces of India where it is perhaps much more extensively studied. For in Bengal Viśvanātha's *Sahitya darpaṇa* appears to be a more popular text book. But it certainly deserves wider circulation and study in Bengal not only as a brilliant text book but also as one of the most remarkable classic works on Sanskrit Poetics.

‘MĀLĀ TU PURVAVAT’


In an article with the above heading (which is itself a quotation from Mammaṭa's *Kāvya prakāśa* x 8b) in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute*,¹ Mr Divekar attempts to throw doubt on the interpretation of most commentators of Mammata that the word *pūrvavat* in this Kārikā refers to *mālopanū* which, though not mentioned before in any of the Kārikās, is dealt with in the Vṛtti on x 4b. The interpretation referred to is of some importance. It implies that the figure *mālā rūpaka* follows the rule laid down for the figure *mālopanū* but since *mālopanū* is not taught in any of the previous Kārikās and is explained only in Vṛtti on a previous occasion, the reference apparently indicates that the Kārikā and the Vṛtti of the *Kāvya prakāśa* must be taken *en bloc* as the work of one and the same author.² The passage, therefore, has been taken as supporting the tradition of the identity of the Kārikākāra and the Vṛttikāra of the *Kāvya prakāśa*. Mr Divekar, however, thinks that the word *pūrvavat* does not refer to *mālopanū* which is not to be found in immediate context nor in any preceding Kārikā, but to the *sāṅga-nurāṅga bheda* mentioned in the very line of which the quotation forms a part. The doubt raised is legitimate, and the suggestion is indeed striking, but there are difficulties in accepting the solution proposed by Mr Divekar of the whole problem.

Mammaṭa is dealing in the context with *rūpaka* and its classification, and it is necessary to consider his treatment in some detail in order to understand the bearing of the passage in question. Defining *rūpaka* in x 7a Mammata

1 Vol. vi, pt. I (1925), p. 50f.

2 See S. K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics*, i p. 166.

etc on *prīya* in the illustration of *mala* given in the text¹. The classification discussed may then be tabulated as follows



Now, from what has been said above it is clear that *malā rūpaka* can in its nature be only *nirāṅga*, for here the successive superimpositions on one object have not the relation of principal and subordinate metaphorical representations. As explained by Nagoji Bhatta in his *Uddyota* commentary *ekaviśaya nana-padartharopa rūpatvan malatvam paraspara sapekṣatva virahac ca nirāṅgatvam itī tad arihah*². Now such serial representation of one *upameya* with successive *upamānas* may take the form either of a simile (*upamā*) or of a metaphor (*rūpaka*) according as there is *bheda* or *abheda* between the properties of the *upameya* and the *upamānas*, but the two figures are essentially of the same nature in having successive representations (in the one case under similitude in the other under metaphorical superimposition) of one *upameya* in connection with successive *upamānas*. This is what Mammata wants apparently to

1 It is conceivable that there may be successive superimpositions on successive objects standing in the relation of principal and subordinate thus in this case each metaphor can be taken separately and be considered as such.

2 Ed Chandorkar 1915 *Ullāsa* r p 34. Similarly Cakravartin quoted by Vamanācārya (*Kavya* pr ed 1917 p 599) says *m (=malā) ca nirāṅga-rūpā rūpyamananam angugibhāva yarahāt*. Commenting on the example of *mālā rūpaka* given by Mammata. Maṅkyaśandra (ed Anandāśrama p 234) says *atra prīyā rūpa eka eva-ropa-viśayo mukī dī jagat r vīnā tarangayadyat rūpāt itī nirāṅgam*.

indicate by the word *pūrvavat* in the Kārikā viz. that the *mala rūpaka* which is one of the sub-divisions of *niranga-rūpaka* is of the same type as the *mūlopanāḥ*¹. In other words the term *pūrvavat*, considered in this light, implies that, as there is in *mūlopanāḥ* a connection through similitude, of one *upameya* with successive *upamānas*, so in *mālā rūpaka* there is a metaphorical superimposition of successive *upamānas* on one *upameya*. And yet Mammata is not presumably justified in referring to *mūlopanāḥ* which he has not defined in any previous Kārikā. The *mūlopanāḥ*, however, is dealt with in the Vṛtti on x 4b. The conclusion, therefore is forced that Mammata is referring to his own Vṛtti where he has already dealt with *mūlopanāḥ*, unless the word *pūrvavat* can be shown to refer to something else in the same or in some previous Kārikā. Let us now see that other interpretation Mr. Divekar has to offer for the much discussed word *pūrvavat*.

In the light of what is said above, we should translate the line in question as follows. This (twofold division is called) *saṅga* or entire², but the *niranga* or partless metaphor³ is single also serial (which is) as before (i. e., as in the case of

1 This is made clear by the Vṛtti on the passage which says *mūlopanāḥam iva ekasmin bahava āropatāḥ* where *mūlopanāḥam* is clearly a commentary on the word *pūrvavat*. It is not correct to presume that 'the Vṛttikāra generally quotes the words of the Kārikākāra when he gives the meanings in the 'vṛtti' for one need not go far but merely point out that the Vṛtti on *saṅgam* etc. paraphrases every word of the Kārikā without repeating the original words.

2 In the absence of better terms, I borrow the terms entire and partless from Chandekar's rendering of the text.

3 See *Pradīpa* ed NSP 1912, p 329. It is noteworthy that the *Pradīpakāra* whom Mr. Divekar quotes as his authority on this point explains the Kārikā in question as referring to *mūlopanāḥ* by the word *pūrvavat yathākatra bahupamāna-yoge mūlopanāḥ yathākatrāneka-dharmarope mala rūpakam ity arthah*. On this Vaidyanātha remarks *etad eva sūtra vṛtti kṛtor ekasme jñāpakaḥ mūlopanāḥ sūtranukūḍya vṛttaveva kathanaḥ*.

serial simile) Mr Divekar however translates the line somewhat differently. This is *sanga* an unmixed (*ri paka*) is however *niranga* but *mala rupaka* is similar to the former. He infers from this that the word *purva* which he translates as former refers to the division of *sanga* and *niranga* (and not presumably to *malopama*). He adds. If we translate as given above *mala rupaka* will have to be considered as *sanga* implying thereby that *purva* or former in this passage refers to *sanga*. This is no doubt a novel interpretation but it is untenable for it will be clear from the exposition given by us above that the *mala rupaka* in its very nature cannot be considered as *sanga*. Mr Divekar quotes the opinion of the Pradīpakara in support. No doubt the Pradīpakara apparently takes this view for commenting on this passage he states *atha sangasyaiva vaicitryan taram āha—mālā tu purvavat*. It appears however that the words *atha sangasya* must be taken as a misreading which is commented upon by Vaidyanātha Tātsal and Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa. Vaidyanātha appears to read instead *atīṣaṅgasya* (for *atīṣa saṅgasya*) and understands *a sānga* as *śuddha* adding *pīrva śabdenopama paramārśah*. Nāgoji goes further and discusses the reading thus *kvacit tu n rangasyaiveṣi pīṣi al ckaṇṣaya nandā padārtharopa rūpatvaṁ mālātvaṁ paraspāra supelkya viraṭ ac ca i rangatvaṁ iti tad arthah* *ayam eva yuktaḥ pīṣi ah*. He would therefore regard *nirāṅgasya* which he finds in some manuscripts to be the proper reading. Vamanacarya in his learned edition of *Kavya prakāśa* (3rd ed 1917 p 599) agrees with this view and remarks *m lī rūpa n n rangam darśayati—mālā tviti ata eva hūh prāñcah—nirāṅgasyaiva vaicitryan taram mālā tviti' iti pradīpe tu atīṣa sāṅgasyaiva vaicitryan taram ala mālā tu pūrvavat nyuktam tad upapattis tuddhote nāgojibhaṭṭaṁ yati ākñhamcit krieti totaiva draṣṭavyeṭy alam asura granīṣa vicāreṇa*. It cannot be determined whether this is slip on the part of Pradīpakara otherwise a very careful and discerning writer or a mere misreading (as Nāgoji's remarks would indicate).

which subsequently crept in. It is clear however that the reading *sanga* of the Pradīpakara has not escaped the notice of commentators on the text and should be considered as incorrect, and nothing is gained by relying on a doubtful text. It may also be pointed out that all subsequent writers on Poetics who have taken Mammata more or less as authoritative have agreed in regarding *mala rūpaka* as *niranga* or *niravayava* and never as *sanga* or *savayava*. This appears to be the view of Ruyyaka (ed Nir Sae p 36 Vidyadhara (p 213) Vidyānātha (ed Bom Sansk Ser p 374) Viśvanātha (ed Durgaprasada 1915 p 495) and Jagannātha (ed Nir Sae p 233).

The difficulty about regarding *mala* as *sanga* was probably present before Mr. Divekar's mind for he adds: "If we now ever translate This is *saṅga* and *mala rūpaka* is as before *mala rūpaka* will be *niranga*." It must be confessed that this proposed alternative translation is far from clear but since *pūrvavat* appears to be translated by as before it may be concluded that Mr. Divekar means to imply that *pūrvavat* in this case does not refer to *sanga* (as in the other translation he has given) but to *niranga* so that *mala rūpaka* as he says should be classified as *niranga*. Having regard to the classification proposed by Mammata and his followers this explanation is certainly not open to serious objection but the difficulty in accepting this translation apart from its vagueness is that it would make the word *pūrvavat* redundant in the *karika* as it stands. If it were Mammata's intention only to say that *mala* like *buddha* is *niranga* it would have been enough for him to state *nirangam tu buddham mala ca*. There would be no need of adding *pūrvavat* after the word *mala* if the purpose was only to refer thereby to *niranga* which immediately precedes it in context. Even if it were supposed that the word *pūrvavat* is necessary for referring pointedly to *niranga* as distinguished from *sanga* occurring in the same line the term would not be happy for in that case applied to two successively mentioned things in the same

being composed by himself he was justified in making such a reference. At any rate, whatever may be the explanation of this procedure adopted by Mammata, one cannot, in the absence of any better interpretation of this passage, find any reason for not accepting the interpretation given by Mammata's innumerable commentators.

THE ŚANTA RASA IN THE NĀṬYA ŚĀSTRA AND THE DAŚA RŪPAKA

It is extremely doubtful if the *śanta* as *rasa* is at all accepted by Bharata for the genuineness of the portion of the text of the *Nāṭya śāstra* in which the mention of *śanta* as a *rasa* occurs is certainly not beyond question

In all the four editions of Bharata's work (Grosset Kavya mala Kashi and Gaekwad) the enumeration of only eight Rasas excluding the ninth *śanta* occurs at the outset of ch. vi and elaborate treatment of these eight Rasas with their corresponding *sthayins vibhavas* etc. their colour and deity follows. It may be noted that Kalidasa (*Vikram* ii 8) credits Bharata with the mention of eight (and not nine) Rasas. It is only in the Gaekwad edition that the text on *śanta* occurs at the end of ch. vi and speaks of *śanta* as the ninth *rasa*. This additional text on *śanta* is commented upon by Abhinavagupta and appears to have been known to Bhaṭṭa Nanyaka. Abhinava makes an elaborate attempt to meet the objections against *śanta* and establish it as a *Rasa*. He gives instances of Bharata's awareness of *śanta* but his arguments are based not upon Bharata's mention of it but upon his silence and are meant to explain why Bharata does not expressly speak of it as a *Rasa*.

In spite of the importance of *śanta* to which so much attention is devoted the insertion of the *śanta* text at the end of the chapter on *Rasa* is in itself suspicious even if this may not be put forward as a conclusive argument. Abhinava himself however admits that this is the reading not of all but of those who read that there are nine *rasas* (*ye punar nava rasu ti pajhanti tanmate* p. 333) implying that the Rasas are generally counted as eight but some old MSS (*cirantana pustakēṣu*) add a ninth. Elsewhere commenting upon Bharata's enumeration of eight Rasas and their corresponding *sthayins*

(p 267) Abhinava remarks that the opponents of *śanta* read eight (*santapalapinas tu aṣṭavite paṭhanti*) and that some read *viśmaya śamaḥ* (in the text of *sthāyin*) for *viśmayāś ceti*

On the other hand Abhinava adduces passages like *kvacic chomah* which indicate that Bharata had some knowledge of *sama* or *śanta* but it is also clear that the instances quoted only show Bharata's recognition of *śanta* as an element and they do not mean Bharata's acceptance of *śanta* as a Rasa. *śama* is not mentioned by him as one of the forty nine *bhavas*. Abhinava himself draws attention to the fact that Bharata's definition of the drama emphasises that it is *kṛīḍanaka prakhyā* and *vinoda-janana* and should therefore depict worldly matters from this point of view *santa* is *apradhana* and not the leading motif. Again Bharata gives *laya śvara guṇa alamkāra vṛtti* etc. of the eight Rasas only in several sections of his work but *śanta* is not mentioned in this connexion. He gives also musical *jaiyangas* suggestive of several Rasas but here also *śanta* is not mentioned (ch xxix 1-4). Abhinava notes that those who admit *śanta* read *svaccha* as its colour and the Buddha as its deity. But Dhanika states distinctly that Bharata did not characterise *śanta* as a Rasa by mentioning its *vibhavas* etc. As a matter of fact except what is stated in the interpolated text on the *śama* at the end of ch vi Bharata does not mention the aspects of *santa* and its attendant conditions.

A further argument may be added. Regarding the admission of *śanta* there has been no uniformity of opinion while its *sthāyi bhāva* has been enumerated divergently. Abhinava refers to various views which show that all are not agreed that *śanta* is its *sthāyin*. Among different *sthāyins* proposed we have *sarva-cittavṛtti prāśama samyag-jñāna nirveda nirviṣeṣa-cittavṛtti tṛṣṇā kṣaya sukha dhṛti utsaha jugupsā rati* any of the remaining *sthāyins* or all the eight *sthāyins* together. The non admission of *śanta* and the positing of various kinds of *sthāyin* for it perhaps indicate that Bharata whose authority is highly respected could not have definitely promulgated

śanta-rasa or its *sthāyin* and the divergence arose from the absence of his express authority in this matter. It is noteworthy that Abhinava (*Locana* ed NSP p. 176) remarks that it is Bharata's non mention of the *sthāyin* of *śanta* which leads Anandavardhana to formulate *irṣya kṣaya* as its *sthāyin*.

The objections against *śanta* are thus summarised but not discussed by the *Dattarupaka*. (1) Some say that there is no *śanta-rasa* because Bharata has not mentioned its *vibhava* etc. and therefore has not characterised it as he has done in the case of other Rasas. (2) Some entirely deny its *de facto* existence (*vastutas tasyabhavam varṇayanti*) because in their opinion men are eternally incapable of exterminating *raga* and *dveṣa* (*anadī kala pravahayata raga dveṣayoḥ ucchettum asakyaḥ*). (3) Some would include *śanta-rasa* in *vīra* and *bhāsa* apparently taking *utsaha* and *jagṛpsa* as its *sthāyin* respectively. (4) The real nature of *śanta* which is the total absence of all feeling and activity involves a state of inaction (*śamastā vyāpura vilaya rūpa*) which cannot be represented on the stage: the development of *śanta*, therefore is inadmissible in the drama (*puṣṭir nāstāya nāṭyegū*). The *Nāgananda* which is regarded by some as a *śanta* play is plainly not so because (a) the end here is not *śanta* but lordship over the Vidyadharas and (b) the attachment to Malayavati being antagonistic to the feeling of non attachment essential in *śanta* both cannot inhere in the same *alambana* namely *Jimutavahana*. The conclusion therefore is that the *vīra* (*i.e. dayā-vīra*) and *śṛṅgāra* are the Rasas in this play.

Dhananjaya himself would object to *śanta* only in the Nāṭya which requires the delineation of the Rasa through its *anubhavas* etc. but he would permit it in the Kāvya because what cannot be acted can at least be described. But his commentator Dhanika would not allow *śanta* even in poetry. There can be in his opinion no such *sthāyi-bhāva* as *śanta* or *nirveda* for the development of that state (if it is possible at all to destroy all feelings of love or hatred) would tend to

the absence of all feeling and action. Such a state is the very negation of the possibility of affirming anything about it and any description of it would be an inadequate description in worldly terms of what is unworldly. Dhanika would regard Jimutavahana as an *udatta* and not as a *śānta nayaka*. To the objection that Jimutavahana is depicted not as a conquering hero (*jigīṣu*) but as devoid of such a mental state he replies that *anulūṭya* as an excelling eminence of the mind is not lacking in Jimutavahana. *jigīṣu* or heroism need not be only of one variety of warlike attainment. One may conquer self and excel in *dayā dharma* or *tyāga*. Jimutavahana may not be a *yuddhāvira* but he is a *dayāvira*. Here the main Rasa being *vira* and not *śānta* he is certainly an *udatta nayaka* and *śṛṅgāra* being not incompatible with *vira* the episode of Malayavati is justifiable. Viśvanātha also takes Jimutavahana to be a *dayāvira* but very ingeniously he attempts to establish that *śānta* can be a Rasa because in that state the soul is about to be emancipated (*yukta vyukta dāsa*) and is not completely detached so that the presence of feeling and activity would not be incompatible while *sukha* is not entirely absent what is absent is the worldly *sukha*. The attainment of *sama* in his opinion does not imply cessation from all activity.

It is held therefore that the objections to the *śānta rasa* are not all valid. A *śānta* play is bound to appeal to persons of devout mind just in the same way as *śṛṅgāra* and *vira* plays appeal to men of a different attitude. It is bound to be uncommon but that does not disprove that it is capable of being depicted and relished while it is not true to say that men are eternally slaves to *ruga* and *dveṣa*. There has been a continuous stream of literature which depicts *śānta* as a Rasa. The non mention by Bharata is at best a technical and trifling objection. The objection that *śānta* can be easily included in *vira* and *bībhatsa* is misconceived. The *śānta* may involve *utsāha* or energy for spiritual attainment is not without effort but the two terms are not co extensive. There

may be *daya utsaha* *dharm utsaha* and so forth but *santa* comprehends many kinds of *utsaha* and is much more than mere *utsaha*. The *daya vira* and *dharm vira* are as Abhinava points out really two aspects of *santa* which covers a much wider field. The *santa* includes *daya* and *dharm* but is not included or exhausted by them. In the same way, *jugupsā* may be an accessory of *santa* but *santa* is not entirely *jugupsatmaka* ¹

Siddha bhārati Hoshiarpur 1950

1 The entire question is discussed fully by V. Raghavan in his *Number of Rasas* *Adya* (Madras) 1940

BHĀNUDATTA AUTHOR OF THE RASA MAÑJARĪ

In my *Sanskrit Poetics* : p. 249 a tentative approximation was made of the date of Bhanudatta author of *Rasa mañjarī*, *Rasa taranginī*, *Gīta gaurīśa*, *Kuñjara bhārgavīya* and other works to the period between the period between the 12th and the middle of the 14th century but it was indicated that the date was not beyond doubt. One passage however, of the *Rasa mañjarī* which was overlooked seems to throw fresh light on the question and enables us to fix Bhanudatta's date with a somewhat greater precision.

In one of the illustrative verses of the *Rasa mañjarī* which exemplifies the Sattvika Gunas¹ there is a description of such Gunas in a young girl at the sight of one *Nijama dharampala*². As the name of some other better known kings of antiquity might as well have served the purpose of the poet the mention of the Nizam in this verse is curious and cannot be dismissed easily as insignificant. It would not be improper to assume that here we have in the usual manner of Sanskrit poets an indirect compliment paid to a reigning sovereign whose patronage the poet probably enjoyed. If we can decide who this Nizam was our enquiry will be narrowed down to a considerable extent.

As a commentary on *Rasa mañjarī* called *Rasa mañjarī vikāśa* by Gopala (alias Vopadeva) son of Nṛsiṃha is expressly dated in 1572 A D³ it is clear that by the words

1 Called Sattvika Bhāvas by other writers.

2 Ed. Benares Skt. Series (1904) stanza 121 p. 232. The line in question runs thus : *taḥ kīṃ rāja-paṭhe nijama-dharampalaḥ yaṃ alokitaḥ*.

3 The verse which gives the date of composition is thus quoted by Stein (*Jammu Catalogue Extracts* p. 273)

śaṅḍya yā gaṇāḍī na veda-dharaṇi-gaṇye guro vatsare ḥ
mañjarīya tu vikāśa eṣa racita bhūvāt sarāṇi prapaye ||

nijama dharanipāla, the poet cannot refer to kings of the modern Nizam dynasty which dates from the comparatively recent time of Nizam ul mulk Asaf Khān. A probable clue to this problem is furnished by Ananta Pandita author of the *Vyangyārtha kaumudī* commentary (1636 A.D.) on *Rasa mañjarī* who explains the phrase in question as *nijamakhyo devagiri rajah*. If this interpretation is accepted¹ then the Nizam referred to would be a king of Devagiri whose name was Nizam. It is well known that Ahmad Nizam Shah obtained possession of Daulatabad (Devagiri) some time between 1499 and 1507 A.D. and founded the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Dekkan which continued in power till 1637 A.D.² The name Devagiri however, was changed to Daulatabad as early as 1339 A.D. when Muhammad Ibn Tughlaq removed his capital from Delhi to that place.³ The reference by Bhanudatta therefore seems to indicate a date at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century for the *Rasa mañjarī*.

Stein interprets *yuga randhra veda-dharan* as 1484 with a query but it really gives as 1494 (as corrected by Stein himself at p. 421). He thinks however that the Saka era is used so that the date of composition of the commentary would be 1438 A.D. But Sudhar Bhandarkar (*Report of Second Tour* 1904-6 p. 36) is probably right in holding that the Śaka era is used in which case the date of the commentary would be 1572 A.D. See *Sanskrit Poetics* I pp. 251-52.

1. Although Ananta Pandita is a fairly late writer belonging to the 17th century his native place was near Ahmadnagar (see *Sanskrit Poetics* I p. 251) and it is probable that his interpretation was based upon some current tradition for the older Nizam dynasty was all but extinct in his time. That the explanation is not a fanciful one is indicated by the fact that Ananta himself gives immediately afterwards another (and this time an obviously fanciful) interpretation of the passage applying it: *Śrīkṛṣṇa yad idā nijam aindryan amata prapnotti it nityamah sa caran dharan palah duhsaha-dānavadī v dāvakatīśa itī bhāvah etadrūpāh Śrīkṛṣṇa ty arthah* I.

2. Briggs *Ferishtah* II 200f.

3. Briggs *op cit* I 419.

It is somewhat surprising that Bhanudatta who describes Videha as his native place and represents the river Ganges flowing through his country¹ should eulogise a prince of Dekkan. It is possible that at some time or other of his career he might have come to the South. This would perhaps explain the fact of Bhanudatta's having more southern commentators than northern. The mislection *vidarbhabhuh* for *videhabhuh* in some manuscripts of *Rasa-manjari*² indicates probably some tradition which connected him with Vidarbha although this was not his native place.

B. N. Bhattacharya refers³ to a tradition among Bihar Pandits that Bhanudatta's father wrote a work called *Rasa-ratna-dīptikā*⁴, and that his grandfather Śaṅkara who wrote a commentary on Śiṅha's *Khandana-khanda-khadya* (ed. Pandit xiii 672) flourished about 1405 A.D. Although the date of Bhanudatta's grandfather does not seriously conflict with the date of Bhanudatta proposed by us the tradition does not agree with Bhanudatta's genealogy as given by himself in his *Kumara-bhāgaviya*⁵ which tells us that the name of his grandfather was Mahadeva and not Śaṅkara. In this genealogical account mention is made of one Sureśvara son of Ratneśvara who was an ancestor of Bhanudatta separated by six generations from himself and who wrote a *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya-varttika*. We need not identify with Eggeling⁶ this Sureśvara with the famous Sureśvara who was a disciple of Śaṅkaracarya for this would

¹ *deśa-janya videhabhuh sura-sarit kallola-karim i toh* stanza 138 p. 247

² *Sanskrit Poet. cs.* i p. 249 fn. 2

³ *Journal of the Dept. of Letters Cal. Univ.* ix 1923 p. 163

⁴ This is probably the work cited by Bhanudatta in his *Rasa-ratna-dīptikā* (ed. Granthamāla on i 31 ed. Renaud p. 44 l. 3rd). The remarks on this work at p. 245 of *Sanskrit Poet. cs.* now require correction.

⁵ *Sanskrit Poet. cs.* i p. 248

⁶ *Ind. A. Office Cat. of Sanskrit MSS.* v p. 1540 where the genealogical verses are quoted in full.

unwarrantably push back the date of Bhanudatta to a time which would be inconsistent with other data furnished by his works

As to the identity of Bhanudatta with the poet Bhanukara Har Datta Sarma¹ relies chiefly on the ascription of large number of Bhanudatta's verses to Bhanukara by some late Anthologies. By far the largest number of Bhanudatta's verses are found assigned to Bhanukara in a compilation entitled *Padya racana* by Lakṣmana Bhaṭṭa Aṅkolakara, but for this work its editors themselves (ed. Kavyamala 86) would not claim a higher antiquity than a hundred years (between 1625 and 1650)². Of the other Anthologies the *Rasika Jivana* belongs to the 17th century, and the *Subhaṣita haravali* as P. K. Gode has shewn³ to the end of the 17th century. One would require more substantial evidence than the notoriously careless and confused attributions in modern compilations of uncertain value.

1 In *Annals of BORI* xv: 1936 pp. 243-58. See also on this question G. V. Devasthali in *New Ind. Antiquary* vi: 1244 pp. 111-17. J. B. Chaudhuri *Musl. in Patronage to Sanskrit Learning* Calcutta 1942 pp. 2-32.

2 See P. K. Gode in *JOR* Madras xv: 1940 pp. 184-93 on the date of this anthology.

3 In *ABORI* xvi: 1935 pp. 262-91.

THE CURTAIN IN ANCIENT INDIAN THEATRE

A great deal of controversy has centred round the word Yavanika which signifies the curtain employed in ancient Indian theatre. The object of this paper is not to reopen the entire question but certain assumptions made since the time of Windisch Weber and Wilson appear to have received currency without much justification and a critical examination of certain relevant facts has therefore become necessary.

It is now generally admitted that the word Yavanika can not be taken as an argument for proving Greek influence on the Indian stage or drama. The word is taken to be a derivative from Yavana meaning Ionian the Greeks with whom Indians came into contact. But since the word was not confined to what was Greek alone and since there is no proof that the Greek mime had any use for the curtain it has been suggested that the word refers not to the curtain but to the material of the curtain for which the practice of using foreign cloth possibly Persian tapestry brought to India by Greek merchants is presumed. But it should be clearly understood that there is no evidence to support this presumption even though it has been repeated in all recent text books on the subject. The attempt¹ again to remove this difficulty and derive the word Yavanika from the root *yu* (*yunakti arynoti anaya iti*) is too ingenious to be seriously considered. But it is important to note in this connexion that the word Yavanika as such is rarely recognised by old Indian lexicographers. It

1 Sten Konow *Indische Drama* (Berlin and Leipzig 1920) p. 4.
A. Berniedale Keith *Sanskrit Drama* (Oxford 1924) pp. 51, 359. M. Winternitz *Geschichte der indischen Literatur* (Leipzig 1922) i. pp. 175-76.

2 T. M. Tripaṭh *Commentary on Damodaragupta's Kāṣhā māla* p. 359.

is not included as a synonym of the curtain by Amara, Śāsvata, Hemacandra, Halāyudha, Yādava-prakāśa or Keśava.

In the second chapter of Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*, where the construction of the stage is detailed, neither the word *Yavanikā* nor any description of it occurs, but it is apparently known, as it occurs later in 5.11-12 in the description of the elements of the *Pūrva raṅga*

*etāni ca bahir gītāny antar-yavanikā gataih/
prayoktrbhiḥ prayojyāni tanirī bhānda kṛtāni ||
tataś ca sarva kutapair yuktānyanyāni kārayet/
vighaṭṭya vai yavanikāṃ nṛtya pāṭhya-kṛtāni ||*

This is the text given by the more recent Benares edition¹ (1929) which does not notice any variant reading, but it should be noted that the older Bombay edition² (1894) records the variant *Javanikā* in both places, while the edition of Grosset (1898) reads *Javanikā* in both places, only one of its manuscripts having the form *Yavanikā*.

This variation of reading raises an important point, for the word *Javanikā* (and not *Yavanikā*) occurs regularly in the lexicons e.g. of Amara (2.6.120) Halāyudha (2.154)⁴ and Keśava (p. 53, śl. 300)⁵ as the name of a curtain, but not necessarily of the theatre curtain. The commentators on Amara, rightly or wrongly, derive the word from the verbal root *ja* thus

Kṣurasvāmīn *javante syam javanikā*
Sarvānanda *javanam vego'sya astuti javanika*
Bhānuji Dakṣiṇa *javatī aṣṭām, juh śantro dhātuh
gatau vege ca, lyuḥ, svārthe kan*

1 ed. Batuknath Sarma and Baladev Upadhyay, *Kaśī Skt. Series* Benares 1929. The later works on Dramaturgy (*Daśarūpaka Nāṭya darpaṇa* etc.) do not throw any light on the question.

2 ed. Nirnay Sagar Press, Bombay 1894.

3 Paris and Lyon, 1898.

4 *Abhidhāna ratna-māla*, ed. Th. Aufrecht, London 1861.

5 *Kalpavṛkṣa kōśa*, ed. Gackwad's Oriental Series, Baroda 1928.

Similarly Hemacandra in his *Abhidhāna-cintamani* (2 344) includes Javanī as a synonym for curtain and explains in the commentary *javante śyāṃ javanī*. The word seems to be old and occurs in the sense of theatre curtain in the *Harī vanśa* ¹

[*prekṣagaranī*] *rejur javanikākṣepaṭh śapahṣā va khe nagah* and in the *Bhagavata Purana* (1 8 19)

*mīya javanikacchannam ajna dhokṣyam avyayam/
na lakṣyase mīlha dṛṣṭa naṣṭo naṣṭa dharo yathā!!*

Although the form Javanika is thus authenticated the etymology of the commentators is considered too fanciful and brushed aside by modern scholars who assume that the word Javanika is nothing but a Prakritic form of the word Yavanika ². But it is clear that this assumption proceeds with the acceptance of the Yavanikā-Ionian equation and thereby really begs the question.

There is yet a third form Yamanika which does not appear to have received any serious consideration. Through the influence chiefly of the Yavanika-Ionian theory this form has been summarily dismissed by Böhtlingk and Roth as a scribal mistake for Yavanika and by Sten Konow as merely secondary but it is recognised independently by Indian lexicographers and found in some manuscripts of Sanskrit plays and poems. Thus Maheśvara³ commenting on the passage quoted from Amara above (2 6 120) gives for the curtain the synonyms *pratisara javanika yamanika uraskaram* (a fact which is noted in the modern *Sabda-lalpadruma*). Bhanuji Dikṣita explains further *yamanika* *iti va pīṭhah yamayati yama uparame lyuṣ* and Sarvananda similarly notes *drṣṭer uparatir anayeti*

1 Ed. Bombay 2 29 7 ed. Calcutta 45-48. In later Kavya the word occurs in *Śiṣupala* *adī* a iv 54 *Harā v jaya* xl 38 etc.

2 But contrary. F. Schell n. *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeiger* 1891 p. 354.—The *Deś-nama-māla* gives both *ja-anī* (4 1) and *ja-onī* (2 25) in the sense of screen but obviously these are derivatives respectively of Sanskrit *javanīka* and *ja-onī*.

3 As in Bombay ed. 1896.

va yamanika¹. Hemacandra in the passage quoted above commenting on the word *yavan* adds *yamanī ity api*. In the absence of critical editions of Sanskrit plays and poems the editors of which usually adopt the form *yavanika*² the evidence therefrom is uncertain but a few important occurrences of the form *yamanika* may be noted here. In Hillebrandt's critical edition of the *Mudra rakṣasa*³ the reading accepted in two places in the stage direction is *yamanika* although the usual variants *yavanika* and *javanika* are also noted. p 192, 17 *tataḥ pravṛtṣṭi yamanikavṛta śarīro mukhamatra dṛśyaś cañak* yāh p 193 l 11 *yamanikam upanīyopasṛīya*. In Megha prabhacarya's *Dharmabhyudaya*⁴ one of the stage directions occurs as *yamanikantarad yati veśa dhari putrakas tatra sthapanīyah* p 15 (no v l noted). In a verse of *Bhartrhari Śataka* given in P von Bohnen's edition (no 51)⁵ and reproduced in Bohtlingk's *Indische Sprüche* (no 779)⁶ the word preferred is *yavanika*.

*jarā śīrṣṇaṁ angārā nāṭa iva vaśī mandita tanur
narah saṁsarante viśatī yama dhari yavanikam*

but both von Bohnen and Bohtlingk conscientiously record the *variae lectiones* namely *yamanika* and *javanika*.

1 The printed text (ed. Trivandrum Skt. Series 1914/17) evidently wrongly reads *yavanikā*¹.

2 As in *Svapna vāsava-datta* Act vi after śl 16 *paśyamas tavad rūpa taddeśyam samikṣya pyatām yavanika* in *Pratimā* at the end of Act ii after śl 21 *kāñcukīyo yavan kastaranarā karot*. Also *Malavikāgn m ita* vi 18/19. As no variants are usually recorded it is not clear whether the editors of plays and poems proceed strictly on manuscript evidence or on a preconceived bias regarding greater desirability of the *Yavanika* form.

3 Breslau 1912. K. H. Dhruva's edit. on reads *yavanika* which is translated as 'a fine coat of mail'.

4 Ed. Jaina Ātmananda. Grantha-mālā Series no 61. Bhavnagar 1918.

5 Berlin 1833. The verse is missing in Telang's edit. on (Bombay Skt. Series Bombay 1893).

6 St. Petersburg 1863/65 (in 3 vols.).

It is clear therefore that Yamāṅkā is as much a recognised form of the word for curtain as Javanikā and perhaps more than Yavanikā. If we accept the etymology proposed by commentators on lexicons the form Javanikā makes some sense however fanciful, while Yavanika derives its validity only from the rather far fetched explanation that it referred to the foreign material of the cloth. The form Yamāṅka, on the other hand, perhaps makes a better and more natural sense. It is obviously derived from the root *yam* (1 1009), 'to stop or restrain', signifying a covering or curtain, and it would not be unjustifiable to suggest that it was perhaps the original form, which is almost lost or replaced by the other two forms Yavanika and Javanikā. That it is not a fictitious derivative of lexicographers is clear from the fact that the word *yamani* from which it is directly derived appears to be old, being traceable as far back as the *Vājasaneyi Samhita* (14 22).

As the Raṅga pīṭha or stage appears to have had no wings¹ (as in modern theatre) the question of drop-curtain does not arise. The curtain was presumably meant (there having been no scenes) to screen off the Nepathya gṛha or tiring room which was behind the Raṅga pīṭha or stage. The exact location of the curtain however is not given in the *Nāṭya śāstra* nor in later dramaturgic works. Wilson was of opinion that curtains were suspended transversely so as to divide the stage into different portions open equally to the audience but screening one set of actors from the other.² But this theory of transverse curtain as Keith has already

1 Unless the two Mattavāraṅga whose function is obscure on the two sides of the Raṅga pīṭha acted as such, but this is very unlikely. See Mankad (Hindu Theatre in *THQ* viii 1932 pp 485f 494 95) who is inclined to believe that there were no wings nor was there any drop-curtain in ancient Indian stage. The Mathavāraṅga are probably emblems in the form of elephant with up-lifted trunks.

2 The passage from *Svapna viśvāsa-datta* quoted above in p 151 foot-note 2 cannot be urged in support for the word *yamāṅkā* there can be explained simply as a screen or veil which hides Vāsavadatta from the king. The first Act of *Mecchhakafika* again is not a relevant instance.

pointed out lacks corroboration.¹ The same remark applies to the conjecture of Monier Williams (*Sakuntala*, p. 4) that the curtain was "suspended across the stage, answering the purposes of scenes, behind which was the space called *Nepathya*" We have only the authority of Abhinavagupta who, in his commentary on the *Najya śāstra*² locates the curtain between the *Raṅga pīṭha* and the *Raṅga śīrṣa* (*ratra yavanikā rangapīṭha tacchurṣayor madhye*, p. 212) But there is some difficulty in accepting this location The *Raṅga śīrṣa* as its name implies, was presumably the place at the head or extreme end of the *Raṅga pīṭha* i.e. between the *Raṅga pīṭha* and *Nepathya grha* Its use is thus explained by Abhinavagupta *tat pātranāṃ viśruntya agacchātām ca guptyai rangasya śobhāyai ranga-śīrṣa kāryam* (p. 63) But since the musicians are also allowed to sit there, it has been urged that there is no point in making them sit behind the curtain, along with actors tired or about to enter, for the curtain in the position suggested would screen them off from the *Raṅga-pīṭha* Even allowing that the orchestra may be screened off there is no point in making tired or entering actors sit there when the retiring room is just immediately behind This might have been the case in Abhinavagupta's time, but in the original plan of the theatre given in the second chapter of the *Najya śāstra*, the curtain appears to have had no place there, and its absence is perhaps in conformity with the original practice of musicians sitting openly in the *Ranga śīrṣa* In the face of these difficulties it is not possible to determine exactly the position of the curtain, but it is not unlikely that its employment was meant (as *Najya śāstra*, Bombay ed. 12. 23, Benares ed. 13. 23, indicates) to screen off the way of entrance of the actors from the tiring room to the stage But since the *Nepathya grha* is allowed to have two doors for

for here obviously we have to imagine six shifting scenes which take place in Cārudatta's house and in the street outside and such unmarked scene-shifting is common enough in Sanskrit plays

1. Ed. Gackwad's Oriental Series Baroda 1926

entrance of actors (*kāryam dvāra-dvayam cātra nepathya-grhākasya tu*)¹ apparently into the Raṅga-śirṣa and thence to the Raṅga pīṭha it has been sometimes presumed that there must have been two curtains covering the two doors. But if Abhinavagupta's view is accepted, the curtain, suspended across between the Raṅga pīṭha and Raṅga śirṣa would have screened off the entire stage from the Nepathya grha with its two doors, thus forbidding the necessity of any presumption of two curtains for the two doors. There is again no ground for assuming that the curtain was parted in the middle, or that the actors entered through the parting drawn aside. At least, no such description or reference is found in dramatic texts. The curtain appears to have been simply tossed aside when actors entered. Even in the case of hurried abrupt or violent entrance the position of the curtain, whether between the Raṅga pīṭha and Raṅga śirṣa or between the Raṅga śirṣa and the Nepathya grha, would not hinder it. The stage direction for hurried entrance *apaṭi kṣepena pravṛṣati* would, therefore simply mean "enters without a toss of the curtain."

Some of the commentators however explain the phrase differently. Quoting Halayudha, who gives *Apāṭi* as a synonym of *Paṭi* or *Javanikā* (*apaṭi kunda-paṭali syat pratisirū javanikā* 2. 154), Raghavabhaṭṭa (on *Śakuntalā* ii and vi) explains *apaṭi kṣepeneti* *śrāṣṭkarani śrāṣṭkurenety arthah*. Kāṭyavarma's explanation is similar *harṣa śokadi saṁbhramajuktasya nāṭasya pravṛṣati paṭakṣepena kṛyate*. This interpretation would imply that normally the entrance of actors was effected by drawing aside the curtain but in the case of hurried entrance the curtain was tossed aside. But Śaṅkara appears to agree with our view when he says *apaṭi kṣepena*

¹ *Atra=raṅga śirṣa* from the context. Bharata *Nāṭya-śāstra* Benares ed. ii 70. Abhinavagupta explains (p. 68) *dvāra-dvayam eva raṅga śirṣe nepathya gata paṭa-pravṛṣṭya*. The position of the doors rather obscurely given is discussed by Mankad at pp. 489-90.

*akasmad ity arthah paśi kṣepo na kartavya arta raja pra
 vesayoh iti bharatah* (we have not been able to trace this
 quotation in the present text of Bharata) That the curtain
 was tossed aside when actors entered is indicated by the
 following passage from Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra* (ed Bombay
 12 23 ed Benares 13 23)

*yatha marga rasopetam prakṛtiṇam praveśane/
 dīruvayam samprayatlayaṁ paśe can apakarṣite||
 karyah praveśah patraṇaṁ narartha rasa saṁ bhāve hi*

The passage from Damodaragupta's *Kuṣṇānī mata* cited by
 Mankad (p 494) need not go against this view the tossing
 of the curtain being indicated equally by the words *ākṣipta
 apakarṣita* or *apanita* Bohtlingk (*Śāntīnālā* ed Bonn 1842)
 has a long note after the commentators on this stage direc-
 tion (Act iv p 46 p 208) but this was written long before
 definite knowledge of ancient Indian stage was available

THE PROBLEM OF BHARATA AND ĀDI BHARATA

The recently published English translation of Bharata's *Nāṭya-sāstra*¹ by Manomohan Ghosh, as well as P. V. Kane's revised History of Sanskrit Poetics prefixed to his new edition of the *Sāhitya darpana*² reopens some important questions about the text, one of which is the much discussed problem of Bharata and Ādi Bharata.

As early as 1912, P. R. Bhandarkar³ first pointed out that "Rāghavabhaṭṭa mentions a work called Ādi Bharata" and that "a MS with the name exists in the Mysore Oriental Library". An actual examination of the MS in 1932 by P. K. Gode,⁴ however, revealed the fact that the work which the Mysore MS contained was nothing more than the *Nāṭya-sāstra* of Bharata itself. This is what P. K. Gode gives as the result of his examination.

The MS is described in the Catalogue of the Mysore Oriental Library (1894) as follows

590 आदिभरतम् श्रीभरताचार्यप्रणीतम्

(474) आ० ५५ प० अक्षयप्रम् ।

With the kindness of the Curator of the Mysore Oriental Library I was able to get on loan the so called MS of the *Ādi Bharata* tallying outwardly with the description of the catalogue given above. On actual examination, however, this work in Āndhra characters turned out to be a regular MS of the *Nāṭya Sāstra* in an incomplete condition, only 15 chapters being extant in this copy with a folio of matter from the 16th chapter.

Gode further notes that the colophon to the first, as well

1 *Bibliotheca Indica* Calcutta 1951

Third edition, Bombay, 1951

2 *Indian Antiquary*, xli p 158

4 *ABORI*, xiii, pp 92-93

as the last 15th chapter, rightly gives the name of the work as Bhāratiya Nāṭya śāstra. The evidence of this MS, therefore, becomes useless in establishing the existence of an independent work of the name of Ādi Bharata.

But in 1930, Maṇomohan Ghosh¹ collected and discussed the quotations from Ādi Bharata as well as from Bharata, found in Rāghavabhaṭṭa's commentary *Aṛiha dyotanikā* on Kālidāsa's *Abhijñāna śakuntala*.² He gives nineteen quotations³ from Ādi Bharata, of which, however as many as twelve are traceable in the present text of Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*. Of the remaining seven quotations four are, in Ghosh's opinion, untraceable and three have parallels in it. Of nine quotations from Bharata seven are shown to be directly traceable.

Rāghavabhaṭṭa appears to have been fairly widely acquainted with works and authors on Alamkāra, Nāṭya and Saṃgīta.⁴ Besides Bharata and Ādi Bharata, he quotes (ed NSP) for instance, from Bhaṃṣa (p 10) Kāvya-darśa (p 19, 68), Udbhaṭa (p 110), Vāmana (p 3, etc), Dhvanikāra (p 11, 110), Mahābhāṭṭa (p 44, 67), Sarasvatī-kāṇṭhabhaṛana (p 19, 98) Bhoja (p 73 199) Rajanaka Mammata (p 85), Rajanaka Rucaka (p 58, 161, 193), Rucaka (p 179) Abhinava bhārati (p 6 20) Daśarūpaka (p 6 8 50, 53, 84 110, 146 189 195, 204, 225 226, 230), Dhanika (p 8 20, 51, 64, 115), Māṭṛgupta or Māṭṛguptacārya (all verse quotations p 7, 8 9, 13 15, 20 57, 62, 74 110, 126, 151, 154, 156, 199, 230) Nāṭya darpaṇa (p 6) Nāṭya pradīpa (p 6), Nāṭya locana (p 7), Bhava prakāśikā (p 7, 9, 168) Rasarnava sudhakara (p 114 17-), Sudhā

1 *IIIQ* 1930 pp 75-80.

2 Our references are to the 8th edition Nirnay Sagar Press Bombay 1922.

3 Ghosh appears to have overlooked one quotation from Ādi Bharata on p 168 which deals with Niyatāpti. This makes the total number of Rāghavabhaṭṭa's quotations twenty.

4 His citations from grammatical, lexical, poetical and dramatic works are not listed here.

kara (p 8, 13, 15 33, 55, 58, 69, 73 75 84, 115, 163, 188, 254), *Saṁgita sarvasva* (p 6), *Samgita sudhanidhi* (p 242), *Samgita ratnakara* (p 191, 209, 229) *Nagara sarvasva* (p 50), and *Rati-vilāsa* (p 76) Raghavabhaṭṭa's date is not known but since the latest work he quotes is the *Rasārṇava-sudhākara* of Śiṅga bhupala, he could not have flourished before 1330 A D By following a different line of investigation P K Gode¹ arrives at a more precise date of Raghavabhaṭṭa in the last quarter of the 15th century (1475 1550 A D) This is a fairly late date, and since a very large number of his quotations from *Ādi Bharata* are directly traceable in *Bharata's Nāṭya śāstra*, his testimony cannot be taken as conclusive But at the same time it is clear that whatever may have been its character, some text or author under the name of *Ādi-Bharata* was known to him, as distinguished from *Bharata* from whose *Nāṭya śāstra* also he makes independent citations

The only other work which purports to give us a portion at least of an *Ādi-Bharata*² is contained in a curious MS, existing in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute and entered in its Catalogue³ under the title *Nāṭya sarvasva dipika* An account of this MS was given by D R Mankad⁴, but since he was unable to come to a definite conclusion and since

1 *Calcutta Oriental Journal* in 1936 pp 177-84 Raghavabhaṭṭa was a Mahārāṣṭra Brāhmaṇ whose father Pṛthivīdhara Bhaṭṭa migrated to Benares before 1450 A D He was also the author of the *Padārthādarśa* commentary on the Tantric work, *Sāradātilaka* (ed Kashi Sanskrit Series 1934)

2 Hanukrishna Kavi (ed *Ādya Śāstra* GOS 1, p 5 of the preface) states that he possesses a fragment of a work called *Saḍśiva bhārata* which according to him may be the *Ādi Bharata* But he gives no account of it nor does he appear to have consulted the Mysore and Poona MSS Similarly he speaks of a *Vyddha Bharata* in 12000 granthas (*Journal of Andhra H R S* in p 23) But these statements are not authenticated

3 *Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* xii (Alaṅkāra, Saṁgita and Nāṭya) 1936 p 453f

4 *ABORI* xiii p 173

it has a bearing on the *Adi Bharata* problem we give here a detailed study of the MS which is necessary for understanding the value of its testimony

The MS obtained on loan through the courtesy of the Curator of the Bhandarkar Institute consists of 61 folios size 10 x 8 written in clear and bold Devanagari characters on country made paper with marginal borders ruled in double red lines having generally 10 to 11 lines to a page. The general appearance of the MS is not old.

Other notable characteristics of the MS are folios 15 contain a list of contents in three columns separated by double red lines and read at the end इति सकेतप्रकरणं संपूर्णं folio 6 begins the text with the *Mangala verse* श्रीनाथदाक्षपतिपुराधिप रेवित्तापि, folios 12 13 and 14 are numbered twice but the repeated folios contain different matter folio 14 which abruptly breaks off without completing the matter in hand is left three fourths blank thereafter the repeated folio 12a is blank the repeated folio 12b begins the text again with श्रीगणेशाय नमः and another *Mangala verse* विष्णु सौकुण्ड प्रणम्य शिरसा, folios 26 29 and 44 are not numbered folio 43b breaks off abruptly without completing the matter and leaves one fourth of space blank folio 47b is blank after folio 47a ends with इति द्वादशदक्षप्रणय समाप्ता folio 48a begins with *Āṅgabhinaya* folio 57b ends with श्रीरामाय नमः श्रीगणेशाय नमः श्रीनारायणाय नमः श्रीशङ्कराय नमः श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः, leaving the page half blank the last folio 61a ends with इति अथ सकेत (s c) दक्षप्रकरणं समाप्त ॥ श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥ श्रीरामाय नमः leaving three fourths of the page blank 61b is blank and bordered with flowery design.

It will be clear even from this brief description that the MS is neither continuous nor complete. But what is not noticed in the *Catalogue* as well as by Mankad is that it is a composite MS written at least by two different hands. In this respect it appears to consist of different units or fragments of text for the first hand appears on folios 1 14 (end of

Samavaya skandha) 26 (beginning of Purvараङ्गा) -47 and 58-61 the second hand is distinctly seen on folios 15-25 (end of Adhy. 6) and 48-57

At the outset there is a curious list of contents (folios 1-5) prefixed to the work and called Samketa prakarana. We shall see that in the beginning of the text itself there is a similar account of the contents and the section is called Samketa dhyaya. The lists give a total of 5 Skandhas, 32 Adhyayas and 221 Prakaranas covering the entire work.

They are enumerated thus

Samavaya skandha	Adhyaya 6	Prakarana 54
Śikṣa skandha	Adhyaya 6	Prakarana 69
Bhava nirupana skandha	Adhyaya 11	Prakarana 53
Ullasa skandha	Adhyaya 6	Prakarana 34
Vaiśeṣika skandha	Adhyaya 3	Prakarana 11

5 Skandhas

Adhyaya 32 Prakarana 221

The prefixed list of contents (folios 1-5) ends with the words एतदर्थं त [अदि on margin probably *secunda manu*] भरतस्याम् । अस्य प्रथमं नाम नाट्यसर्वस्वरूपम् ॥ We shall see that so far as the text is available the contents as detailed here do not actually conform to the matter respectively dealt with in the work itself. As the pagination and handwriting are continuous it cannot be said that this prefixed list was compiled and added later on. But it is curious that it contains words like Prakaranaku (=Prakaranani) Dṛṣṭi bhedaḥ (=Dṛṣṭi bhedah) Stri sthanakulu (=Stri sthanakani) etc. where the Telugu plural affix *lu* undoubtedly indicates its Andhra origin.

After this comes the text of the work itself which commences on folio 6a but the MS is corrupt and incorrect throughout. It begins thus

[folio 6a] श्रौतायनायपतिपुराणिसौविताधि
सिन्धुभादुरततुर्गिरिनासदाय ।

कोटीर्योत्तरविधु कम्पारसाब्धि
मां पातयेत्तरशिवः प्रियशाकरस्थ ॥

एषा ग्रन्थकर्तृस्तोषासितदेवताभ्यानानुरूपा नान्दीति नरयति (१) केषां-
चिन्नान्या पदभियमो नाभ्यु(प)गत । आशीर्निर्मस्त्रिद्या वस्तुनिर्देशो वापि
तन्मुखम् (Dandin : 14) इति प्रामाण्यात् । तत आशीर्वादनान्दीं करोति—

ध्रुवद्विरवभराणि ध्रुवतुल्यवस्तुभूमिभूमिनीसनि
बुधस्ताराणि रिङ्खलद्विरधिरधिर धेनुशीर्यदसन्ति ।
दिकीणोदन्वतोवे द्वन्द्वमन्त्रमूलकनधद्वियन्ति
व्यस्य तु न्यापदस्क (१) त्रिपुरविजयिनस्तारण्डवाडम्बराणि ॥

एषा आशीर्वादरूपा नान्दी । अत आरम्भग्रन्थार्थं सूचित । अथ
नमस्कारनान्दीं न करोति—

आज्ञिक भुवन यस्य वाचिक सर्ववादमयम् ।
आहार्यं चन्द्रतारादि तन्मस्तुगलिक शिवम् ॥

एव नमस्कारनान्यामपि आरम्भग्रन्थार्थंजातकथ (१) भवति । अनन्तर
वस्तुनिर्देशप्राधान्यां नान्दीमाह—

ब्रह्मा तातधरो हरिस्तु पटहो बीणाधरा भारती
वशास्यो शशिभास्करौ ध्रुविरता धीरेवमेते स्थिता ।
नदी शृङ्गिरिदो रुक्मललितौ गेयो गुनिस्तुगुद
शराभुष्टं तकरान्तुजो विजयते नाव्य सदैव भजे ॥

[folio 6b] एव शिवस्य नाव्यसामादिव निरूपणायेतच्छास्त्रप्रकटनीय-
वस्तुनिर्देश विवक्षित चाभवत् । इदं नाव्यमहं सदा भजे इत्येव निरन्तरा
भ्यासाद्यत्यज्ञानुभव इति भावः । एव त्रिभि ओकैश्चिन्विधनान्दीं सूचय-
तिर्विप्रपरितनात्यर्थं विष्णेश्वर स्तौति—

विष्णोर्वान्तनिवारणीकतरणिर्विघ्नोदवीहव्यपाद्
विघ्नोत्पन्नगिरिभेदनपनिर्विघ्नान्धिबुद्धिम्नोद्भव ।
विघ्नोदोषधप्रचण्डपवनो विष्णोभयपञ्चाननो
विघ्नोत्पन्नकुलप्रमत्तयहो विष्णेश्वर पातु न ॥

After another Namaskriya to Bhumi devi, we have prelimi-
nary remarks on the subject matter of the work (folio 6b)

एवं नमस्तुल्य ततः शास्त्रारम्भं समाचरेत् । आदौ भरतराज्यार्थस्वरूपं
विष्णोति—

मकारो भावसंशुद्धो रेफो रागाधितोऽथ हि ।
तकारस्तालसहितस्तलाद्भूत उच्यते ॥

[folio 7a] अतो भाव इति नृत्तं राग इति गीतं ताल इति वार्ध
तन्मासौर्बलिकं भरत इति श्वत्सुरात्मजस्य भावः । स्वस्यभाह—

गीतं विष्णुस्वरूपं तु वार्धं ब्रह्मात्मकं तथा ।
नृत्तं शिवात्मकं प्रोक्तं ततो भस्मा प्रयोजयेत् ॥

एवं लिपूतिस्वरूपत्वाद्देवस्वरूपं च तदिति विद्वद्वाचो—
जातस्तु वाधो श्रुतवेदाद्यजुषोऽभिनयस्त्वया ।
सामपेदाद्भवेद् गानं नृत्तमापरेणाकृतम् ॥

एवं नृत्तगीतवाद्याभिनयतालाः देवतावेदस्वरूपत्वाच्छास्त्रप्रामाण्यरहितवर्णादोपः
सम्बलीलाह—

युतिर्माता पिता गीतं वाद्यं चैव भूतो भवेत् ।
तालस्तदोदरस्तस्य कलसं रसपद्धतिः ॥
एतत्कुटुम्बं कथितं नाट्यम् पुरुषस्य हि ।
एकेन हीनं न्यूनं स्वात्ययोक्ता दोषमागमवेत् ॥

In this way, after elaborate Śāstra prasaṅgā, the work refers to the mythical origin of the Śāstra, and proceeds to give some information about its own purpose and its author (folio 7b):

तदेतदगमं यस्मिं लोके भरतसंश्रयम् ।
आदौ महानटः समुत्सृज्यमान्महागे स्वयम् ॥
नाट्यवेदं ददौ साङ्गं भरताय चतुर्मुखः ।
ततो धीमान्भरतमुनिः¹ कृतवान् शास्त्रमुत्तमम् ॥
नाम्ना स्वेनैव लोकानां हितोपकरणाय वै ।
तस्माल्लोके भरतमिति² प्रतिष्ठाप्यभवत्किल ॥
तच्छ्रुत्वा भरतं शास्त्रं गन्धर्वोत्तरसा गण्डा ।
ततश्च गोवाणीं सर्वे भरतं प्रशशंसिरे ॥

1 The Pada is metrically defective (hypermetric)

ततो मुनि शार्ङ्गमतपकण्व
पैलाक्षिर कोदलदत्तिलादि ।
इत्यादिराङ्गुलवाशिनी च
राज्ञा जनानामुपयोज्यमेतत् ॥

सञ्छात्र शिथिलीभूत जनैरित्तप्रसादिभि ।
पुनरुद्धारयाम्यय प्रज्ञया दैवलचपया ॥

स शास्त्रोद्धारक इत्याशङ्क्य नारायण शुद्धशिवश्रीरामानन्दयोगिराज
प्रभुर्दीरस्तापी विद्याभोगोद्भो गुरुदत्तो हि षोडशैतानि नामैकमेकस्यैव भविष्यति
(folio 8a) इति ग्रन्थकर्तृर्भविष्यते च रहस्य (१) । इदानीं प्रस्तुतोपशेष
मनुसरामाह—

वैद्यममन्त्रिततय कोकिलाम्बातनुभय ।
नारायण सिद्धशिवयोगिराजो विराजते ॥
वरकोटि क्लृप्तपूडिपराजो प्रज्ञवेत्ता
ज्ञ(श्च?)भावलसुकलश्रीवत्सगोत्र कवीन्द्र ।
भरतमखिलमापस्तम्बसूत्र पवित्र
स्फुटतरमकरोत्त योगिनारायणार्थ ॥
देवस्य नामैककरो^१नाज्यसर्वैखदीपिका ।
सप्रहीतुस्तस्य कवेरारम्भस्मूच्यते तत ॥
वैद्याह्वय सशुद्धनाथमह प्रणम्य
सम्यद निधाय हृदि साम्बशिवाङ्घ्रि पदम् ।
सस्तुल्य देवमुनिपूर्वकवि गुदामु
ज्वाकतुमादिभरत स्फुटमारभामि ॥

This rather long quotation from the beginning of the work is given not only because it will give some idea of its mode of composition which consists of verse *karika* and running prose commentary but also because it furnishes information about the author or authors and the purpose of the work. It would appear that the MS contains the text of what is called the Ādi Bharata along with its commentary called *Natya sarvasva d pika*. The author of the Ādi Bharata appears to be Nara

1 As the metre is Māli na the reading वरकणि is suggested

2 MS नागेति करो

yana or Nārāyaṇarya, also called Rāmānanda Siddhaśiva jogurāja, who was the son of the minister Vaidyappa and his wife Kokilambā, and belonged to the Varakoṭikalapūḍi family of the Vatsa gotra. The name of the author of the commentary is not given, but he bows to his preceptor, named Vaidya, before he commences his exposition of the Ādi-Bharata which is apparently a late work of South Indian origin.

As no other MS of the so called Ādi Bharata is available we will have to examine the subject-matter of the work itself, as presented by our MS, and find out, if possible, (i) whether our MS contains the entire Ādi Bharata, along with its commentary, or gives only a part of it, and (ii) whether the MS contains a continuous and single work, or fragments of different works.

On folios 8a-11a we have a general synopsis of topics dealt with in the work in the order of Skandhas Adhyayas and Prakāraṇas. The section is called Samketadhyāya. Although less detailed, it corresponds generally to the prefatory list of contents (hereafter called Contents) given on folios 1-5, of which we have spoken above. It is entirely in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka metre, with no prose commentary. A verse towards the end (folio 10b) says that all this was taught by Śiva himself.¹

उद्दिष्टेवमेतावच्छुनैवोपरिहितम् ।

and then summarises the extent of the work thus (folio 10b)

सर्वाणि भरते नामोद्देशप्रकरणानि तु ।

तत्रैकविंशतिशतं द्वाविंशोऽध्यायसहस्रकम् ।

श्लोकानां पञ्चसहस्राणि पञ्च स्कन्धा विनिर्मिताः ॥

¹ Abhinavagupta (Abha Bhārata ed GOS p. 8) informs us that Sadāśiva like Brahmā is sometimes spoken of by some teachers who were foremost among Nāstikas (nāstika-dhuryopadhyayāḥ) as one of the expounders of the Nāṭya śāstra. Śaraḍatanaya also refers to Sadāśiva (fl. 152). Apparently Abhinavagupta considers such Sadāśiva Bharata to be heretical.

समवायस्य शिष्या स्वधो भावनिरूपणम् ।
 उल्लासो वैशेषिक इति स्वभानामेव निर्णय ॥
 एतदप्रकरणानां च क्रमादेकैकरा स्फुटम् ।
 सर्वेषां पूर्वसांख्येकं तद्वत्परिचीर्यते ॥

This enumeration corresponds with that given in the preliminary Contents namely that the work contains 5 *Slandhas* called respectively *Samavaya Śikṣa Bhava nirupana Ullāsa* and *Vaiśeṣika* 32 *Adhyayas* and 221 *Prakaranas* in 6 000 *Ślokas*

Then we have an interesting passage in which different traditions of the Śāstra as well as the scope and character of the present work are mentioned (folio 10b)

भरता बहुधा सति नान्दिसारस्वतादयः ।
 तेषां प्रमाणमादिभ भरतस्य उमापतिः ।
 अतएवादिभरतप्रचार नटनं स्मृतम् ॥
 नाटकास्तु क्षयादया दशाहपक्षमश्रयाः ।
 शैलपसुतधारार्यै पुस्तिकाप्रतिमादिभिः ॥
 वैपभाषाविचारादिकल्पनाभिर्वर्द्धिताः ।
 तस्माच्छुद्धस्य नृत्तस्य प्रमाणं न भवति ते ॥
 नटनं नादिकानां च तेषां कारणमेव हि ।
 तस्मान्नृत्यस्य शुद्धान्न शास्त्रसिद्धिं प्रवक्ष्यति ॥

The purport of this passage seems to be that there are various Bharata śāstras of which the authority as well as the original is that Bharata who is Umapati (i.e. Śiva). Hence dancing² is known as the mode of Adī Bharata. The Natakas called *Daśarupakas* which consist mostly of words and are variously represented by actors etc. are not the standard for pure dancing (*Nṛtta*) which is indeed the source of both Natakas and *Nāṭikas*. Hence this work speaks according to the śāstra of the unmixed element of the *Nāṭya* (namely *Nṛtta*). In other words *Nṛtta* is believed to be the proper

1 The Pada is hypermetrical.

2 We are taking the word *Nāṭyanaṭya* as equivalent to *Nṛtta* below which is essentially *rāga layaś ca* according to *Uḥāṇanāya*.

subject-matter of the present work, and the varieties of Nāṭakas, known as Daśarūpakas, have no place in it. This statement is indeed borne out by the Contents (on folios 1-5) where no Rūpaka prakāra, nor any matter directly bearing on it, is found, this is also confirmed, as we shall see, by the topics actually dealt with in the rest of the present work available in our MS

This, however, raises a difficulty. The avowed object of the Ādi Bharata namely, that its treatment is entirely confined to Nṛtta, does not appear to be consistent with what is revealed in the text of the Ādi Bharata as it was known to Rāghavabhaṭṭa. Most of Rāghavabhaṭṭa's quotations, which are to be traced also in the present text of Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*, deal with the topic of Rūpaka, rather than with that of Nṛtta. For instance, the quotation on p. 6f deals with construction of the stage, Sthāpaka and Sūtradhara, on p. 15, 69 with elements of the plot Bija Bindu etc, on p. 23 with Upakṣepa on p. 69, 115 with Prayātna and Garbha sandhi, on p. 15, 21 with language to be employed in case of different characters, on p. 40 with Patakā sthānaka, on p. 168 with Niyatapti, on p. 248 with Nirvahana sandhi. It would appear, therefore, that the text of the Ādi Bharata known to Rāghavabhaṭṭa, which in its subject-matter greatly overlaps the present text of Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra* was probably not the same text as the Ādi-Bharata found in our MS, which is devoted exclusively to Nṛtta, and not to Nāṭya. There is, however, a passage of four lines in one of Rāghavabhaṭṭa's quotations from his Ādi Bharata which almost literally agrees with a passage of four lines (folio 13a lines 3-5) in our text of the Ādi Bharata. It speaks of the characteristics of a Sabhya thus

Raghavabhaṭṭa's quotation (p. 9)

मध्यस्था सावधानाश्च धार्मिको न्यायवेदिनः ।

तुष्टितातुष्टिताभिज्ञा दिनयानमन्यरा ॥

अथर्वा रसभावज्ञास्त्रीर्यक्षितयकोविदाः ।

असद्भावनिषेधाश्चतुरा मत्परच्छिदाः ।

continues up to folio 14b, but breaks off abruptly leaving the rest of the page blank. On the corner of the right hand margin of folio 14b we have (probably *secunda manu*) the caption नाट्यसर्वस्व. Thereafter the folios are numbered over again as 12, 13, and 14, of which folio 12a is left blank, but the subject matter of the repeated folios is not the same. The repeated folio 12b begins afresh with श्रीगणेशाय नमः and another Maṅgala verse as follows

विष्णु लोकायुक्तं प्रणम्य शिरसा परमार्गसदृशं
कीर्तिप्रीतिकरं जनस्य लघुना कालेन कामप्रदम् ।
सेव्यं सद्यस्तिभिर्भुक्तुं तदपद्व्यासात्तल्लोकतम
तालानां कथयामि लक्षणमहं पूर्वोक्तसाधकमात्रम् ॥

Only on this verse there is prose Anvayārtha but the Karika-form in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka metre continues thereafter, and ends on the repeated folio 14b with the colophon इति आदि भरतशास्त्रे समवायस्कन्धे नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकायां समोद्धारादिपरेष्वन्ताश्चक्रणं नाम द्वितीयोऽध्यायः ॥ श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥ धोरामः ॥ The marginal caption नाट्यसर्वस्व occurs again (apparently *secunda manu*) on the repeated folio 13b, but it should be noted that with the exception of three lines of Anvayārtha on the Maṅgala verse mentioned above the text is not accompanied in these folios by any running prose commentary.

The text continues in Anuṣṭubh metre, without any commentary up to folio 18a and ends with the colophon इति धीमदादिभरते समवायस्कन्धे नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकायां आचार्यनृणां दि मार्द्वि-
शान्तं नवप्रकरणं नाम तृतीयोऽध्यायः ॥ The next fourth chapter deals generally with the topic of Tala in Anuṣṭubh metre (without any commentary), but it is not clear where it ends, for no colophon is found. The colophon to the fifth chapter occurs on folio 23a as follows इदं रचितोऽहं भरते महापद्मसत्त्वान्ध्रवचो
ऽप्यविहितो सुधेनाय ध्वजायवरो न्वेदः (१) पदस्वटीको दे राजः (२) नारायण
सिद्धसिखयोगिनाथेन सममन्दवपदेन रम्यं हि इति पद्यमस्त्यम् ॥ Parts of this colophon which is faithfully transcribed here, is not intelligi-

ble, but Gode conjectures¹ that it was written by the scribe who transcribed the original work in Āndhra characters (andhra vacah) into the present Devanāgarī copy.

The next sixth chapter, which begins on folio 23a in Anuṣṭubh metre (without any commentary) ends on folio 25b with the following colophon नारायण सिद्धशिवरामानन्दयोगिराज-
विरचिते आदिभरते नाट्यानां नाट्याङ्गसामग्र्यादि हस्तादिदेवतान्त सप्तप्रकरण-
निरूपणं नाम अष्टोऽध्याय ॥ श्रीरामार्पणमस्तु । श्री ॥ It is notable that the *Natya sarvasva dipika* is not mentioned in this as well as in the previous colophon to the fifth chapter.

Here ends the first *Samavaya skandha*. The next seventh chapter begins on the unnumbered folio 26a with the topic of *Purva raṅga* in the same manner in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka metre and without any prose commentary and ends on the unnumbered folio 28a with the following colophon इति श्रीआदिभरते
शास्त्रे शिष्टास्त्रय्ये नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकाया पूर्वरादि सभासत्वात् त्रयप्रकरण-
निरूपणं नाम सप्तमोऽध्याय ॥ The next eighth chapter begins on the unnumbered folio 28a with the topic of *Natya svarupa* similarly in Anuṣṭubh metre and without any commentary and ends on folio 32b with this colophon इति आदिभरते शिष्टा-
स्त्रय्ये नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकाया नाट्यमेदप्रकरणं नाम अष्टमोऽध्याय ॥

Here ends the *Śikṣa skandha* of which only two out of six chapters are given here. After this the next folio 33 should have taken up the topics detailed in the Contents under the rest of the *Śikṣa skandha* or under *Bhava nirupana skandha*, but the topic actually dealt with does not correspond. It deals in Anuṣṭubh metre and without any commentary with 23 *Lasyaṅgas* of which only 15 are defined and the folio 33b abruptly breaks off without completing the topic. It is not known whether all this should come under the remaining portion of the second *Śikṣa skandha* or under the third *Bhava nirupana skandha* for the Contents mention a variety of topics for the *Śikṣa skandha* and give 12 *Hasta*

dvadaśa prañah 30 Asamyuta hastah and 16 Samyuta hastah as the subject matter of the first Adhyaya of the Bhavanirupana skandha. A fresh text appears to begin from folio 34b (folio 34a being left blank) with the repetition of the Mangala verse विष्णु लोकगुह प्रणम्य शिरसा (see above p. 168). No colophon occurs hereafter up to the end of the MS.

As the successive colophons up to this point show there is a kind of homogeneity of the text up to the eighth chapter or up to the second chapter of the second Śikṣa skandha i.e. from folios 1 to 32b and perhaps it continues a little till the text breaks off with folio 33b. As far as the work these folios contain goes it is more or less orderly and coherent. But it should be noted that there is the intrusion of a Maṅgala-verse on folio 12b and what is more remarkable is that there is an almost complete absence of any commentary from folio 7a the text consisting almost entirely of Kāvya verses in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka metre. With reference to this portion of the text therefore the question arises that if the Adī Bharata is the original and the Nāṭya sarvasva dīpikā is its commentary the Kāvya verses may be allowed to constitute the text of the original but where is the systematic commentary thereon? Curiously enough the Contents profess to index the Nāṭya sarvasva dīpikā and say at the end अथ प्रत्यक्षं नाम नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिका, but mention is made at the same time that एतत्पर्यंतं आदि [mark see manā] भरतस्य । If we take notice of the marginal caption नाट्यसर्वस्व appearing twice on the repeated folios we should be inclined to take the Kāvya as belonging to an unknown Nāṭya sarvasva of which the Nāṭya sarvasva dīpikā is apparently the commentary. But the difficulty is that the colophons to different Adhyayas say quite clearly इति आदिभरते नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकायां, the name Nāṭya sarvasva alone never appearing except in two doubtful captions written probably by a different hand. Or perhaps it is possible that the Adī Bharata itself was called Nāṭya sarvasva. But there is hardly any trace of the commentary

on these Adhyāyas throughout. As no other copy of the text of the Ādi-Bharata is available, the points raised cannot be finally determined; but we can state with some confidence that although the extent of the commentary and its exact relation to the text are uncertain, the text from folios 1 to 32b is at least one homogeneous whole.

Turning to the text which follows on 34b, we find that it commences afresh with श्रीगणेशाय नमः and the Maṅgala-verse विष्णुं लोकेयुद्धं प्रणम्य शिरसा repeated from folio 12a, with just a slight verbal variation. The subject matter of what follows is Tāla, in accordance with the last Pada of this Maṅgala-verse:

तालानां कथयामि लक्षणानिह पूर्वोक्तैस्तत्त्वमात्रम् ।

According to the Contents on folio 4a, the Tālas come under the heading Tāla-vidhāna in the 7th Adhyaya (saptamādhyāye (tāla-vidhāne) under the Bhāva-nirūpana-skandha. The Tālas are also mentioned on folios 14a and 18b. But it should be noted that there are considerable differences between the topics enumerated in the Contents and those actually dealt with in the folios following 34a. With reference to the Tālas these folios discuss six Sthānas (folio 35b), and then proceed to Tāla-prāna mentioned thus as ten in number:

कालो मार्गः क्रियाहारानि प्रहो वाति कला लयः ।

यदि प्रत्येकमेति तालप्रकारा दश स्युताः ॥

Accordingly, the treatment of Kala-lakṣaṇa follows (folios 35b-36a), six Mārgas are mentioned and defined (folio 36b), the total number of Mārga prakāras being given as twelve. We have then the treatment of Kriya (folio 36b), Aṅga (folio 36b), Graha (folio 37a), Jati (folios 37a-37b), Kalā (folio 37b) Laya (folio 38a), Yati (folio 38a) and Prastara (folio 38b). These elements are given respectively as 8, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3 and 4 in number, but it should be noted that the Contents (folio 4a) enumerate them respectively as 16, 6, 6, 5, 3, 4, 6 and 4. The next folio (38b) enumerates 101 Tālas, and then Gura-

not entirely tally. The MS ends हति प्रभवत् (sic) हस्तप्रभवत् समाप्त ॥ श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु । धीरस्तु ॥ There is no final colophon to the work.

It is clear from what is said above that these supplementary folios 44 to 61 contain fragments of three or four unrelated texts on diverse topics one of which is actually a reproduction of a part of the Citradhyaya of Bharata's Nāṭya śāstra and the others have topics which are similar to its corresponding topics. While the preceding folios give regular colophons to each Adhyāya and Skandha these fragments are devoid of them and do not appear to contain a single work. From citations one fragment at least cannot be assigned to an early date. From all this it is reasonable to conclude that these fragments are hardly related to the fairly continuous text contained in the preceding folios 1-33 and cannot be regarded as forming a continuation.

The foregoing description and discussion would point to the following conclusion.

- (1) Raghavabhaṭṭa probably had some text called Ādi Bharata before him which he distinguishes from that of Bharata. But most of the quoted passages from his Ādi Bharata are directly traceable in the printed text of Bharata or have parallels in it. From his quotations it also appears that his Ādi Bharata did not exclude the various topics of Nāṭya of Daśarupaka. But since the Ādi Bharata contained in our MS professes as well as actually deals mainly with Nṛtta and Saṁgīta and directly excludes topics proper to Nāṭya or Daśarupaka it cannot be taken as identical with Raghavabhaṭṭa's text only one short passage of four lines quoted by him being directly traceable in our MS.
- (2) The text of the Ādi Bharata presented by our MS professes to be a fairly extensive work consisting of 5 Skandhas 32 Adhyāyas and 221 Prakaraṇas in

6 000 ślokas. It was probably a late work of South Indian origin declared to have been composed by Nārāyaṇa or Nārāyaṇārya, also called Rāmānanda Siddhaśiva-yogirāja.

- (3) It was chiefly a work on Nr̥tta or Nṛṭya, as distinguished from Nāṭya, contained no matter peculiar to works on Dośarūpaka, and probably followed a different tradition which is said to have originated from Umāpati or Śiva himself. If we accept Abhinavagupta's testimony, this tradition was regarded as non-orthodox in his time. Of course it knows Bharata as an exponent of the Nāṭya śāstra. Although some matters inevitably overlap, the present Ādi-Bharata does not appear to have any direct relation with the text of Bharata.
- (4) Whatever may be its intrinsic value, the text of Ādi-Bharata presented by our MS appears to be contained in folios 1 to 33, but it is incomplete. It gives eight chapters and ends with only two chapters (out of six) of the second Śikṣa skandha (out of the five declared Skandhas). It cannot be determined if the text is given in extenso or only in synopsis here, but the text up to the point it goes is fairly orderly and coherent even if it is often corrupt and incorrect.
- (5) There are occasional prose comments especially at the beginning of this text which is written mostly in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka Kāvya but there is no regular running commentary. The name of the work Ādi Bharata, appears connected, in the colophons and also in the preliminary remarks with Nāṭya sarvasva dipikā which last appears to be the name of the commentary. The name Nāṭya sarvasva dipikā itself would suggest the existence of a work called Nāṭya sarvasva on which it might have commented. It is not clear if such a work existed or if the Ādi Bharata itself went by the name Nāṭya sarvasva.

laghu nirṇaya is spoken of on folios 39a-40b. Then comes (folio 42b) the treatment of Sadhikṛmā tala (which ends on folio 43a with the remark कोइलमते सकीर्णवतिदालानि¹), and of Ślāḍīnārṇ Guru laghu nirṇayah (folio 43a). This is followed by the topics of Aṣṭavidha nayika (which should come according to Contents under Bhava nirūpana skandha Adhy 3) and Daśavidha-cumbana (which does not occur in the Contents). Here folio 43b ends abruptly without a colophon.

It is to be noted that this portion of the text from folios 34b to 43b is written generally in the form of Anuṣṭubh Karika but there are occasional short comments in prose and occasional citations of authoritative works. There are references to or quotations from the following works: Saṁgīta ratnakara (folio 34b बालसलप्रविष्टार्थे इति भातोर्षदि स्पृष्ट, folio 36a काललक्षण), Saṁgītaratna tālakala vilasa (folio 34b) Saṁgītaratna (folio 36a) Saṁgīta vidyāvīṇoda (folios 36b-37a) Saṁgīta cūḍamāni (folio 37a) Tāla kala vilasa (folio 37a) Saṁgīta māni darpaṇa (folio 37a) Catura sabha vilasa (folio 37a) Sarasvatī kanthābharana (folio 38a) and Kohala māta (43a). Of these works if the Saṁgīta ratnakara be the well known work of the same name by Saṁgādeva its date would be between 1210 and 1247 A.D. while if the Saṁgīta māni darpaṇa be the work of the same name by Catura Damodara son of Lakṣmīdhara then it may be assigned to the second half of the 15th century. It seems therefore that this portion of the text in our MS cannot be assigned to a date earlier than the 16th century.

It will be seen from this brief description that although some of the topics dealt with would come partially under the Bhava nirūpana skandha (as detailed in the Contents) the portion of the MS from folio 34b to folio 43b which is marked by no distinguishing colophon is of a different

¹ Kohala's lost work appears to have influenced the redactors of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra. See S. K. De Sanskrit Poetics, p. 23. F. V. Kane introduction to his new edition of Sāhitya-darpaṇa (p. 24).

character and can hardly be regarded as forming an organic part or a legitimate continuation of the so called *Adi Bharata* text preceding it. It is perhaps a fragment from some other work on *Nrīta* or *Saṃgīta* dealing generally as it does with the technicalities of *Tala*.

The same remark applies to the remainder of the text given in our MS from the unnumbered folio 44 up to the end on folio 61. This part of the text has a fresh beginning (folio 44a) with श्रीगणेशाय नमः followed by a *Maṅgala* verse to *Ganapati* namely विप्रश्वातनिकारणैस्तरुणिर्विप्रादपीदृश्यवाट which happens to be the fifth *Maṅgala* verse occurring at the commencement on folio 6 (see p 161 above) of the so called *Adi Bharata*. The text which follows is written in *Anuṣṭubh* *Karika* verse with hardly any commentary accompanying it. Starting with the topic of *Hasta lakṣaṇa* (folio 44a) it proceeds to deal briefly with *Ranga devata pujaṇa* (folios 44b-45b) *Nāṭya śāla lakṣaṇa* and *Sabbapati namaskara* (folios 46a-46b) and closes up with *Hasta dvadśa prapa* (46b-47a) which last topic the Contents include under *Adhyāya 1* of the *Bhava nirupana skandha*. Here the fragment ends and folio 47b is left blank.

After this from folio 48a to folio 51a we have a reproduction of the topic of *Citrabhūmayā* of the present text of *Bharata's Nāṭya-śāstra* (ed. Nirmay Sagar Press ch 25 ed. Kāśhī Sanskrit Series ch 26) but some of verses of the printed text of *Bharata* (e.g. verses 74 75a 85 131 of the NSP edition) are missing here. The colophon ends (folio 51a) significantly with इति भारतीयोक्तानि नामिमां समाप्तं ॥

From folios 51a to 57b we have a description in *Anuṣṭubh* metre (without commentary) of *Hasta* mostly of *Asaṃyuta* which follows but it is not identical with that of *Bharata*. The folio 57b three fourths of which is left blank closes with श्रीरामाय नमः सीतालक्ष्मणरत्नलक्ष्मणरत्नमेतथीरामाय नमः । After this folios 58 to 61 deal with the *Vinīyoga* of *Asaṃyuta Hasta* which follows *Bharata* generally but does

The author of the somewhat meagre commentary does not record his name but he mentions his preceptor Vaidya by name

- (6) An examination of the remaining folios 34 to 61 of our MS shows that they do not form a continuation of the work contained in folios 1-33. They present diverse *disjointed fragments of text*, one of which is a direct reproduction from Bharata, while the others, having some passages corresponding to those of Bharata are presumably derived from some unknown source. These, therefore, do not possess any value for our present enquiry.
- (7) The distinction between Bharata and Ādi Bharata as P V Kane rightly observes is made by comparatively late writers. It should be remembered that the word Bharata came to mean an actor or dancer, and in course of time Bharata or Bharata-śāstra came to signify works on Nāṭya, Nṛtya and allied topics. It is possible, therefore, that to distinguish such late amorphous compilations from the older text of the sage Bharata, qualifying adjectives like Ādi or Vṛddha¹ came into existence, on the analogy of the epithet Vṛddha applied in Nīti śāstra to Vṛddha Caṇakya or as P V Kane points out on the analogy of the epithets Vṛddha or Brhat applied to Vṛddha Manu or Brhad Viṣṇu in Smṛiti literature. They might have derived material from different sources, but they were, as these compilations themselves show nothing more than mere manuals to which were given such titles of a vague but high sounding character.

Without further material this is all that can be concluded about Ādi Bharata and its relation to the text of Bharata.

Our Heritage (Journal of the Research Dept. Calcutta Sanskrit College) vol. 1, 1953

¹ Saradātanaya (1175-1250 A.D.) in his *Bhāṣa prakāśane* refers to Bharata Vṛddha as well as to Bharata.

THE THEORY OF *RASA* IN SANSKRIT POETICS

The theory of *Rasa* like the theory of *Dhvani* with which it is intimately connected forms one of the most important aesthetic foundations of Sanskrit Poetics. From its first appearance in the dramatic theory of Bharata down to its establishment as the soul of Poetry in the work of Viśvanatha there has been a steady working out of the idea into a fundamental aesthetic conception and it is worth while to study the gradual unfolding of the idea through its fairly long course of history.

(The dogma of *Rasa* apart from any theory thereon was naturally known to the old writers on Poetics but in the beginning it was taken into account only in connexion with the drama and its importance as one of the essential factors of poetic theory was not properly understood. This importance was probably for the first time ably set forth by the Kashmirian Anandavardhana in the ninth century and subsequently elaborated with such mastery by his commentator Abhinavagupta that it became thenceforth an accepted fact in Sanskrit Poetics never to be set aside by rival systems and improved only in detail by later speculations.)

But it can be easily shown that some theory of *Rasa* however undeveloped or even a *Rasa* School particularly in connexion with the drama was in existence long before the time of Anandavardhana although the bearings of this theory on poetry in contradistinction to drama were seldom discussed. The importance of this dramaturgic *Rasa* School must have been somewhat overshadowed by the dominance of the *Alankara* and the *Riti* Schools in the sphere of poetic theory but its comparative antiquity going back to a period even anterior to Bharata is undoubted. Dramaturgy however appears at first to have formed a study by itself and even among later writers only Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha think it

ment of the Rasa theory which Bharata, if Rājasekhara is right, must have borrowed and worked up into his own system (That the Rasa theory was older than Bharata is apparent from the fact that Bharata himself cites in chs vi and vii several Ślokas in the Ārya as well as in the Anuṣṭubh metres in support of his own statements, and in one place, he distinctly quotes two Ārya ślokas from a chapter of an unknown work relating to the discussion of Rasa¹. It may be mentioned, however, that Keśava Miśra, a comparatively recent writer of the 16th century speaks of one *sutrakāra bhagavan Śauddhodan*,² who according to him was one of the first to formulate the view that Rasa is the essence of poetry. Nothing is known of this mysterious Śauddhodan: apparently a Buddhist writer except that Keśava Miśra on his own acknowledgment, is following this old master, whose views, as recorded in the *Alamkāra śekhara*, do not seem however, to deviate in any material way from those of Mammata.

With Bharata on the other hand we arrive at a distinctly definite landmark. Long before the Dhvani School led by

Car Cat i 276 ii 59 iii 206) on music histrionic art erotics grammar and Tantra. The writer on erotics is cited as Nandīśvara in *Pancasayaka* (*Bik Cat* 533 Peterson ii 110) who is supposed by Aufrecht to be the same as Nandin quoted by Vātsyayana (i 18) but the name Nandikeśvara is given in *Ratirajasya* (*Oxf Cat* 218a Schmidt *Ind Erotik* 1911 pp 46-59). See Schmidt's remarks *ibid* p 47. The work on histrionic art attributed to Nandikeśvara is called *Abhinaya darpana* (ed Manomohan Ghosh Calcutta Sansk Series 1934 English trans A K Coomaraswamy and Duggirala Gopal Krishnaiah with introd and illustrations New York 1936). A work on music called *Nandikeśvara mātā śādhya* in Weber 1729. See also *Madras Car* ix i 15006-8 where mention is made of *Bharatārjuna* supposed to be a condensed version apparently after Bharata of the work of Nandikeśvara by Sumati treating of dramatic gestures and *śālas*. See S. K. De *Sanskrit Poetics* i p 3 footnote.

1 *atīrāya rasa vicāra mukhe* ed Kāvya-māñ p 67

2 *Ala ikara-śekhara* pp 2, 20 etc

Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, was dominant Bharata's views on Rasa seem to have been discussed in some detail with the result divergent theories came to prevail under the names of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Saṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and others all of whom appear to have been commentators on Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*¹ and to have therefore taken Bharata as their starting point. As their discussion however, chiefly related as we have stated above to the dramatic art and as there existed side by side the rival theories of the more

1 The views of all these writers whose works are now lost are known from the exposition of Abhinavagupta (followed by other writers e.g. Mammata, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara etc.) who also cites some less known commentators such as Rāhula or Rāhala and Bhaṭṭa Yāntra. This practically coincides with the enumeration of the different commentators on Bharata by Śārngadeva as the sources of his work (13th century see intro. to Ānandasrama edition of the text) with the exception of the name of Udbhaṭa mentioned by the latter (i. 1. 19). It is curious that Udbhaṭa actually quotes (iv. 4) the first half of Bharata vi. 15 enumerating the eight Rasas only making enough verbal change in the latter portion of the verse to admit Śānta as the ninth Rasa in the category. Rāhula is cited by Śārngadeva as one of his authorities (i. 1. 17) while Lollaṭa and Saṅkuka belong in all probability to the 8th and the 9th centuries. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka does not appear to be very distant chronologically from Abhinava who is the oldest writer to quote him and probably belongs to the end of the 9th or the beginning of the 10th century a date which makes it likely that he is identical as Peterson suggested (intro. *Saṅkha* p. 50) with the Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who is mentioned by Kalhaṇa (v. 159) as having flourished in the reign of Śaṅkara varman son of Avantivarman of Kashmir (see *JRAS.* 1897 p. 296). Sundarama śa in his *Nāṭya-praśṅga* (Ind. Off. Cat. iii p. 347) as well as Rāghavabhaṭṭa speaks of a commentary on Bharata by Mātṛgūptacārya who is also mentioned by Śārngadeva as one of his authorities (i. 1. 17). If this Mātṛgūpta is the same person mentioned by Kalhaṇa (iii. 125-252) as living under Haṇṇa Vikramāditya and referred to by Vāsudeva on *Karpura-manjari* (Aufrecht Cat. Cat. i. 448) as a writer on *Alaṅkāra* then he must have been one of the earliest commentators on the present day text of Bharata. But this view about the date of Mātṛgūpta is very doubtful. These points have been discussed in detail in *Sanskrit Poetics* (vol. i p. 245) which see also on questions of chronology omitted as a rule in this article.

influential Alamkara and Riti Schools who never realized its aesthetic importance the Rasa theory and its exponents never seem to have come into prominence until the idea was taken up by the Dhvani School and worked into its system. In the meantime the dramaturgic Rasa School succeeded to a certain extent in reacting upon and influencing the rival schools who were apparently forced to acknowledge Rasa and accord it even a subsidiary place in their general theory of Alamkara or Riti.

This will be evident from a reference to the standpoints of Bhamaha and Dandin the two earliest known writers on Poetics whose works have survived. Without going into details we may state that to Bhāmaha the most important element in poetry is Vakrokti which is apparently identified with Atīśayokti and which probably means a kind of heightened expression which is the underlying principle of all poetic figures or Alamkaras. Bhamaha does not seem to possess a very clear notion of the function of Rasa in poetry the only direct reference to it occurring in the definition of the figure *rasavat* which in his opinion should manifest the Rasas clearly.¹ Rasa is thus apparently included in the sphere of a particular Alamkāra and given a very subordinate place in his system. Commenting however on Bhamaha's central verse on *vakrokti*: II 85

saṅga sarvatra vakroktir ananyartā vibhāvya

Abhinavagupta attempts to read into it his own idea of Rasa and interprets *vibhāvya* in the technical sense as *pramāḍodyānād r vibhāvatāḥ nitya viśeṣa ca bhāvya* *rasamayikriyā* in.² In other words he takes Bhamaha to mean that by Vakrokti the sense of poetry is rendered into a suitable factor of the Rasa so that by using the word *vibhāvya* with the meaning given to it by Abhinava Bhamaha apparently implies that

¹ *rasavat darśa-saṅga* 1-2 *ga* 2d *rasa* 6

² *Locana* p. 208

Rasa as well as Alambhāra originates in Vakrokti. The scholastic speculation with regard to the origin and function of Rasa does not appear, however, to have started in Bhāmaha's time, and Bhāmaha, in common with Dandin, never uses the technical terms *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc., so familiar to later theorists. On the other hand, Bhāmaha's opinion seems to be that Rasa need not be invariably present in poetry, what must be present is Vakrokti¹). In v 3, no doubt, Bhāmaha speaks² of *kāvya-rasa* as mitigating the rigour of the Śāstra, a sentiment which is endorsed by Rudraṭa³ and which probably inspired the dictum of later writers that the Śāstra is *prabhu sammita*, while the Kāvya is *kantā sammita*⁴. It is probable that the phrase *kāvya-rasa* is used here in the general untechnical sense of 'the flavour of poetry,' but if we read, with Abhinavagupta,⁵ a technical meaning into it, it only shows that the earlier authors were satisfied with assigning only this pleasing and extraneous function to Rasa.

The same remarks with regard to the recognition of Rasa apply more or less to Dandin, but Dandin seems to be more alive to its importance than Bhāmaha. Like Bhāmaha Dandin allows Rasa to be included in the poetic figures and therefore assigns to it only a minor place in his system. It may be contended that Dandin gives greater prominence to Rasa by including it in one of the essential qualities (*guṇa*) of diction (*śūti*), viz. in *madhurya*, which is defined as the

1 s. 30-36 u. 85-6, vi. 23

2 *śraddhā kāvya-rasamūlārāh śāstrin āpy upayukta e f
prathamā dha-madhavāy pibanti kaju bhogajam f*

3 xu 1, 2

4 Abhinava uses the terms *prabhu sammita* and *mitra sammita* (Locana p. 12) which is followed by Mammata (Kāvya-pr. ed. Bombay Sansk. Ser. 1917 p. 9). Later writers distinguish (Eḷāṣaṇi pp. 13-5) between the Vedas which are *prabhu sammita* the Itihāsa etc. which are *mitra-sammita* and the Kāvya which is *kāntā sammita*.

5 Locana p. 182

establishment of Rasa in the word and in the object¹. But from ii 292 it appears that Dandin means by *mādhurya guṇa* mere absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatā*) and does not contemplate the inclusion of Rasa as such. This is made clear by i 64 where *agrāmya artha* is said to be *rasāvaha*, as well as by the *Hṛdayaṅgama* commentary on this point: *mādhurya guṇe pradarśitah śabdārthayor agrāmyatayā jāto rasavākyaśya bhavati, alaṅkāratayā nirdiṣṭau rasavattvam aṣṭa-rasāyattam* (p. 167), the last part of this passage calling attention to the fact that the only cases, where the eight Rasas are admitted by Dandin and which we shall discuss presently, occur in connection with his inclusion of this element in poetic figures like *rasavat*. The *mādhurya guṇa*, according to Dandin, may appear in two aspects, in so far as it creates *vāg-rasa* and *vastu-rasa* (i 51), the former consisting of alliteration of similar sounds (*śrutyānuprāsa*) and the latter denoting absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatā*)². Thus Hemacandra rightly explains Rasa in Dandin's *mādhurya* according as it resides in *vac* or *vastu*, in this way *śruti varnanuprāsābhyāṃ vāg-rasah, agrāmyābhīdheyatā tu vastu-rasah* (p. 198). The Rasa in *mādhurya*, therefore, has a distinct technical connotation different from that imparted to it by the exponents of the Rasa School. A similar use of the term, which, however, Dandin does not explain, as he does in this particular case, is to be found in iii 149 (or iv 26 in the Madras edition) where the phrase *gītam rasah* should be interpreted, as it is done by Tarunavacaspati, *us sudhuvam*³.

1 *vāci vastutay ope rasa-sthitiḥ* i 51

2 See i 51-67. Also Manukyaçandra p. 189

3 The modern commentators are sometimes misled by their own ideas of Rasa and interpret Dandin in that light. For instance Premacandra commenting on Dandin's exposition of the *kāvya-tarīṅga* in i 10, notes *kāvyaṇam śarīraṇi ca ātmabhūtānyā rasādī ryoṅgya sya deha bhūta āśrayaḥ ca* although Dandin himself nowhere speaks of the suggestion of Rasa as the 'soul of poetry'. The same remark

At the same time it cannot be affirmed that Dandin was entirely ignorant of the idea of *Rasa* for he declares that poetic figures to which he attaches great importance as an element of poetry endow the sense with *Rasa* (1 62) although here as elsewhere the *artha-rasa* has a distinct reference to *agramyata* from the context. Again a *Mahakavya* in his opinion should invariably possess *rasa* and *bhava* (1 18). A clearer indication is given by his treatment of the figures *rasavat*, *preyas* and *urjasvin* (II 275-92) where he betrays an undoubted acquaintance with the existence of the eight recognised *Rasas* all of which he enumerates by their respective names and four of which (viz. *śṛṅgāra*, *raudra*, *vīra*, *kāruṇya*) he illustrates as elements of the poetic figures under discussion. If we are to accept Abhinavagupta's interpretation Dandin's conception of *Rasa* like that of Lollata is what may be described as objective or in other words Dandin believes in the causal development of *Rasa* through the Excitants (*vibhāvas*) and Ensouants (*anubhāvas*). Without making a definite statement on this point—for Dandin's somewhat meagre indication hardly justifies us in doing so—we may however affirm that Dandin apparently speaks of *Rasa* as being developed as an effect from a temporary (e.g. *raśi* or *krodhā*) to a permanent mood (e.g. *śṛṅgāra* or *raudra*) and the way in which he deals with the question lends colour to Abhinavagupta's interpretation or at least indicates that Dandin was probably aware of some such theory. For speaking of the figure *rasavat* which according to him possesses the characteristic of manifesting the *Rasas* he gives an example of the manifestation of *śṛṅgāra* in such a figure with the remark *ratih śṛṅgaratam gaurā pa bahulya yogenā* (1 281). Similarly with reference to the development of *raudra* from *krodhā* he says *ity aruhyā* applies to the modern commentary in the ed. of Dandin in Bombay Sanskrit Series.

² See *Bhāratā cārī* (the of which follows below) reproduced partially by Hemacandra p. 57 comm.

parāṇi loṣaṇi krodho raudrātmatāṇi gataḥ (ii 283) But the Rasa in these figures is, of course, subordinate to the expressed figure itself (*alaukikaratayā smṛtam*, ii 287), of which it serves as a means of embellishment. It seems, therefore, that Dandin was to some extent cognisant of *rasa*, *bhāva* etc., but he could not give them a place in his system except as an embellishment of the language or of the sense, and this somewhat objective view of Rasa was apparently responsible for the subordinate position assigned to it in the Alaukikāra and the Riti Schools.

Although Vāmana makes a great advance on Dandin's system in other respects, he does not seem to have gone further than his predecessor in the treatment of Rasa. He emphasises, no doubt, the necessity of distinguishing between those characteristics (*guṇa*) which are essential (*mṛya*) and those (*alaukikāra*) which are secondary (*amṛya*) in poetry, and marks an improvement on Bhāmaha and Dandin, who include Rasa only in the poetic figures, by including it in the essential characteristics, for he defines the *artha-guṇa kānti* as that essential excellence of sense "in which *rasa* is conspicuously present" (*dīpta rasatvam* iii. 2 15). In this respect Vāmana in a way anticipates the importance which Rasa assumed in later schools, but it must be admitted that although Vāmana includes Rasa in the essentials of poetry, he had no clear idea of its aesthetic significance except as an accessory element, just in the same way as he had no clear notion of the 'suggested sense' except as a similar accessory element in a particular figure (iv, 3 8).

Udbhata, a follower of Bhāmaha and a contemporary of Vāmana, adheres in the main to the views of his predecessors and treats Rasa as a subsidiary element in poetry, including it like Bhāmaha in figures like *rasavat*, but in one passage,¹ curiously enough he apparently designates Rasa as the 'soul' of poetry, without, however, setting up an

1 *rasādyaśuddhitasat kāvyaṃ jīva-rūpatayā yataḥ /
kathyaṭe tad rasadīnāṃ kavyatmatvam vyavasthitam //*

aesthetic system on its basis. This verse occurs as vi 17 in the text of Udbhata's work published by Col. Jacob in *JRAS*, 1897, p. 847, but the verse appears to be a little out of place in the context in which it occurs, and in the text published by the Nirnay Sagar Press it is wanting, although given as a quotation with a *tad aha!* in the accompanying commentary of Pratiharenduraja (p. 77). Hermann Jacobi's supposition¹ therefore, based on Jacob's text that Udbhata was the first writer to consider the question as to what constitutes the 'soul' of poetry, and to regard Rasa as such does not appear to be at all plausible. Even if the verse in question be Udbhata's it should be taken as one of his *obiter dicta* which does not fit in well with his system as a whole although Pratiharenduraja would probably find a place for it by reading into Udbhata as he does, his own views about Rasa. It is true that Udbhata betrays a closer acquaintance with the Rasa theory in some form or other and its technicalities using terms like *vibhava sthayan sancarin* (iv 4) and *anubhava* (iv 2) and enumerating after Bharata vi 15 the eight orthodox Rasas with the addition of a ninth *santa* in the category, but all this is taken into account as an embellishment of the expressed figure or in other words Rasa is not considered for its own sake but because it helps to emphasise and constitute the charm of the particular figure. Hence Pratiharenduraja remarks that the question as to the nature of *rasa* and *bhava* and how far they may stand as a mere *kavyulankara* or as the very 'soul' of poetry, is not discussed partly for fear of prolixity and partly because it is not relevant.²

¹ Ed. *Kāvya-mālā* p. 50. Not much capital can be made out of this article, Prof. Jacobi admitted that his contention was no longer tenable.

² Ed. *Kāvya-mālā* p. 50. Not much capital can be made out of the fact, referred to in p. 180 footnote above, that Śiṅgaḍeṣa mentions Udbhata as one of the commentators on Bharata. If it were true it only shews that Udbhata was conversant with Bharata's

Rudraja on the other hand seems to be the earliest writer who explicitly includes a treatment of Rasa as a separate topic devoting four chapters to the discussion of Rasa and its adjunct subject of the hero and heroine (*nayaka nayikā*). It is not clear, however, what theoretical significance he attaches to Rasa, for although at the beginning of his work he praises poets who have won eternal fame by composing poetry enlivened by Rasa he devotes a comparatively small part of his work to its treatment and is entirely silent with regard to the theoretical aspect of the question. Out of the sixteen chapters into which his work is divided only two chapters deal directly with Rasa not theoretically but descriptively while the rest is taken up with the details of the poetic figures (*alamkaras*), on which apparently he puts greater emphasis. Speaking of the necessity of making a poem *sarasa* he says (su 1) that to those who enjoy the Rasas but fight shy of the dry Śāstras instruction in the *caruvargas* is easier to impart through the medium of delectable writing, and this seems in his opinion, to be the chief motive for inspiring the sense of poetry with Rasa. Rudraja in his theoretical attitude has no affinity with the Rasa School but rather with the Alamkara School and we have the testimony of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha to this effect. Ruyyaka says¹ that Rudraja laid special stress on *alamkara* in which he comprised the three kinds of suggestion including the suggestion of Rasa (*rasa*

theory as his citation of a half line from Bharata and use of technical terms like *vibhava* etc. would indicate. It does not prove that he belonged to the school of Bharata. On the other hand evidence is not wanting that Udbhata belonged to the Alamkara School (Ruyyaka p. 7) and was a follower of Bhamaha whose definitions of many poetic figures (e.g. *rasamāṭi alāyokā sāsaḥ deśa sahoṭi apāṇāṭi utprekṣā yathasā kṛvā aprastuta prafamsa parayokā ākṣepa vibhāvana vrodha and bhāṭikā*) he faithfully copies and on whose text he also appears to have written a *vyākhyāna* (Pratibandha p. 13. Locana pp. 10, 40, 159. Hemacandra p. 17. Ruyyaka p. 183. Samudrabandha pp. 89-90).

1. Ed. Kavyamālā p. 5. Samudrabandha agrees with this.

dhvani) and that in the figure *rasavat* and the like the *rasa* and *bhava* implied are taken as elements which only heighten the charm of the expressed idea. Namiśadhu Rudrāṣa's commentator however explaining Rudrāṣa xii 2 states in the usual metaphorical language that in the opinion of his author *śabda* and *artha* constitute the body of poetry the poetic figures take the place of artificial ornaments while *rasa* resembles natural qualities like beauty prowess etc (*rasas tu saundaryādaya iva sahaja-guṇaḥ*). This interpretation only shows that like Vāmana Rudrāṣa was a step in advance of Bhamaha and Dandin inasmuch as he would regard *Rasa* as a natural quality which is not extraneous but stands in intimate relation to poetry but there is nothing anywhere in Rudrāṣa which will support this elaborate description especially as Rudrāṣa can scarcely be supposed to look upon poetic figures which are of utmost importance in his view of poetry as mere artificial ornaments of expression.

The older writers on Poetics therefore before the advent of the *Dhvani* School contented themselves with the working out of the outward form of expression and hardly troubled themselves with the question of an ulterior aesthetic principle the soul (*ātman*) of poetry nor do they identify as some later writers do this soul with the subtle psychological factor known as *rasa*. Vāmana no doubt offers to solve the question by declaring (i 2 6) that the *Riti* which has been usually but inadequately translated as style or diction is this soul but in Vāmana's view the *Riti* is not the expression of poetic individuality but the objective beauty of representation called forth by the unification of certain more or less fixed excellences known as *guṇas* or by adjustment of word and sense. The older writers therefore lay the greatest emphasis on the poetic figures or *alankāras* as Ruyyaka (p 7) testifies or on *riti* or diction in the objective sense and although cognisant of that aesthetic delectableness which should be present in all poetry and which in Sanskrit goes by the name of *Rasa* they could not yet har-

monise it well into their theory of externals, and treated it more or less as an embellishment of the language by including it in certain poetic figures or by allowing it to form an element of the excellences of diction. The Rasa could come into their system only through this backdoor as it were. It is partly for this reason that the Dhvanikara (in 52) condemns earlier theories as crude and insufficient for the purpose of explaining the nature of poetry and expounds his own aesthetic doctrine in which Dhvani especially Rasa dhvani plays such an important part.

The Dhvanikara however in his exposition of *rasa dhvani* seems to have been greatly influenced by the dramaturgic Rasa School (Bharata declared that the business of the drama was to evolve one or more of the eight Rasas and therefore a more or less elaborate psychology of human sentiments had been analysed in the service of the dramatic art. Bharata's ideas on these psychological processes and on Rasa which is the final internal experience consisting in the consciousness of a certain objective condition of the ego were elaborated by his commentators and followers till the Dhvanikara followed by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta came into the field.) From the earlier drama and dramatic theory therefore the idea of Rasa was taken over to poetry and poetic theory and as the transition from the naïve to the sentimental poetry was accomplished the theorists went a step further and erected Rasa into one of its essential aesthetic foundations. Anandavardhana is quite explicit on this point when he says *etac ca rasadī tatparyena kāvya sambandhanam bhāratadāvatī suprasiddham eva* (p. 181). In other words what was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others thus found its way into poetry profoundly modifying as it did, the entire conception of Kāvya. In the same way Abhinavagupta commenting on the concluding part on of the prose passage just before Bharata vi 33 says *nāṣṭi samudāya rūpād rasah naṣṭa eva rasah kaṣṭhe pī nāṣṭi jāmana eva rasah kāvyārthah*. Similarly Roderabhaṣya states at

the beginning of his work (1-5) that Bharata and others have already discussed Rasa in connexion with the drama, while his own object is to apply it to the case of poetry

It must be noted, however, that although all later theorists take Bharata as their starting point, and build up their own theories round his authoritative, if somewhat meagre, text, Bharata himself, like most old masters, is very simple in his statements, and the subject does not appear to have been yet brought into the realm of scholastic speculation. Bharata's work is encyclopaedic in scope but his primary theme is the drama and his conception of poetry dramatic, a view which perhaps inspired Vamana's partiality towards dramatic composition expressed in 1-3 30-32 and which is concisely put by Abhinavagupta by saying *kāvyaṁ śāvad dātarupitma-kam eva*. In such a composition Rasa, according to Bharata, should be predominant, for he says that the drift of sense which arises from Rasa appeals to the heart and pervades the body, like fire lighting up dry pieces of wood¹. Without Rasa there can be no sense of poetry². Although Bharata does not go much into technicalities he seems to be of opinion that the *vibhavas* and *anubhavas* which, according to later theory, constitute the essential factors, call forth Rasa, but he is not clear as to what this process of evolution exactly is. He explains *bhāva* the basis of Rasa generally as that which brings into existence the sense of poetry through the three kinds of representation, viz. through words, gestures and internal feeling³. This *bhāva* when permanent and not transitory, reaches the state of Rasa through the factors known as *vibhava* and *anubhava*⁴. A *vibhava* is explained thus.

1 vi 7

2 *na hi rasad rīe kalcid arthah pravarīte* ed. Grosset p 87
ed. Kavyamālā p 62.

3 *vag-ā-ga-sattvopetān kāvy-arthan bhavayantīti bhāvaḥ* op cit., p 100 op cit p 69

4 *śhōjano eva bhāvā rasatānām āpnuvanti* op cit p 102 op cit p 70 *śāra v bhāvānubhava vābhīkarī samyagod rasa uppatīh* op cit p 87 op cit, p 62.

*vibhāva itī kasmād ucyate, vibhāvo nāma vijñānārthah, vibhāvyante'nena vāg anga-sattvābhīnayā ityato vibhāvah*¹ The word *vibhāva* is used, therefore, to imply knowledge or understanding and may be explained generally as that which makes the three kinds of representation capable of being sensed. In the same way, the *anubhāva* is explained as that which follows upon and makes the three kinds of representation actually sensed.² The third element of Rasa, the *vyabhicārī bhāva*, consists of accessory facts which help and strengthen it, and is etymologically described as *vi abhi sty etān upasargau cara gatau dhātuh*³ As to what relation these factors bear to Rasa and how this state of relish is brought about, Bharata simply lays down: *vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicārī saṁyogād rasa-niṣpattih*, a formula which, in spite of his own explanation, is so ambiguous with respect to the exact significance of the central terms *saṁyoga* and *niṣpatti* that a great deal of controversy has gathered round its interpretation. As each commentator has tried to explain it in his own way, it has given rise, as we shall presently see, to a number of theories on Rasa. Bharata's own explanation, if it can be called an explanation, is that just as a beverage is accomplished through various seasoned articles and herbs, so the permanent mood, the *sthāyi-bhāva*, reinforced (*upagata*) by various *bhāvas*, attain the state of *rasa*⁴ and it is so called because its essence consists in its taste or relish (*rasa itī kah padārthah, ucyate*

1 *op cit.*, pp 100-1 *op cit.* p 69

2 *anubhāva itī kasmād ucyate yad aham anubhavasau manur abhinayannasau vāg-angasattva kriam abhinayam itī op cit.* p 101 *op cit.* p 69

3 Bharata deals with *lakṣaṇa alankāra doṣa* and *gana* under *vācika abhinaya* treated in ch. XIX to XX and these are thus made subordinate to Rasa. All these elements are considered in so far as they form dramatic embellishments, but *lakṣaṇa* disappear in later works being included either under *alankāra* (Dandin II 366 and *Dattarupaka* ed Hall IV 78) or under *gana* and *alankāra* (Viśvanātha VI p 322, ed Durgaprāsada)

4 Ed Grosset p 83 ed Kavyamālā p 62

asvadyatvat) He also explains that the *sthāyī bhāva* is the basis of Rasa because it attains as it were mastery or sovereignty among the forty nine different *bhāvas* (viz. eight *sthāyī bhāvas* eight *sattvika bhāvas* and thirty three *vyabhicārī bhāvas* mentioned by him in vii ad 6 and vi 16 f) which naturally rest upon it as being presumably the principal theme of the composition in question¹ Nothing definite can be concluded from all this except that in Bharata's opinion the *sthāyī bhāva* is the basis of Rasa, while the *vibhava* *anubhava* and *vyabhicārī* contribute to its final realisation But this explanation by its very ambiguity or vagueness taxed the ingenuity of the commentators its general trend anticipating theories like the *utpatti vada* of Lollata and the *anumiti vada* of Saṅkuka while special technicalities (used probably in an untechnical sense by Bharata himself) like *vyanjita* and *samānya guṇa yoga* occurring in the text suggesting or lending support to specialised doctrines like the *vyakti vada* of Abhinavagupta or the *bhukti vada* of Bhaṭṭa Nayaka

The general foundations of the theory however, remain as fixed by Bharata It is practically admitted on all hands that the Rasa is realised when a permanent mood or *sthāyī bhāva* is brought to a relishable condition through the three elements viz the *vibhava* the *anubhava* and the *vyabhicārī bhāva* Of these the first two are the more important the *vyabhicārī* being only concomitant or accessory Bharata's explanations of these terms are rendered with greater precision by his followers By *sthāyī bhāva* in poetry and drama are meant certain more or less permanent conditions of the mind such as love grief anger or fear This permanent mood constituting the principal theme of composi-

1 *aurātā vad anyanyārtha-saṅskṛtair vibhā An bhāva rajanyā r
ekonapa caśatā bhā aīh sāmānya guṇa yogenābh n pādyaṇte ra āh
tar kaīham dān m sī ā) na eva bhā va rasatvam ānu anr ucyaie
bahvāī ayatāḥ x īmīl tal sthā) na bhā āh ed Grosset pp 107
ed Kāvya-mālā, p 70*

tion and running through all other moods like the thread of a garland cannot be overcome by those akin to it or those opposed to it but can only be reinforced. Those elements which respectively excite, follow and strengthen (if we may use these expressions) the *sthayi bhava* are in poetry and drama known as *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *vyabhicari bhava*¹ although in the ordinary world they may be known as mundane cause and effect (*laukika karana* and *karja*). Devoid of technicalities a *vibhava* may be taken as that which makes the permanent mood capable of being sensed an *anubhava* as that which makes it sensed while a *vyabhicari* (also called *samcari*) *bhava* as that which acts as an auxiliary or gives an impetus to it. In the case of Love as a permanent mood the stock examples given of *vibhava* are women and the seasons of *anubhava* glance and embrace of *vyabhicarin* the transient subordinate feelings of joy and anxiety. Now Bharata says that the Rasa is realised through a certain correlation of these elements with the *sthayi bhava* or permanent mood. The question therefore arises to which Bharata himself gives no definite solution viz. what this process of realisation actually consists in and what relation do these elements bear to Rasa in this process: the solution depending upon the explanation of the two much discussed terms *samyoga* and *nispatti* in Bharata's original dictum cited above.

✓ Bhatta Lollata appears to be one of the earliest commentators of Bharata to offer an explanation. But excepting the brief review of his opinion in *Abhinavagupta's* commentary²

1 Ballantyne renders these terms conveniently if not very adequately as the Excitant, the Eminent and the Accessory respectively a nomenclature which is accepted by Gangadhar Bha in his translation of the *Rasya prakasa*. H. Jacob however (*ZDMG* 1902 p. 394 ff) uses the terms Factor, Effect and Concurrent.

2 The extracts given below are taken from a transcript published herewith of the Tiruvandrum Palace MS. received through the kind offices of Gangadhar Bha. Lollata's views are reviewed after Abb.

on Bharata which is copied more or less by all subsequent writers from Mammaṭa and reproduced almost literally but anonymously by Hemacandra. Lollaṭa is unknown to us and his work is apparently lost. Very little can be gathered from this summary exposition by an adverse critic but it appears that Lollaṭa took the *vibhāṭa* as the direct cause (*kāraṇa*) of Rāsa which is therefore an effect (*anukārya* or *utpadya*) and the word *niṣpatti* of Bharata is explained as *utpatti* or *puṣṭi*.¹ The Rāsa found in characters like Rāma is attributed to the actor who imitates the character in form, dress and action and thus charms the spectator.² Mammaṭa and his followers agree with this interpretation of Lollaṭa by Abhinava but they make it more clear by saying that the permanent mood or the *sthayī* is directly connected with the hero (*mukhyaṭya vṛtīya* = *sakṣat sambandhena*) but it is recognised as existing in the actor³ through a clever imitation of the original character, this imitation being apparently the source of the charm (*camaikaraṇa* *hetu*) to the spectator. The locus of the Rāsa therefore is supposed to be in the hero but it is not clear how it is apparently transferred to the actor and how the spectator is charmed by a feeling which does not exist in him. Govinda therefore rightly comments on this view of

nava, in Mammaṭa iv ed. Bom. Sansk. Ser., p. 87. Hemacandra p. 57. Mallinatha on Vidyādharma p. 85. Govinda ed. Kavyamālā p. 63. Hemacandra practically reproduces Abhinavagupta's very words.

1 *utpa bl āṭṭa lolleṭa prabhīṭayās tavad eva n vyacakhyat. Vibhāṭ tad bhīṭi sanīyogo rti at sthāyinat tato rāsa nīṣpattiḥ. Tatra vibhāṭaś c ita piteḥ sthāyīyatm kārya utpattau kāraṇam. anī bhāṭi al ca na rāsa jāyātīti v vaktīta. teṣāṃ rāsa karanatīcna gāṇāṇāratīvāt api tu bhāṭāṇāṃ eva etc.* Abh. on Bh.

2 *sthāyīyeva vibhāṭān bhāvāt bh r upacito rāsaḥ sthāyī bl avatr-anupacītaḥ. Sa cobhāyo py anukārye nukārya ap [v]īcarānusaṃbādhanā bāṭāḥ itī cīrāntanānī n cāyāṃ pakṣaḥ.* Abh. on Bh.

3 *rāmadāvanukārye tad rūpānusaṃdī anan nartake pī prai yamāna rāsaḥ.* Mammaṭa loc. cit. where the term *prai yamānaḥ* is interpreted by Govinda as *aropyamānaḥ* (*naṭe tu tulya r pāṇanusaṃdī arā vāṭāḥ aropyamānaḥ san aḥ kāmāni cūmaṭkara hetuḥ* p. 63).

Lollaṭa *tad apeśalam sāmajikeṣu tad-abhave śatra camatkara-anubhava virodhat, na ca tajñānam eva camatkara hetuḥ laukika śrīṅgarādi darśanenāpi camatkara prasangat* (p. 63)

The rival school of Saṅkuka we are told by Abhinava gupta and following him by Hemacandra brings forward ingenious objections into the technicalities of which we need not enter here.¹ The later writers² however demur to this cause and effect theory on more philosophical grounds. An effect they argue may exist when its efficient cause is destroyed, but as the life of Rasa is circumscribed by contact with the *vibhavas* (*vibhavadi paramarśa jñātavadhī*) it disappears when the latter disappear a fact which goes to prove that the Rasa must not be taken as an ordinary mundane (*laukika*) effect.³ Again the cause and the effect cannot

1 Saṅkuka for instance maintains that Bharata apparently uses the terms *rasa* and *śhānta* synonymously for the latter mentions the same *vibhāvas* with respect to a particular *śhānta* and its corresponding *rasa* and hence if they are identical there is no question of one being produced from the other. Nothing can be gained by replying that in its undeveloped state it is *śhānta* but in the developed state it is *rasa* for such a supposition will involve an infinite multiplication (*ānanyūpama*) of the stages of *śhānta* and its corresponding *rasa*. If it is said that in its highest stage of development it is *rasa* then how can we imagine sixteen different varieties of *hāṣya-rasa* (Bharata vi. 52) or the ten different stages of *śrīṅgāra* (Bharata xiii. 154-175)? Besides the priority of *śhānta* in relation to *rasa* is not always vouchsafed by experience: a great sorrow felt in its intensity at the beginning is not seen to subside in time but grow stronger (see Hemacandra pp. 57-8).

2 Among the earlier authors Daṇḍin as already noted appears to have been influenced by Lollaṭa's theory which is entirely discredited in later times. This does not argue the priority of Lollaṭa to Daṇḍin for the theory in which the influence of Mīmāṃsaka is apparent, might have obtained in the schools before Lollaṭa first brought it into prominence.

33 Mallinātha on Ekādaśī p. 87 *kūṛyatre ghaṭād vai vibhāḍi mīle pi raṭṭnaḥ pī prasāṅgah* — *na cāstyaḥlaukikasya a-prakāśānandātmakasya laukika pramāṇa-gamyanam* see also pp. 93-4 Govinda p. 69 *vibhāḍiḥ parāmarśarjā kṛānatanādi yadi ā, ānādi nimitta-kāraṇatvam* etc.

be contemporaneous if Rasa is supposed to be an effect its relish cannot be as it actually is contemporaneous with the appearance of the *vibhavas*. Hence Viśvanātha remarks that if Rasa is an effect having for its cause the perception of the *vibhavas* then at the time of the relish of Rasa the *vibhavas* would not be perceived for we do not find the simultaneous perception of a cause and its effect. The perception of the touch of the sandal wood unguent and the perception of the pleasure produced thereby cannot take place simultaneously however rapid the one may succeed the other.¹

Śaṅkuka therefore the next commentator on Bharata rejecting this theory contends that the Rasa is not produced as an effect but *inferred*. The permanent mood is inferred to exist in the actor—though not actually existing in him²—by means of the *vibhavas* etc cleverly exhibited by him in his acting so as to produce an illusion of identity with the feelings of the hero³ and the mood thus inferred being sensed by the spectator through its exquisite beauty⁴ adds to itself a peculiar charm and thus develops into a relishable condition called Rasa. The realisation of Rasa therefore is simply a process of logical inference the *nispatti* of Bharata being explained as *anumiti* and the *vibhava* stands to Rasa in the relation of *anumapaka* or *gamaka* to *anumapya* or *gamyā*. But the mood itself though inferred in this way from the relation of the major and middle terms (*liṅga-bālatā*) is yet cognised as different from the objects of ordinary inference being inferred as it were by force of its exquisite charm as something to be relished on account of its connexion with the *vibhavas* etc which though artificial are not recog-

1 Ch. I, p. 86 ed. Durgaprasāda.

2 *nañe tyanta dya n'no pa* Hemacandra p. 58.

3 *ramadyabhadra-bha ena nañe ta p akaf ta r e a bh v d bh r anumitah* Mallinātha p. 83.

4 *ast saunda ya bālatā rāsa ya vena s hāy nam anjanumeja a lakṣyaṇa* Govinda p. 65. practically paraphrasing Mammaṭa p. 50.

nised as such.¹ This cognition or knowledge is characterised² as based on what is called *citra-turaga-nyāya*, (viz the analogy by which a horse in a picture is called a horse), and should be differentiated from the true ('he is Rāma'), the false ('he is Rāma' with a following negation 'he is not Rāma'), the doubtful ('he may or may not be Rāma') knowledge, as well as from the knowledge of similarity ('he is like Rāma').

This theory, however, has been discredited by later schools because, as Govinda concisely sums up the objections, it disregards the well recognised fact that the inference of a thing can never produce the same charm as its direct cognition.³ It has been pointed out that the Rāsa is not capable of being cognised by the ordinary means of arriving at knowledge, for the feeling of Rāma, the hero represented on the stage, being past, cannot be cognised by the organs of sense belonging to the present time and the present place.⁴ The *anumāna* theory is discussed elaborately in connexion with the theory of 'suggestion', coming topically within the province of the suggestion of Rāsa (*rasa dhvani*), by later adherents of the Dhvani School⁵ and the general argument

1 *karana-kārya sambodhībhiḥ kṛtrimaḥ api tātha nobhūtiḥ* *anumāna* Mammata iv, also Hemacandra p. 58

2 Mammata ibid Hemacandra expanding Abhinava's exposition on this point puts it in this way *na citra nartaka eva sukṣite prate patih nāpyayam eva rama it na capyam sukṣite napi ramaḥ yad a na vāyam it na capy tai sadṛśam it kiṁtu santyati anityā samāya sādṛśa prastūbhya vācāṇaḥ citra-turagādy nyāyena yā sukṣite ramaḥ anūyayam it pratīte aṁ* (p. 59)

3 *etaḥ apy ahṛdayagṛaḥ yataḥ pratyakṣam eva jñānāḥ sa-camat karam nanumityadit it loka prasādāḥ avadhānyayāḥ kalpane mana bhavaḥ*, p. 65

4 *yad api rasatyānāpyatvābhīdhānāḥ tad api rasasya rater utā tva sanukṛta-deḥa varitamāna kalendriya sāmākarṣaṇāpyatvābhī prayena* Vidyadhara p. 94

5 The *anumāna* theory never appears to have received liberal recognition in the hands of later theorists. Mahimabhatta author of the *Pyākā uvāḥa* was the only known writer who put forward a similar theory, for trying to prove in opposition to the accepted Dhvani theory that the so called *dhvani* including *rasadhvani* can be arrived at by the ordinary process of logical inference he professed him self to be an *anumati vadin* in his idea of Rāsa. We do not possess enough data to decide what relation if any Mahima bore to his predecessor Śaṅkuka. We have the testimony indeed of a very late (A.D.

by which it is sought to be discarded is that the *vibhāvas* cannot be taken as the middle term in proving the *sthāyin*, because the *vibhāvas* do not stand in the same relation to the

1700) and not usually careful writer, Rāmācāraṇa who commented on the *Sthītya-darpana* that Mahima was in reality a follower of Śaṅkuka (*śaṅkuka-matānūjīnānāḥ vyākṛtīśīrekakāśārādīnānāḥ maraṇā dājayati*, ed. Durgaprasāda p. 248 ed. Roer, p. 121 note), but Mahima himself who throughout takes pride in his originality omits all reference direct or indirect to his predecessor. It is probable however that the theory developed by Mahima was not originated by him. Ānandavardhana himself refutes at some length (pp. 201 f.) a similar theory which tried to establish that the cognition of the unexpressed is nothing more than the cognition of the object of a logical conclusion so that the relation of the suggestor and the suggested is that of the syllogistic middle and major terms. Mahimabhaṭṭa's theory bears little resemblance to that of Śaṅkuka for the former proceeds on a quite different line. Although accepting the new concept of *dhīraṇī* he differs from Ānanda in holding that it can be realised by *anumāna* and that therefore there is no need to establish a separate function of *vyākhyāna* and by a process of elaborate destructive criticism he attempts to make the definition of *dhīraṇī* conform to what he calls *lāṭyānūmāna* as the process by which another sense is revealed by the expressed sense (*vācya*) or by a sense inferred sometimes connectively from it (p. 22). He argues that the existence of a *lāṭya* or sequence however imperceptible (*asatīlakṣya*) cannot be denoted between the suggested elements (*vyākhyāya vattu alamkāra* or *rasa*) and the expressed (*vācya*) sense (*vibhāva* in case of *rasa*) and this only shows that the two senses expressed and unexpressed (*vācya* and *vyākhyāna*) are sequential and being such bear the relation of premise and conclusion (pp. 11 f.). Hence *artha* is merely a ground of inference which is very wide in its scope (*mahābhāga*) and not a *vyākhyāna*. Again as *śabala* exhausts itself after expressing its literal or primary sense even the secondary sense (*lakṣya artha*) has admittedly to be inferred not from itself but from the latter how can it be supposed to be a *vācya* and convey a deeper sense? But such words through their expressed sense can well become a source of inference (*anumānpaka*) pp. 27 f. There is no room here to consider this theory in detail nor take into account the different objections urged against its over-subtlety (see Mammāṭa v. Ruyyaka ed. Kāvyaṃbhāṭṭa pp. 123. Vidyādharma pp. 32 ff. Viśvanātha. v.) Mahima had no followers in later literature.

sthāyin as the middle term (*sādhana*) does to the major term (*sādhya*), but are simply its suggestor (*vyāñjaka*)

The *vibhāvas*, therefore, are neither the efficient cause (*kāraka hetu*) nor the logical cause (*jñāpaka-hetu*) of Rasa, as held respectively by Lollata and Śaṅkuka. In both these theories the difficulty remains, namely, that if Rasa is an objective entity, produced or inferred, how can it bring about a subjective feeling of relish in the audience in whom these factors are presumably absent? If, on the other hand, it is supposed that it exists in the audience also, the question still remains as to how the particular feelings of a particular hero, like Rāma who is different or superior to the spectator himself, can be relished or realised as his own by the spectator. These objections are ably set forth by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as interpreted by Abhinava in his *Locana* (pp. 67-8), *raso yadi para-gatatayā prāṇyate, tarhi tūjasthityam eva syāt. Na ca svagatatvena rāmadā caritamayāt kāvyād asau pratīyate. Sva-gatatvena ca pratītau svātmāni rasayopattir evābhyupagatā syāt, sā cayuktā sāmānyikānāṃ praty avibhāvavat Kantātvaṃ sādharāṇaṃ vāsanā vīkasa hetur vibhāvanayaṃ prayojakaṃ itī cet, devatā-varṇanādau tad api katham? Na ca śva kanta-smaranam madhye samivedyate. Aloka sāmānyūnāṃ ca rāmādinaṃ ye samudra setu bandhādāyo vibhāvās te katham sādharāṇyaṃ bhajeyuh?*

Hence Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka attempts to refute these earlier theories (as well as those of the new Dhvani School who later on found a champion in Abhinavagupta), and sets up a peculiar theory of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*). He argues that (1) Rasa cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes, namely, the *vibhāvas*, being non-realities, cannot bring about real effects, (2) it cannot be inferred, because the character, Rāma, not really being before the audience, his feeling does not exist, and what does not exist cannot be inferred (*na ca tatvato rāmarāya smṛtir, anupalabdhavarai*). Besides, how is it possible for the ordinary reader or spectator to identify himself with the extraordinary virtues of a hero

Saṃkhya philosophers which is borrowed by these theorists, from the prominence of the attribute of goodness (*sattva*) in a man and differing from what is known as worldly happiness¹. It is distinguished from the two kinds of knowledge *anubhava* and *smarana*, and consisting of the qualities of melting, pervading and expanding the mind it is compared to the indescribable bliss of divine contemplation². According to Bhaṭṭa Nayaka, therefore, the Rasa consists in the *sthayi bhava* or the permanent mood experienced in a generalised form in poetry and drama through the powers of *abhidha* and *bhāvaiatva* and enjoyed by a blissful process known as *bhoga* till it is raised to a state of pleasurable relish, which is not worldly (*alaukika*) and which is akin to the philosophic meditation of Brahma.

It will be noticed that all these different theories about Rasa though applied to drama and poetry, are at the same time tinged with the doctrines of the various schools of Indian Philosophy. Lollata appears to be a Mīmāṃsaka, Saṅkuka a Nāyayika, while Bhaṭṭa Nayaka seems to follow the Saṃkhya doctrine. But what is more noticeable is that in Bhaṭṭa Nayaka we mark a transition from what may be called the objective to the subjective view of Rasa and an understanding that the whole phenomenon should be explained in terms of inward experience. If we may judge from the some what elaborate criticism levelled against this theory it seems to have produced a greater impression and undoubtedly paved the way for the later theory of Abhinavagupta to whom really belongs the credit of elaborating the new aesthetic system of

1 *sattvotreka prakāśānandamāya saṁvīṭi vīraṁti satattvina bhogena bhujate* Mammata explained by Govinda as *bhogaś ca sattva guṇo drek it prakāśate ya anandas tat svarūpananyatān bandh ya saṁvīṭi tat svarūpo laukika sukla anubhava-ī lakṣanaḥ* etc. *sāṅkhya siddhāntaḥ sūtrina* viii p. 66.

2 *tato pūṭi aīa-smṛtyāḥ vīlakṣaṇena drūti vistara vikāśatmanā para brahmānanda saṁvīṭhena bhogena* Abh. on Bh. bhā. līc. ca. ca. ca. *tasya bhogaś ya pūṭi aīa smarana pratipattiḥ vīlakṣaṇa e a drūti vīraṁti vīlakṣaṇa nāṭya* para brahmānanda-saṁvīṭh. Locana p. 68.

like Rama? To solve these difficulties, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as interpreted by Abhinava and others, maintains that the Rasa is enjoyed in connection with the *vibhāvas* through the relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed (*bhōjaka* and *bhōjya*). This school postulates three different functions of a word, namely, *abhidhā* (already admitted by Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians), *bhāvakatva* and *bhōjakatva*. *Abhidhā*, however, is not Denotation merely, but is given an extended meaning so to include *lakṣanā* or Indication¹ in its scope thus embracing the two functions already analysed by previous speculation. *Bhāvakatva* which, as Abhinavagupta suggests, is derived apparently from Bharata's general definition of *bhava* is described as the power of generalisation which makes the *vibhāvas*, as well as the *sithayī bhava* sensed in their general character without any reference to their specific properties². For instance, the *vibhāva* *Sita*, is understood through this power not as a particular individual but in the general character of a woman³ and the *sithayī-bhāva* e.g. Rama's love towards her, is taken as love in general without any reference to the agent or the object⁴. By the third function of *bhōjakatva*, the *sithayī* is enjoyed in this general form, accompanied by the *vibhāvas*, sensed also in a general form and this enjoyment is described as a process of delectation similar to the enlightened, self-sufficient and blissful knowledge arising, in the language of the

1 *abhidhāpi lakṣanavācā*, *Locana* p. 68 *tatrabhidhā nirantara-santarārtha nyāyātvena dvaidhā* *Goviṇḍa* p. 66

2 *vibhāvādi sādharanīkaranātmana abhidhātō dīptīyenoṣṭhena bhāvakatva vyāpāreṇa bhāvyamāṇaḥ* *Abh. on Bh. loc. cit.* *etad bhāvakatvān nāmo yaḥ kavyasya tad vibhāvādīnam sādharanatūpadānaḥ namo* *Locana loc. cit.* *bhāvakatvāni sādharanīkaranam tena ca vyāpāreṇa vibhāvādayaḥ sītanī ca sādharanīkriyante* *Goviṇḍa* p. 66

3 *sādharanīkaranānī etad eva yaḥ sūcī vīkṛjanādī kāmīnīvādī nāmanvhopasthātūḥ* *Goviṇḍa loc. cit.*

4 *sādharanīkṛtena vibhāvādī kēna bhāvakā vyāpāreṇa naṭadī kṛtāyo parihāreṇa sādharanatājānīyamīdī vyāmanāḥ sithayī* *Malimatha* p. 85

which Vamana had already amply recognised and on which the Alankāra and the Riti Schools had put so much emphasis. The metaphorical or the allegoric however veiled it may be is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such but the suggestive (*vyangya*) is always unexpressed and is therefore a source of greater charm through its capacity of concealment, for this concealment in which consists the essence of art is in reality no concealment at all. The new aesthetic school claims a particular function of suggestion appertaining to words and their senses whereby the unexpressed or the inexpressible is called into being or to speak with *haṁt* whereby poetry becomes an expression of the aesthetic idea.

Now the unexpressed through the suggestive power of word or idea may be an unexpressed thought or matter (*vastu*) or an unexpressed figure of speech (*alamkāra*) but in most cases it is a mood or feeling (*rasa*) which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani School therefore took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and tried to harmonise the idea of Rasa with the theory of Dhvani. It was realised that poetry was not as Dandin thought the mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language the feelings and moods play an important part in it. But the feelings and moods in themselves are inexpressible. We can give a name to them but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best therefore we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or describe are the *vibhavas* etc. but with the help of these expressed element which must be generalised and conceived not as they appear in the mundane world but as they may be imagined in a poetic world the poet can awaken in us through the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas a particular *alaukika* condition of the soul in which the relish of the feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling as the person (e.g. Rama) whom he describes felt in times past but he can call up a reflection of

the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana¹ From his extensive literary and philosophical studies as well as from his interest in the works of Bharata and his followers, Abhinava seems to have realised that no system of Poetics, like no system of Dramaturgy, can ever completely ignore the feelings, moods and sentiments and must find an important place for Rasa the manifestation of which is as much the business of poetry as of the drama The insufficiencies of the earlier theories on Rasa are obvious but it was a happy idea to elaborate the theory in such a way as not only to supply these deficiencies but also to fit it well into the *dhvani* theory formulated by the new school

It is not necessary for us to enter into the details of the *dhvani* theory, it will suffice here to indicate generally how the idea of Rasa was worked up into it The Dhvani School in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the contents of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts The one is that which is expressed and includes what is given in so many words, the other content is not expressed but must be added to it by the imagination of reader or the listener The unexpressed or the suggested part, which is distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is developed by a peculiar process of suggestion (*vyanjana*) is taken to be the 'soul' or essence of poetry To the grammarians and learned writers it seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of a poem is that which is not even expressed On the other hand some form of symbolical speech in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words was always in vogue, and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegories But the suggestive poetry is something different from the merely metaphorical

¹ There is some difference in the general theoretical positions of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta which will be noticed in its proper place later

which Vāmana had already amply recognised and on which the *Alaṅkāra* and the *Riti* Schools had put so much emphasis. The metaphorical or the allegoric however veiled it may be is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such but the suggestive (*vyāṅgya*) is always unexpressed and is therefore a source of greater charm through its capacity of concealment for this concealment in which consists the essence of art is in reality no concealment at all. The new aesthetic school claims a particular function of suggestion appertaining to words and their senses whereby the unexpressed or the inexpressible is called into being or to speak with Kant whereby poetry becomes an expression of the aesthetic idea.

Now the unexpressed through the suggestive power of word or idea may be an unexpressed thought or matter (*vastu*) or an unexpressed figure of speech (*alaṅkāra*) but in most cases it is a mood or feeling (*rasa*) which is directly inexpressible. The *Dhvani* School therefore took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and tried to harmonise the idea of *Rasa* with the theory of *Dhvani*. It was realised that poetry was not as *Dandin* thought the mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language the feelings and moods play an important part in it. But the feelings and moods in themselves are inexpressible. We can give a name to them but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best therefore we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or describe are the *vibhavas* etc. but with the help of these expressed element which must be generalised and conceived not as they appear in the mundane world but as they may be imagined in a poetic world the poet can awaken in us through the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas a particular *alaṅkāra* condition of the soul in which the relish of the feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling as the person (e.g. *Rama*) whom he describes felt in times past but he can call up a reflection of

of the power of *bhāvakaṭva*, Abhinava turns to the other power assumed as *bhoga* or *bhogikarana* by Bhaṭṭa Nayaka. He remarks that beyond the *prāpti* or perception of *rasa*, he is not aware of any other process called *bhoga*. If it is relish or enjoyment, it is already admitted; and nothing is gained by giving it a new name, just as nothing is gained by arriving at the same idea by the use of different terms like *darśana*, *anumiti*, *śruti*, *upamiti* or *pratibhāna* according only to the distinction of the means employed¹. Hence *bhoga* is nothing more than the perception of *Rasa*, consisting of its essence of relish based on permanent moods like *rati* etc. But it must not be supposed to rest there, for although it is admitted that wherever there is *Rasa* there is no doubt its perception, consisting in its enjoyment, yet since the nature of *sattva* and other *gunas*, involved in such enjoyment is diversified, according as they are principal or subordinate and is therefore in itself infinite and incomprehensible, the relish of *Rasa* is not to be measured by the mere supposition of three functions². The *bhoga* supposed by Bhaṭṭa Nayaka therefore consists essentially in the *anvada* of *Rasa* possible by the suggestive power of poetry, and falling naturally within its domain it need not be taken as a separate function³.

*asmābhir utatya vakyaṃ Na ca kavye śabdānam leśānam
bhāvakaṭvam na kevalānam arthanām dvayor tu bhāvakaṭvam
asmābhir uktam ismad vyanjakaṭvākhyena vyāparena gunalane
kāraucityadikatoṇetī kartavyatāya kavyam bhāvakaṭva rasam bhāvayati
Locana p 70*

1 *prāptiyadī vyatiriktaś ca saṃsāre ka bhoga itī na vidmah rasam
eti cet sūpti pratipattiḥ eva leśalam upaya varlakṣyanyam namantarani
pratipndyātaraḥ darśananumiti śruty-upamiti pratibhānādī nāmanantaravai
(Hemacandra p 61)*

2 *attho'cyate prāptir asya bhogikaranam tac ca tatyaḍī svarupam
tad astu Tathāpi na tavam matrem Yāvanto hi ratas tavatya eva
rasāmananā prāptiyo bhogikarana svabhā ah saṃsādi gunanām can
guṇaḥ vācītryam ananiam akalpyam itī ka tritveneyatā (ibid loc cit)*

3 *bhogikaranam vyāpuraś eva kavyatmakā-rasa vṛtayo dhvananot
maiva alaṅkāre danti vistara vākāśānamāni bhoge kartavye lokottara
dhvanana vyāpara eva murchābhāṣikāś Locana p 70*

This *prattī* of Rasa, Abhinava maintains, is nothing more than its *abhiyāki* or manifestation by the power of suggestion resulting in an extraordinary state of relish, known as *rasanā āsvāda* or *cāriṇā*. What is manifested is not the Rasa itself, but its relish, not the mood itself but its reflection in the form of a subjective condition of aesthetic enjoyment in the reader. This taste or relish partakes no doubt, of the nature of cognition, it is nevertheless different from the ordinary or *laukika* forms of the process, because its means, the *vibhāvas* are not to be taken as ordinary or *laukika* causes¹. Although Rasa requires these factors for

1 *rasanā ca bodha rūpaya kīṃ tu bodhīntarebhyo laukikebhyo vikalpānāṃ apyūcīṣṭā vibhāvādīnāṃ laukika-vikalpānāṃ* (op. cit. p. 66). This will make it clear why Rasas like *kāruṇya* *bībhatsa* or *bhayanaka* which cause pity, disgust or horror be termed Rasa in which enjoyment is essential. The relish of Rasa is supposed to be an extraordinary bliss not to be likened to ordinary pain or pleasure and the mind is so entirely lost in it that even when the sentiment of grief or horror is relished in such a state pain is never felt and even when it is felt it is a pleasurable pain. The fact is borne out by the common experience that when grief is represented the spectator or the reader says 'I have enjoyed it'. Hence Viśvanātha remarks (ii 6-7 and viii ed Durgaprasāda p. 78) that those very things which are called causes of pain in the world (like banishment of Śiśu in the forest) when consigned to poetry and dramatic representation possess the right to be called in consequence of their assuming such a function *alaukika vibhāvas* etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does from bites and the like in amorous dalliance. It is also maintained (*ibid* 11 §) that tears constitute no proof that anything but pleasure is felt in poetry for the tears which are shed by the reader are not those of pain but those of sentiment. Jagannātha's remarks in the connexion are interesting. He says (p. 26) that the shedding of tears and the like are due to the nature of the experience of the particular pleasure and not to pain. Hence in a devotee tears arise on listening to a description of the deity in this case there is not the slightest feeling of pain. Such is the power of the extraordinary function of poetry that even unpleasant things like sorrow generate *alaukika* pleasure and this pleasant aesthetic relish should be distinguished from the experience realised by other ordinary means.

its manifestation and cannot exist without them, it cannot yet be regarded as an ordinary effect, and the cause and effect theory is inapplicable; for in the transcendental sphere of poetry, it is said, the connexion between cause and effect gives place to a imaginative system of relations, which has the power of stirring the reader's soul into Rasa. The resulting Rasa cannot be identified with its constituent *vibhavas*, for the latter are not experienced separately, but the whole appears as Rasa, which is thus simple and indivisible, and at the time of relish nothing else but Rasa is raised to our consciousness. The writers on poetics are fond of explaining this phenomenon under the analogy of a beverage, which, though made up of black pepper, candied sugar, camphor and other ingredients gives us a different taste from that of its constituents. The result, therefore, is an indissoluble unity of taste from which every trace of the constituent elements is obliterated.

Abhinavagupta goes a step further also in maintaining that the *sthāyin* or the permanent mood, inferred from its *laukika* causes (e.g. woman, garden, etc.) remains in the hearts of the appreciating audience in the subtle form of latent impressions¹. On reading a poem or witnessing a drama this permanent mood, remaining in the form of latent impressions (*vāsana*), is suggested by the depicted *vibhāvas* etc., which cease to be called *laukika* causes but go by the name of *vibhavas* etc., in poetry and drama,² and which are taken in their general form without specific connexions³.

1 explained by Mammata as *samaj kananā vāsanātmatayā sthāyā* on which Govinda comments *samaj kananā sukṣmatayanā sthāyā* and Mallinātha adds *samojkananā evanubhava jāmī vāsanātmatayā sthāyā* explaining *vāsana* as *sañiskara*.

2 *laukika karanatvādī bhūyam atikrāntā evaulaukika vibhavadī vyapadeśa bhūgbbhū*. Abh. on Bh. *karanatvādī parihāreṇa vibhavanatī vyaparavattitvad alaukika vibhavadī śabda vyavahara* i. Mammata explained by Vidyādhara as *loke tu karanā kurya sañiskarany evabhidhīyante, na vibhavanubhava vybhīcarinā* p. 92.

3 *saddhāranyena prasa* i. Mammata.

The *vibhavas*, therefore, are generalised in the minds of the reader and do not refer to particularities not through the power of *bhāvakatva*, as supposed by Bhaṭṭa Nayaka but generally through the suggestive power of word and sense and specifically through a skilful use of *guna* and *alamkāra* in poetry, and clever representation in the drama. In the same way, the *sthāyī bhāva* or the permanent mood which is the source of the *Rasa*,¹ is also generalised, because the germ of it is already existent in the reader's soul in the form of impressions, and this together with the beauty of the generalised representation of the *vibhavas* etc., removes all temporal and spatial limitations.² The mood is generalised also in the sense that it refers not to any particular reader but to readers in general so that although it is relished by a particular individual, yet at the time of relishing it, he does not think that it is relished by him alone³ but by all persons of poetic sensibility.⁴ This relish is known as *Rasa* in poetry and drama.

1. The *sthāyī* is so called because though the feeling itself like all feelings is essentially transient its impression in the form of *rasana* or *sarīskara* is more or less permanent being called up when the *Rasa* is cognised. Cf. *Prabha* p. 61. *anṛtaḥ karanaḥ pratyakṣaḥ rūpasya ratyudat asu vīnaśīte p. samīkṣatmana cya kula sthāyīti ad. jayad. rasa prapiti kalam anusandhanāc ca sthāyīti am.* But the *sthāyī* itself is not *Rasa* it must be *vyakta vibhāva* and *vibhāva* *śāli melaka* and thus made relishable (*caranapayogi*). Govinda p. 62. The ultimate relish of *Rasa* is free from all contact either of the *vibhavas* or of the *sthāyī*.

2. *mukuta pratīṣṭhakatvāda tava nā buddhir acchadyate gadā prakāṣaṇa sarīrat sarīskaraḥ ca kavya bhāṣe anuṣṭupānāṁ na tatra ramadhī r. vīramyati. rasa vibhāva-deśa kālā paritī. gah. Abh. as cited by Hemacandra p. 66.*

3. *mamante vibhāvadāyāḥ aham eva rasavadaṁyā evam ityā a śādhyaṁmanah.*

4. *nitya pramāṇ-gatasena sthito p. sadharanopāya bahar. tatkalā vīraṇa-parimā pramāṇa bhāṣa valanmīṭa vedyantara sarīparika kavya parimāṇa bhāṣena pramāṇa sadharanyena śākhāra vīrabhinno p. gocantirah. Mammata.*

To state it briefly and without any technicality, there is in the mind a latent impression of feelings which we once went through and this is roused when we read a poem which describes similar things. 'By universal sympathy we become part and parcel of the same feeling and imagine ourselves in that condition.' Thus the feeling is raised to a state of relish, called *Rasa* in which lies the essence of poetic enjoyment. It will be noticed that these theorists presuppose latent impression of experience (*vasanā*) and universal sympathy (*sādhāranya* or *sādhāranīkaraṇa*). Those who have never experienced the feeling of love for instance, and have therefore no impression of experience left in them as well as those who have no sense of community of human feelings can never relish *Rasa* in poetry. The *vasanā* we are told is natural (*svābhavikī* or *naisargikī*) but it may be acquired by study and experience. The writers on Poetics, therefore, are merciless in their satire on dull grammarians and old *Mīmāṃsakas* to whom such relish of *Rasa* is denied and they declare unanimously that *rasika eva rasīsvade योग्याः*. As *Rasa* is not an objective entity which can reside in the hero or the actor it is realised, as *Dhananjaya* puts it (iv 36) by the reader's own capacity of enjoyment. Thus a degree of culture and aesthetic instinct is demanded in the critic, the *rasika* or *sahridaya*, who is the *adhikārī* dignified with the appellation of *pramāṇ* compatible with this subtle and extraordinary conception of poetry. As *Abhinavagupta* puts it *adhikārī catra vimala pratibhāṣaṇaḥ hrdayaḥ*, and elsewhere (*Locana* p 11) he describes such a *sahridaya* as *yeṣāṃ kavyānuṣṭhānabhyasa vāśaḥ viśadībhūta manomukure varṇanīya tanmayībhavonā योग्यातु ते ह्रदयाः सन्वदा-भञ्जं सहृदयः*

✕ It may also be pointed out that this subtle conception of *Rasa* makes it difficult to express the notion properly in Western critical terminology. The word has been translated etymologically by the terms 'flavour' 'relish' 'gustation' 'taste' 'Geschmack' or 'savour', but none of these renderings seems to be adequate. The simpler word 'mood' or the term *Stim*

‘mung’ used by Jacobi, may be the nearest approach to it, but the concept has hardly any analogy in European critical theories. Most of the terms employed have ideational associations of their own, and are therefore not strictly applicable. For instance, the word ‘taste’ or ‘relish,’ though literally correct, must not be understood to imply aesthetic or moral judgment, ‘good or bad taste,’ but must be taken to indicate an idea similar to what we mean when we speak of tasting food. At the same time, this realistic description must not lead us to drag it down to the level of a bodily pleasure; for this artistic pleasure is given as almost equivalent to the philosophic bliss, known as *ānanda* being lifted above worldly joy.

This peculiar condition of the ego, the *Rasa*, is realised through the characteristic function of *vyāñjanā* or suggestion in poetry. The idea is elaborated by later theorists, who take pains to show that it does not come under the province of *abhidhā* (denotation), nor of *tātparya* (import), nor of *lakṣanā* (indication), nor of *pratyakṣa* (perception), nor of *anumāna* (inference), nor of *smarana* (reminiscence), admitted by philosophers and grammarians. Into these technicalities which properly come under the discussion of the *vyāñjanā-vṛtti*, we need not enter; but it may be noted that Abhinava describes this *abhiivyakti*, which is taken as synonymous with *carvanā*,¹ as *vīta-vighna-prapti* or cognition rendered free from obstacles. Following him, Jagannātha notes in this connexion: *vyaktiś ca bhagnāvaraṇā cit, yathā hi śarāvādīnā pihito dīpas tan-nivṛttau sannihitān padārthān prakāśayati, svayaṁ ca prakāśate, evaṁ ātma-caitanyaś vibhāvādi-saṁvalitān ratyādīn. Similarly carvanā is described by the author of the Prabhā as vibhāvādi-samūhālambanena ratyavacchinna caitanyābhiivyaktiś carvanā, sā ca bhagnāvaraṇā cit. The cognition of *Rasa*, therefore, is a distinct realisation freed from all doubts and obstacles by means of the *vibhāva*s etc., which are accordingly designated*

¹ *vyaktiś carvanat paryāyah*, Govinda, p. 62.

as *vighnāpasūra*¹ It is variously described as *camatkāra-nirveśa* (awakening of poetic charm), *rasanā* (relish) *āsvāda* (taste), *bhoga* (fruition) *samāpatti* (accomplishment), *laya* (fusion) and *viśrānti* (repose) ²

The essence of Rasa, therefore, consists in its *āsvāda* or *carvanā* (*carvyamanaiḥ prānah*) which is *alaukika*, being incompassable by the ordinary processes of knowledge It is a relish in which the Rasa alone apart from its constituent elements, is raised to consciousness, and it is therefore, described as a relish in which the contemplation of any other thing but Rasa itself is lost (*vigalita vedyāntara*) or which is free from the contact of aught else perceived (*vedyāntara-sparśa śunya*), like the state of mind lost in the philosophic contemplation of Brahma It is not capable of proof or designation and cannot be made known, because its perception is inseparable from its existence, or in other words, it is identical with the knowledge of itself ³ The only proof of the existence of Rasa is its relish itself by the *sahṛdaya* ⁴ It is therefore *sakala saṁhṛdaya hrdaya samvedana sakṣika* or in the words of Mammata *sakṣa saṁhṛdaya saṁvāda-bhāṣa pramātra gocariketaḥ* Although it is a very intimate relish *camatkāra* is supposed to constitute its life breath This *camatkāra*, which has been compared to the 'wonder spirit' of modern critics is described by Viśvanātha as a kind of expanding of the mind of which another name is 'wonder' (*camatkāraś citta vistara rupe vismayāpara paryayah*) implying that the marvellous always underlies the Rasa (*taḥ camatkāra sūratve sarvatrāpy adbhuto rasah* under m 3) Jagannātha, however,

1 See Hemacandra p 63 *sarvatha rasanaत्मका विता व घ्ना प्रति ग्रह्यो भवा एव रासः तत्रा विघ्नापसारका विभवा प्रोक्षयान्* where the *vighnas* are enumerated as seven in number and discussed in detail

2 *loke sakala vighna v nirmuktā saṁvitar eva camatkāra n rveśa-rasanāsvadana bhoga-samāpatti laya viśrāntipadi śabda r abhidhāyate* Hemacandra loc cit following Abhinava

3 Viśvanātha m 20

4 *Ibid* m 26

completes the idea by correlating this *camatkāra* with the *vaicitrya* or *vicchitti* of the Alankāra School who mean by it a special charm due to an act of imagination on the part of the poet (*kavi karma* or *kavi pratibhā*) underlying and constituting the essence of all poetic figures¹. The *camatkāra* therefore which is the essence of all poetic figures is also the essence of *Rasa* and has been defined² as a fact of our consciousness (*anubhava sākṣika*) consisting of extraordinary pleasure (*alaukikāhlāda*) which depends on a concept formed by continued contemplation of itself.

The last step in this idea was taken by the attempt of bringing Poetry to the level of Religion by likening this aesthetic enjoyment to the ecstatic bliss of divine contemplation (*brahmānanda*). Viśvanātha sums up the idea briefly thus: 'The *Rasa* arising from the exaltation of *sattva* (purity) indivisible self manifested made up of joy and thought in their identity free from the contact of aught else perceived akin to the realisation of Brahman the life whereof is supermundane wonder is enjoyed by those competent in inseparableness (of the object from the realisation thereof) and as it were in its own shape'. It follows from this that the *pramāṇ* to whom alone this bliss is vouchsafed is like a *yogin* or devotee who deserves this preference through his accumulated merits (*pūṇyāntah pramāṇanti yogivad rasa samītatim*).

This in its general outlines is the *Rasa* theory as finally fixed by the *Dhvani* School and all later writers from Dhananjaya to Jagannātha accept this new interpretation and attempt to work it out in detail. Thus an endeavour was made not only to explain the concept of *Rasa* in terms of inward experience but also to absorb this idea of aesthetic delectation into the new theory of *Dhvani* and make it appli-

1 See Jacob *Ueber Begriff und Wesen der poetischen Figuren* in *GN* 1908 where this conception of an *alaukikāra* is explained. See also *Introd. to the Vākyakī*, 1st ed. S. K. De.

2 *Rasagangādhara* p. 4 ed. Bombay 1916.

3 *Sul yad-darpana* 2: 23 ed. Durgaprasāda p. 27 f.

cable to poetry and the Rasa School properly so called began to merge from this time onwards into the dominant Dhvani School. Even Maṇimabhaṭṭa who attempted to demolish the Dhvani theory was forced to acknowledge Rasa and declare that on this point there is no difference of opinion between himself and the Dhvanikara¹, the only difference existing with regard to the function *par excellence* which should be operative in poetry. But the Dhvani School and its followers consider Rasa as an element of the unexpressed only, and though their theory which puts a great emphasis on *rasa-dhvanī* practically leads to such a conclusion, both the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana are yet careful not to erect it into the very soul of poetry. From the theoretical standpoint at least they could not give exclusive preference to *rasa dhvanī* however important it may be, for in their complete scheme of Poetics the unexpressed may also take the form of *vastu dhvanī* and *alanākara dhvanī* and the centre of gravity in a poem may lie in its matter or in its poetic figure as well as in its Rasa. Abhinavagupta however appears to have attached little weight to these theoretical considerations and brushing them aside he boldly brings forward the essentiality of Rasa declaring that there can be no poetry without Rasa (*na hi tacchunyam kavyaṁ kiñcid asti*²) because all poetry lives through *rasa* (*rasenaiva sarvaṁ jīvati kavyam*). He attempts however to reconcile the theoretical discrepancy by saying that although admittedly the unexpressed may also take the form of a *vastu* or an *alanākara* these two kinds of suggestion³ resolve themselves ultimately into the suggestion of Rasa which is in fact the essence of poetry⁴. This opinion apparently led Viśvanatha to push the theory to its logical limit and formulate his somewhat extreme view that the Rasa alone constitutes the essence of poetry (1.3). But the

1 *kāvyaśāstram* rasād rupe na kasyacid mat h p 22

2 *Lacana* p 65

3 *rasa eva vastuta ātmā vastvālanākāra-dhvanī sa sarvāṅgu rasam*
prati parivartayate p 27

considerations which led the founders of the Dhvani theory to leave this view wisely unstated, could not be easily put out of the way, and Jagannatha objects on this very ground. The definition of poetry given by Viśvanatha he says, cannot be accepted, because thereby poetry in which the central charm lies in the matter or in the poetic figure (e.g. in professedly descriptive and ornamental poetry) would be entirely excluded and such an exclusion is not warranted either by theory or by the practice of great poets. Viśvanātha anticipates this objection by saying that in these cases there is a semblance of Rasa (*rasabhāsa*) and the verse given in *Dhvanyaloka* p. 20 as an instance of *vastu dhvani* is in his opinion, admissible because there is a touch of Rasa (*rasa sparsa*) and not because mere *vyāngya vastu* can constitute the essence of poetry. Jagannatha replies that nothing is gained by this clumsy subterfuge of an indirect reference to Rasa because such a reference may also be construed in phrases like 'the cow moves' or 'the deer leaps'. This cannot be taken as a criterion because thereby any and every content of poetry would be reduced to the position of a *vibhava anubhava* or *vyabhiçari bhava* of the Rasa.¹ Jagannatha himself one of the latest writers on the subject, therefore tries to solve the difficulty by studiously avoiding all mention of Rasa in his definition of poetry, although in theory he, like Viśvanatha adheres in the main to the views of the Dhvani School. Jagannatha mentions as many as eight different theories about Rasa (p. 28), but the existence of so many conflicting views as well as the fact that Rasa cannot be taken as the essence of all poetry, makes him define poetry as *ramanīyārtha pratipadakah śabdah* inasmuch as all theorists agree that Rasa, which cannot be manifested without an accompanying state of joy conveys a peculiar *ramanīyata* essential to poetry.² It will be noticed there-

¹ See on this point *Saṅgīta-darpana* pp. 16 f. and *Rasa-gaṅgā-dīpikā* pp. 7-8. Cf. also Govinda *Pradīpa* ed. Kāvya-mālā 1912, p. 11.

² *Ittha h nānā pūrīyabhih śamāśibhir nānā rūpatojā-asito pi*

Bhoja's work and the *Rasurnāya* of Śiṅgabdhūpala as well as the two well known works of Bhaṇudatta the *Rasa mañjarī* and *Rasa taranginī* deserve mention. None of these specialised treatises however add anything of speculative interest to a topic already thrashed out to its extreme, and as they belong properly to the province of Erotics rather than Poetics a treatment of them must be sought elsewhere. The simple idea elaborated more or less in all these works¹ is that the fundamental Rasa is *śṛṅgāra*, which is consequently treated in detail with regard to its *vibhāvas* etc. This brings in topically the extensive discussion of Nāyaka and Nayika and their various conditions and emotions acting as a factor of the Rasa. Into these elaborate definitions distinctions and classifications of the amatory sentiment with its varying emotional moods and situations which these works industriously discuss and which always possessed an attraction to mediaeval scholastic minds we need not enter here in the discussion of general principles. These theorists delight in arranging into divisions and subdivisions according to rank character circumstances and the like all conceivable types of the hero the heroine and their adjuncts together with the different shades of gestures graces feelings moods and emotions in conformity to the tradition which had already obtained in the sphere of Dramaturgy. We cannot refuse to recognise the subtle power of analysis and insight which these essays indicate and although much of it is marked by scholastic

1 This is clear from the attitude of Bhoja in his *Śṛṅgāra prakāśa* as reported by Vidyādhara and Kumārasvamin both of whom point out that Bhoja accepts only one Rasa the Erotic (*rujāṁ śṛṅgāraṁ ekam eva śṛṅgāra prakāśe rasant utarikalāṁ Ekāvat* p. 98 *śṛṅgāra eka eva rasa ś śṛṅgaraprakāśa lāraḥ Rānāpāna* p. 221). Although Bhoja mentions as many as ten Rasas in his *Sarasvatī kaṇṭhābhāṣana* he appears to devote almost exclusive attention to *śṛṅgāra* in his treatment. In the same way Rudrabhaṭṭa declares *śṛṅgāraṁ nāyako rasat* : 20 and Bhaṇudatta appears to take it for granted that *śṛṅgāra* occupies an honoured place among all the Rasas (*śāstra rasat* : *śṛṅgāraṁ vāg* : 21) as observed Benares p. 21).

formalism there is an unmistakable attempt to do justice to facts not only as they appear to experience but to the observation of general poetic usage. In the elaborate working out of the general thesis that the Rasa is evolved on the basis on one or other of what they call the permanent mental moods with the help of various emotional adjuncts, the writers on Poetics have proceeded a long way in the careful analysis of poetic emotions, the psychology of which bears an intimate relation to their theory and in itself deserves separate study.

A new turn was given to the theory by Rūpa Gosvamin's *Ujvala nīlāmam* which brings erotic-religious ideas to bear upon the general theme of Rasa. It attempts to deal with Rasa in terms of the Vaiṣṇava idea of *ujjala* or *madhura rasa* by which is meant the *sringara rasa* the term *ujjala* being apparently suggested by Bharata's description of that Rasa¹. The *madhura rasa*, however, is represented not in its secular aspect but primarily as a phase of *bhakti-rasa* (*madhurākhyo bhakti-rasah* 1.3), for the Vaiṣṇava theology admits five Rasas as forming roughly the five degrees or aspects of the realisation of Bhakti or faith, viz. *śānta* (tranquillity), *dasya* (also called *prīti* servitude or humility), *sakhya* (also called *preyas* friendship or equality), *vatsalya* (parental affection) and *madhurya* (sweetness). The last also called the *ujjala-rasa* being the principal is termed *bhakti-rasa-raj*² and constitutes as such, the subject-matter of the present treatise. The *kṛṣṇa-rati* or the love of Kṛṣṇa forms the *sthayi-bhava* of this Rasa and the recipient here is not the literary *sahyodaya* but the *bhakti*

1 *yat kīrtiḥ loka śuci madhyam ujvalaḥ dardantiyam va sa cchāgarenopamiyate* ed. Grosset pp. 89-90

2 1.2 explained by Jiva Gosvamin as *śānta-prīti-preya-vātsaly-ujjala-nāmaṣu mukhyaṣu sa evajjalāpara-paryāyo bhakti-rasānām-rajā madhurākhyo rasah* ed. Kāvya-mālā p. 3

the faithful'. This *sthāyi bhāva* known as *madhura ratī* which is the source of this particular Rasa is defined in terms of love of Kṛṣṇa¹, and the nature of the Nayaka and Nayikā is defined in the same manner and their feelings and emotions illustrated by examples adduced from poems dealing with the love stories of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. The work is therefore essentially a Vaiṣṇava religious treatise presented in a literary garb taking Kṛṣṇa as the ideal hero with the caution however that what is true of Kṛṣṇa as the hero does not apply to the ordinary secular hero (i 18 20)

APPENDIX

[We give in the following pages the relevant text of Abhinavagupta's commentary on Bharata ch vi with reference to his famous Sūtra on Rasa referred to in this monograph. The passage gives a learned summary of the various theories on Rasa obtaining in Abhinava's time. Most of it has been as we have noticed appropriated by Hemacandra in his commentary on his own *Lāṭyānuśaṣana* (p 57f). Manuscripts of Abhinava's commentary are by no means plentiful and so far two copies are known to be in existence one of which is now in the Trivandrum Palace Library and the other in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library Madras. Our text is based on a Devanāgarī transcript procured for us by Mm Gaṅganāth Jha presumably from the Trivandrum MS. The text offered here being based on such imperfect material is indeed deficient and unsatisfactory in many places but it is

1 s ūdya ā t pā bhāktānām ūnā ā śra anūd bhīl |
eṣā kṛṣṇa ratī t sthāyi bhāva bhakti rasa bha cī ||

c teḍ by J va Giosvām n p 4

2 madhurākhyaṇā ratī lakṣaṇam cōltam—
m a ha cr mrgākhyaṇā ca sa t bī oṣāyāḥ lāṭānam |
madhuraṇa a paryāya priyatākī yod t ā rat h |

ibid loc c i

published in this tentative form out of a consideration of its importance. We have noted some readings from the Madras MS also '}

एतन्नेति श्रीशङ्कः । विभावाद्ययोगे स्थायिनो लिङ्गभावेनावगम्यनुपपत्तेः , भावानां पूर्वमभिधेयताप्रसङ्गात् , स्थितदशार्थां सङ्ख्यानन्तर्यैर्गर्भ्यान् मन्दतर-
तममाप्यस्याधानमन्यापत्तेः , हासरत्ने⁶ दोढात्वाभावप्राप्त्ये , कामापस्यासु
दशस्वसङ्ख्यरसभावादप्रसङ्गात् , शोकस्य प्रथमतीव्रत्व कालान्तु मान्यदर्शनम् ,
शोभोत्साहहर्तीनाममर्पस्त्वैर्यमेवाविपर्यये हासदर्शनमिति विपर्ययस्य स्वयमागतत्वाच्च ।
तस्माच्चेतुर्भिर्विभावाह्यै कार्यैश्चानुभावात्मनि सङ्चारिरूपैश्च व्यभिचारिभिः
प्रयोजार्जिततया कृत्तिमैरपि तथानभिगम्यमानैरनुकृत्यस्थलेन लिङ्गवत्तत् प्रतीय-
मानं स्थायी भावो मुख्यरामादिगतस्याप्यनुकरणरूपत्वादेव न नामान्तरेण
न्यपदिष्टो रसः । विभावा हि काव्यवलादनुसंधेया , अनुभावा शिक्षात् ,
व्यभिचारिण कृत्तिमनिजानुभावाज्जनवत्तात् । स्थायी तु काम्यपलादपि
नानुसंधेयः । रतिः शोक इत्यादयो हि शब्दा रस्यादिभ्यभिधेयीकुर्वन्त्यभि-
धानत्वेन , न तु वाचिभ्यमित्यस्यतयावगमयन्ति । न हि वानेव वाचिभ्यम् ,
अपि तु तथा निर्दुःखम् , अज्ञैरिषातिव्यम् । तेन—‘वाङ्मेनेव जलधि
शोक कोपेन पीयते’ इति । तथा—‘शोकेन कृतस्त्रम्भस्तथा स्थितो यो-
ऽजवस्त्रितावदै’⁷ इत्येवमादौ न शोकोऽभिनेयोऽपि त्वभिधेयः । ‘भाति पतितो
लिखन्त्या’⁸ इत्यनेन तु नाजयेन स्वार्थमभिदधता उदयनगत मुक्तात्मा रति-
स्याभिभावोऽभिनीयते , न रूप्यते⁹ । अवयमनराक्तिर्भिनयन वाचकत्वा-
दन्या । अतएव स्थायिपदं सूत्रे भिन्नविभक्तिरूपमपि बोधात्तम् । तेन रति-
रित्येवमाणा रटङ्गार इति तद्वारमद्यत्वं तद्वारमवत्वं च युक्तम् । अर्थक्रियापि
भिध्याङ्गानादृष्टाः । न चात नर्तक एव सुलोठि प्रतिपत्तिः , नाप्ययमेव राम

6 भाष्यपात्रे ६।५।

7 ‘विश्रामाकाप्यभावेऽपि दुरन्तोऽपि मदानरि’ इत्यस्य पूर्वार्थं ‘अनपत्तेः’ ।

8 यत्तु पूर्वार्थमेतत् ‘अनपत्तेः’ वदितमेव प्रतीयते , अतएव तु तत्र “वद-
कृतमनपत्तेरादिप्रमथ्येयं वचिने” इत्युपपन्नम् ।

9 ‘भाति पतितो लिखन्त्यास्तथा रस्यान्नुद्योकरकचोव ।

स्वेदोऽयं ह्यं कृतककर्मपदार्थेयं मे वदधि ॥’

इति ‘अनपत्तेः’ पूर्वार्थमेतत् प्रतीयते ।

10 न नृत्तमेव इति यदापादघट्टकम् ।

इति । न चाप्ययं न सुखीति, न चापि तत्सदृश इति । किंतु यं सुखी
रामोऽमानयमिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति । तदाह—

प्रतिभाति न संदेहो न तत्र न विपर्यय ।

धीरसावयमित्यस्ति नासावेवायमित्यपि ॥

निरुद्धमुद्धिराभेदादनिवेचिताग्रज ।

युक्तपा पर्यमुयुज्येत स्फुरतनुभव कथा ॥ इति ।

तदिदमप्यन्तस्तत्त्वशून्य विमर्दक्षममिदुपाध्याय ¹¹ ।

तथा हि—अनुकरणरूपो रस इति श्रुच्यते तत् किं सामाजिकप्रतीत्यभि
प्रायेणोत नटाभिप्रायेण ? किं वा वस्तुभूतविषेयकव्याख्यातृदुहितमवलम्बनेन ?
यदाहुर्व्याख्यातार स्वयमेव विवेचयन्तीति । अथ मरतमुनिवचनानुसारेण तत्रास्य
पक्षोऽसंगतः । किञ्चिद्दि प्रमाणेनोपलब्ध तदनुकरणमिति शक्य इत्तुम् । यथा
—एवमसौ सुखं पिबतीति मुरापानानुकरणत्वेन पयःपानं प्रत्यक्षावलोकितं प्रति
भाति । इह च नटगतं किं तदुपलब्धं तदनुकरणतया भातीति चिन्त्यम् । तच्छ-
रीरं तन्निष्ठं प्रतिस्तीर्षकमदि रोमाञ्चगात्रादिकादि भुञ्जान्तेष्वलनप्रभृति मूलेषु
कटाक्षादिकं च न रतेधितप्रतिरूपतयानुकारत्वेन कल्पयितुं प्रतिभाति । अद्वत्वेन
मिन्नेन्द्रियप्राप्तत्वेन भिन्नाधिकरणत्वेन च ततोऽतिरिक्तत्वस्यात् । मुरानामुच्यते
बलोकने च तदनुकरणप्रतिभासो न च रामगता रतिमुपलब्धपूर्विकं केचित् ।
एतेन रामानुकारी नट इत्यपि निरस्तं प्रवादः ।

अथ नटगता चित्प्रतिरेव प्रतिपन्ना सती रसत्रुकार रटद्वारं श्रुच्यते
तत्रापि किमात्मकत्वेन सा प्रतीयत इति चिन्त्यम् । ननु प्रमदादिभिः कारणैः
कटाक्षादिभिः कार्यैर्भट्टादिभिश्च सहचारिभिर्लिङ्गभूतैर्या लौकिकी कार्यरूपा कारण
रूपा सहचारिरूपा च चित्प्रति प्रतिप्रतियोग्या, तदप्रत्ययत्वेन सा नटचित्प्रति
प्रतिभाति । इत्थं तर्हि रत्नाकारेणैव सा प्रतिपन्नेति दूरे रसत्रुकरणादाद्यो-
युक्तिः ।

कृत, स उत्तरत स्थावरो चर्चयिष्यते । तस्मात्सामाजिकप्रतीत्यनुसारेण
 स्वाग्यनुकरणं रस इत्यसत् । न चापि नटस्येव प्रतिपत्तिराम तक्षितवृत्ति
 वानुवरोमीति । तद्वशात्करणं हि तावदनुकरणमनुपलब्धप्रवृत्तीनां^{१४} न शक्यं
 कर्तुम् ।

अथ पञ्चाक्षररसमनुकरणं तल्लोकेऽप्यनुकरणात्मिकेति प्रसङ्गात् । अथ न
 नियतस्य कस्यचिदनुचारोऽपि तूत्तमप्रकृते शोकमनुकरोति, तर्हि केनेति विन्त्यम् ।
 न तावच्छोबनेन, तस्य तदभावात् । न चाश्रुपातादिना शोकस्यानुकार,
 तद्वैलक्षण्यमित्युक्तम् । इत्युक्तं सादुत्तमप्रकृतेयं शोवानुभावात्मानुवरोमीति ।
 तत्रापि कस्योत्तमप्रकृते ? यस्य कस्यचिदि चेत्, सोऽपि विशिष्टतां विना कथं
 बुद्धाधारोपयितुं शक्यः । य एव रोदतीति चेत्, सात्मापि मध्ये नटस्यानु-
 प्रविष्ट इति गतितोऽनुकार्यानुवर्तुर्भेदः । किं च, नटश्चावशात्पदिभात-
 म्भरणाक्षितवृत्तिमाधारस्वीभावेन हृदयसत्त्वादात्तं केवलमनुभावान् प्रदर्शयन्
 काम्यसमुचितकाव्यप्रस्तुत्युपगंस्कारेण पठयेद्वत् इत्येतावन्मात्रेऽस्य प्रतीतिर्न
 त्वनुकारो वेदयते । कान्तवेदानुच्चारवदि न राम^{१५}चेष्टितस्यानुकारः । एतच्च
 प्रथमाध्यायेऽपि दर्शितमभ्यासि । नापि वस्तुतत्त्वानुसारेण वदनुकारत्वम्,
 अनुसंवेद्यमानस्य वस्तुतत्त्वानुपपत्तेः । यस्य वस्तुतत्त्व तद्दर्शयिष्यामः । न च
 मुनिप्रबन्धनेव विषमलि कश्चिन् स्वाग्यनुकरणं रस इति । नापि लिङ्गमतीर्थं^{१६}
 मुनेरुपलभ्यते । प्रयुक्तं प्रवृत्तानतात्पर्यविश्वनासाद्गोपजीवन निष्पत्तादिविपर्यये
 लिङ्गमिति संप्रज्ञाध्यायान्ते वितनिष्यामः । तत्तद्विधानुकरणमित्याद्यन्यथापि
 शक्यमगमनिकमिति तदनुकारेऽपि ङ् च^{१७}नामान्तरं कान्तवेद्यत्वमनुकरणादौ ।
 यथोच्यते—वर्णरैर्हरितालादिभिर्गुण्यमान एव गीरित्वादि, तत्र यथामिष्यय
 मान इत्यर्थोऽभिप्रेतस्तदस्मत् । न हि गित्वादिभिर्पारमार्थिको गीरिति

व्ययतो प्रदीपादिमिति¹⁸ । किं तु तालादरा समुद्रविरोधो निरस्यते । तेष्व
हि तिन्दुरादयो गवावयवसनिवेशसदृशेन सनिवेशविरोधेणावस्थिता मोक्षगिति
प्रतिभासस्य विषय, नैवं विभावादिसमूहो रतिगदराताप्रतिप्राप्तः । नमोद्भावाजु-
वरणं रय इत्यसत् ।

येन त्वभ्यन्तरेण—सुप्तदुःखजननशक्तिगुक्ता विनयसामग्री पाशैव मां दयदृशा
सुप्तदुःखस्वभावो रसः, तस्यो च सामग्री दलस्थानीया विभावा भ्रकारता,
अनुभावम्यमिचारिण क्षायित्वं तन्सामग्रीजन्या आन्तरा सुप्तदुःखभावा
इति, तेन स्वाविभावाभ्यन्तरमलमिष्टादाबुधचार¹⁹ मन्दोर्ध्वता मन्वविरोध स्वयमेव
बुध्यमानेन दूषणाविस्फुरणमौर्ध्व्यत् प्रामाणिक्येन परिरक्षित इति किमस्योच्यते ।
यत्कलत्वं न प्रतीतिवैषम्यप्रयुक्तादि तत्किं यदस्योच्यताम् ।

भट्टनायकप्रत्याह—रसो न प्रतीयते, नोत्पद्यते, नाभिव्यज्यते । स्वगतत्वेन
हि प्रतीती कष्टो दुःखितः स्यात् । न च वा प्रतीतिगुक्ता सीतादेरविभावा-
त्वात्, स्वरुन्तास्मृत्यसंवेदनात्, देवतादौ न साधारणीकरणयोग्यत्वात्,
समुद्रलङ्घनादेरव्यापारस्यत्वात् । न च तत्त्वतो रसस्य सृष्टिः, अनुपलभ्यत्वात् ।
न च शब्दावुत्तमानादिभ्यस्तरप्रतीती लोकाश्च सरसता प्रयुक्ता प्रलङ्घादिव ।
नायकमुगलकवभागे हि प्रयुक्तं तन्वाजुगुण्यासृष्टादिसोचितचित्तरस्य तरोदवम-
व्यप्रतयाभास²⁰ त्वमथापि स्यात् तत्र । प्रतीतिरनुभवस्मृत्यादिरुपा रसस्य
गुक्ता । उत्पत्तावपि तुल्यमेतदूषणम् । शक्तिरूपत्वेन पूर्वं स्थितस्य पथादभिव्यक्तौ
विषयार्जातारत्नम्पतिः । स्वगतत्वपरगतत्वादिति च पूर्वद्विकल्पम् । तस्मा
रसाव्ये दोषाभावगुणालंकारमन्त्रलक्षणैः, भाव्ये चतुर्विधमिन्द्रियैः, निबिड-
निजमोहसकन्निवारणकारिणः विभावादिसाधारणीकरणरूपनामिधातो द्वितीये
नाशेन भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसोऽनुभवस्मृत्यादिविलक्षणैः, रजसामो-

18 प्रतिवादिभि इति दुष्ट पाठः ।

19 'स्वाविभावात् रसलक्षणमथापि इत्यादाबुधचार' इति श्रीमत्कथित
पाठः ।

20 व्यपत्तयाकाशरसलक्षणमथापि इति संक्षिप्तपाठो गृह्यत्वमेव ।

अनुपेयवैचित्र्यरलाद्रुतिविकानविस्तारलक्षणेन, सत्त्वोदेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिज-
सविद्विश्रान्तिक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादमविधेन भोगेन पर भुज्यत इति ।²¹

तत्र पूर्वपक्षोऽयं भङ्गलोकप्रज्ञानभ्युपगमादेव नाभ्युपगत इति तद्रूपणमु-
त्थानोपपत्तयेव । प्रतीत्यविषयतिरिक्तश्च तद्वारे को भोग इति न विप्र । रसेनेति
चेत्, साध्यत प्रतिवर्तिरेव । जेनमुपायवैलक्षण्यमात्रान्तर प्रतिपद्यता
दर्शनाभिमितिश्रुत्युपमितिप्रतिमानादिनामान्तरवत् । निष्पादनाभिव्यक्तिद्वया-
नभ्युपगमे च निष्को वासद्वा रस इति न तुल्योपायमिति स्यात् । न चाप्रतीत-
वस्तुस्ति व्यनहारे योग्यम् । अथोच्यते प्रतीतिरिति रसस्य भोगीकरणम्, तत्र
रत्नादिरूपम्, तदस्तु । तथापि न ताव मातृम् । वाकन्तो हि रसास्वादन-
एव रमनात्मन प्रतीतयो भोगीकरणस्वभावा । गुणानां चाज्ञाद्विनैचित्र्य-
मनन्तमरुण्यमिति का त्रितयेनेत्या ।

भावनाभाव्य एषोऽपि शृङ्गारदिगुणो मतः²² ।

इति । सत्काव्येन भाव्यन्ते रसा इत्युच्यते तत्र विभावादिजनितचर्वणा-
त्मकास्वादरूपप्रत्ययगोचरतापादनमेव यदि भावन तदभ्युपगम्यत एव । यतः—

सवेदनाख्यव्यञ्जय[स्तु] परसवित्तोचर* ।

आस्वादानात्मातुभावो रस काव्यार्थ उच्यते ॥

इति, तत्र व्यञ्ज्यमानतया व्यञ्जयो लक्ष्यते । अनुमतेन च तद्विषय इति
मन्तव्यम् । नन्वेव कथं रसतत्त्वम् ? आस्तां हि कुर्म ।

प्राप्तायमिदं किमपूर्वमेतत्

सविद्विभासेऽधिगतारमिषम् ।

21 काट्यासीकलोचने (पृ ६०-६१) एतच्छास्त्रमाख्यानं दृश्यते ।

22 अधिधा भावना भव्या तल्लोचोक्तमेव च ।

अधिधावायतां याते अन्तर्मातृलक्षणे तस्य ॥

भावनभावा एषोऽपि शृङ्गारादिगुणो मतः ।

तल्लोचोक्तरूपेण व्याख्या विहिताह ।

इति जेमचन्द्रसूत भट्टनायककृतलोचनम् ।

इत्थं स्वप्नाग्रमद्वाहयेत्
 इन्द्रेण किं दूययिता न शोकः ॥
 ऊष्णार्थमात्राया ददर्पतल
 धी परयति धान्तिमवेदयन्ता ।
 अत तदायै परिचलितानां
 विपश्योपानरसपराणाम् ॥
 चित्र निरात्मन्वमेव मन्ये
 प्रमेयचिदां प्रथमावतारम् ।
 तन्मार्गानामे सति सैतुबन्ध-
 पुरप्रतिष्ठादि न विस्मयाय ॥
 तस्मात्प्रतामत्र न दूषितानि
 मतानि तान्मय तु शोभितानि ।
 पूर्वप्रतिष्ठापितयोजनानाम्
 मूलप्रतिष्ठापनानामन्ति ॥

तर्पुष्यताम्—परिशुद्धतत्त्वमुक्तमेव मुनिना, न तत्पूर्वं चिन्तिन् । तथा ह्यह—
 काम्यार्थो भावयन्तीति तद् काम्यार्थो रम । तथा हि—“रासीरागते तानमी
 प्रादात्” (तै मा) इत्यादी अर्थितादित्येवसाधिकादिप्रतिपत्तिर्मात्रादिति-
 त्वस्योचितत्वं” प्रथमप्रवृत्तदन्तर्गतमधिकैवोपात्तशक्तिरुत्कारेणैव भास्ते ।
 प्रददातीत्यादिरूप सङ्गमञ्जुद्विस्मयाः । तथा इत्थं प्रति भावगादिविशुद्धयोगादि-
 भावाभिर्भवेवता प्रतिपत्तिस्तथैव काम्यारम्भादि राग्यादधिकारिणोऽधिकारि-
 प्रतिपत्तिः । अधिकारी चात्र विमलप्रतिमानशक्तिरुद्देश्य । तस्य च ‘श्रीवा-
 म्हाभिरामम्’²³ इति, ‘उमापि नीलाक्षक’²⁴ इति, ‘हरस्तु चिन्तिन्’²⁵ इत्यादि
 वाक्यैर्मध्ये वाक्यार्थप्रतीतेरनन्तर मानमी साक्षात्कारात्मिका अपहस्तितत-
 द्वाक्योपात्तशक्तिविभागा तान्मयतोक्तिरुपनायते । तस्याथ यो मृगयोतकादि-

23 प्रतिपत्तिर्मात्रादित्येव इत्यादि महाकादम्भेऽप्युक्ते लब्धे ।

24 अभिज्ञानशकुन्तले ॥१०

25 कुमारसंभवे ॥१३

26 तत्रैव ॥१३

भाति तस्य विशेषरूपत्वाभावाद्गीत²⁷ इति माहकम्यापारमार्थिकत्वाद्भूयमेव पर
देशकालाद्यनालितितम् । ततएव भीतोऽह भीतोऽय शत्रुर्वयसो मध्यम्यो
चेत्यादिप्रत्ययेभ्यो दु सप्तसादिकृतहातादिषु द्यन्तरोदयनियमवतया विप्रबहुतेभ्यो
विलक्षण निविघ्नप्रतीतिप्रकाशा साक्षादिव हृदये निर्भीयमान चक्षुषोरिव विगर्भित
मान गयानको रस । तथार्थापे हि भवे नात्मा तिरस्कृतो निविरोपत उल्लिखित ।
एव परोऽपि । ततएव न परिमितमेव साधारण्यमपि तु चित्तम् । व्याप्तिमह
इव धूमान्भ्योर्भयम्भयोरेव वा । तदस साक्षात्कारायमाणत्वोपिका ननादि
सामग्री । यस्या वस्तुसता काव्यापिताना च देशकालप्रमाणादीनां नियमहेतू
नामन्योन्यसंबन्धवत्तादित्यन्तमपसरणे स एव च साधारणीमान सुतरा पुन्यति ।
अतएव सर्वसामाजिकानामेकधनतैव प्रतिपत्ते सुतय रसपरिपोषाय सर्वेषामनादि
वासनावितोक्तवनेतसा वासनसवादात् ।

सा धावित्रा सविचमत्कार । तज्जोऽपि कम्पमुल्लोत्तसनादिविकार
क्षमत्कारः । यथा

अन विहरी चमकइ बहुकइ वि ए मदरेण कतिभाद ।

चदकताकदलसच्छभाइ लच्छीइ अगाइ ॥

तथा हि—स चातुस्त्रिव्यतिरेकेणाच्छिन्नो भोगावेश इत्युच्यते । भुजानस्याद्भुत
भोगरूपदाविदस्य च मन ररण चमत्कार इति । स च साक्षात्काररूपावो
मानसाप्यवसायो वा सवदसो वा स्मृतिर्वा तयात्वेन स्फुरन्नस्तु । यदाह

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्

पर्युत्प्लुते भवति यत्पुष्टिर्लोऽपि ननु ।

तस्ये तसा स्मरति मूलमवोपपूर्व

भावस्थितानि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ॥²⁸

इत्यादि सर्वेषा सान्देशा प्रतीतिराज्ञादात्मा, यस्या रतिरेव भाति । अतएव
विशेषान्तरानुपहितत्वात् सा रसनीया सती न लीयितीति, न मिथ्या, नाति-

27 'विशेषरूपत्वाभावा' इति पठामादृष्टांशके पाठ ।

28 'आवश्यात्वावि' इति मल्लि पाठ ।

सोप्या, न सोकिष्यतुन्या, न तदारोपादिरूपा । तथैव सोपचयावस्थागु देशाव-
नियन्त्रणात्, अतुकारोऽन्यतुभावातुगामितया करणात्, विषयसामग्र्यमपि
भवतु विज्ञानवादावलम्बनात् ।

सर्वथा रसनसमकवीतविप्रप्रतीतिप्राद्वी भाव एव रमः । तस्य विप्राप-
सारका विभावप्रभृतयः । तथा हि लीके मलविम्वनिर्मुक्ता संवित्तिरेव
चमत्कारनिर्वेशरसनाभ्यादगमोग्रमापत्तिलयविध्रान्त्यादिशब्दैरभिधीयते । विप्रा-
शब्दास्तं प्रतिपत्तावयोर्यवता संभावनाविरहो नाम, क्षणतत्त्वपरगतत्वनियमेन देश-
कालविरोधावेतः, निजगुणादिविचरीभावः, प्रतीत्युपायवैयर्थ्यम्, स्फुटत्वाभावः,
अप्रधानता, संशययोग्य । तथाहि—संविपमसंभावयमानः संवेदे संविदं निवैश-
यितुं न शक्नोति । का तस्य विध्रान्तिरिति प्रपमो विप्रः । तदप्यारणे
हृदयसंवादोऽलोक्यतामान्दस्तुविषयः । अलोपसामान्येषु चेष्टितेषु असम्भित-
प्रसिद्धिनिजगताद्वारुडप्रत्ययप्रसरकारिप्रव्याठराणादिनामधेयपरिग्रहः । अतएव
नि सामान्योत्पेदेऽपि देशव्युत्पत्तिप्रयोजने नाटकादी प्रख्यातवस्तुविषयत्वादि-
नियमेन निरूपयिष्यते । न तु प्रदृशनादायेतथ क्षावसर एव वक्ष्याम इत्यास्तां
तावत् ।

स्वैक्यतानां च मुखदुःखसंविदात्मात्वादे यथासंभव' तदपगमनीयतया वा
तत्परिरक्षाव्यवस्था वा तत्सदृशोज्ज्वीपया वा तन्निहातया वा तत्प्रविष्ट्या-
पयिषया वा तद्रोपनेच्छया वा प्रक्षरान्तरेण वा संवेदनान्तरसमुद्भूत एव परमो
विप्रः । 'परगतत्त्वनिवममराजामपि मुखदुःखानां संवेदने निवम्रेण स्थलमनि
मुखदुःखमोहमाभ्यव्यादिसंविदन्तरोद्गमनसंभाषनादवर्यंभावो विप्रः । तदपा-
करणे "कार्यो नातिप्रसंगोऽलौक्यादिना पूर्वज्ञानिगूढतेन प्रक्षायनालोकनेन च यो
नटकपताधिगमस्तत्पुनरुः प्रतियोगिकविना तत्प्रच्छादनाप्रकारोऽभ्युपायः, अलो-
किकभाषादिभेदलास्याहृदयपीठमण्डपयत्कक्षादिपरिमहनाभ्यधर्मसहितः । तस्मिन्
हि तत्संवातेन एवत्यैव च मुखदुःखं चेति न भवति, प्रतीतित्वरूपस्य निहवाद्-
पान्तरस्य चारोपितस्य प्रतिभासविद्विध्रान्तिवैकल्येन स्वल्पे विध्रान्तभाषात् ।
सकम्, तदीयस्वनिहवमान एव पर्यवमानात् । तथाहि—आसीनपाठ्यपुष्प-

यस्यिहनादि²⁹ लोके न दृश्यम् । न च तत्र किञ्चित्कथनित्समाव्यत्वादिति स एव राजा मुनिना साधारणीभावसिद्धरसचर्वणोपयोगित्वेन परिक्रवन्भ समाश्रित इति तत्रैव स्पृष्टीभविष्यतीति तदिह तावन्नोपमनीयम् । तत्र स एव स्वपरनियततया विप्रापसरणप्रसारो व्याख्यात ।

निजमुखादिविषयशब्दतश्च कथं बलवन्तरं सविद विधामयैदिति तत्प्रत्युद्भवोद्देशनाय प्रतिपदार्थनिष्ठै साधारण्यमहिम्ना स्वतन्त्रभोग्यत्वसहिष्णुभि रशब्दादिविषयमयीभिरातोद्यमानविचित्रमगङ्गपदविदग्ध्यश्लिष्टादिभिरभरण समाश्रितम् । यैनाहृदयोऽपि हृदयैर्मह्यप्राप्तया सहृदयीक्रियते । ऊहं हि—दृश्य प्रव्य चेति । किं च—प्रतीत्युपायानाममावे कथं प्रतीति स्फुटवतीति तत्कारिशब्दसिद्धिरागवेऽपि न प्रतीतिर्विश्राम्यति, स्फुटप्रतीतिरूपप्रसङ्गोचित प्रत्ययसाक्षाद्भूत्वात् । यथाहुः—‘सर्वो चय प्रमिति प्रत्यक्षपरा’ इति । समाश्रितकृते आगम्यानुमानशतैरपि अनन्यथाभावस्य स्वसंवेदनात् । अत्रात चलादौ साक्षात्कारान्तरेणैव बलवता तदवधारणादिति लौकिकलावदय कम । तस्मात्तदुभयविप्रविधावेऽभिनयबोधकषर्मिगतिप्रवृत्तपृच्छता समभिपिच्यन्ते । अभिनयन हि सशब्दलिङ्गव्यापारवितरसमेव प्रत्यक्षव्यापाररूपमिति विशेष्याम ।

अप्राधाने च वस्तुनि कस्य सविद्विधाम्यति तस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानान्तर प्रत्यगुपाकत स्वात्मनि अनिधाम्यत्वात् । अतोऽप्रधानत्वं जडे विभावानुभाववर्गे व्यभिचारिनिचये च सविदात्मकेऽपि नियमेन नान्यमुख्येक्षिणि³⁰ सम्भवतीति तदतिरिक्तं स्थाप्येव । तथा न सर्वेषांप्राप्तं तत्र पुरुषार्थनिष्ठा काचित् सविद इति प्रधानम् । तद्यथा—रति कामतदनुपक्षिप्तगोर्धनिष्ठा, क्रोधस्तदप्रधानेर्धनिष्ठा कामवर्मेर्धवसितोऽप्युत्साह, समस्तधर्मादिर्धवसितस्तत्त्वज्ञानजनितनिर्देशमाश्रितानो मोक्षोपाय इति तावदेव प्रधानम् । यद्यपि येषामप्यन्योन्यं गुणभावोऽस्ति तथापि तत्प्रधाने रूपके तत्प्रधानं सम्भवतीति रूपकमेदपर्यायेण सर्वेषां प्राधान्यमेवा लक्ष्यते । अद्वयमाणादिनिविष्ट-

29 भरतनाट्यशास्त्रे १०।१०० दृश्यरूपके १ । ४०-४८ साहित्यदर्पणे १।१।१५

30 भाव्यमुख्येक्षणि इति पाठो मूलग्रन्थके ।

रसा त्वेस्मिन्नपि रूपके दृष्टम् प्राधान्यम् । तत्र सर्वेऽपि सुतप्रधानाः,
स्वनिधिरूपरूपस्यैक्यनस्य प्रसङ्गास्वानन्दसारवात् ।

तथाहि—एकघनशेषविधिरणोऽपि लोके स्त्रीलोचनस्य हृदयविधान्तरन्त-
रायसूच्यविधान्तरारोत्वादविधान्तरूपतैव दुःखम् । तत एव कापिलैर्द रास्य
चायस्यमेव प्राणत्वेनोक्तं रजोरत्नितं वदद्भिरित्थानन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम् । किं
तु परचक्रविषयसाक्षेपानपि वदुः किं भासि स्वशो धीरस्य । स हि श्रेय-
सदिष्णुतादिप्राण एव । एव' रसादीनां प्राधान्यम् । हास्यदीनां तु
सातितयं सफलतोऽमुक्तभविभावतयोपरजवत्वमिति प्राधान्यम् । अतएवा-
नुत्तमप्रकृतिषु हासादयो बाहुश्चैन भवन्ति । पामरयाव सर्वेऽपि हसति
शोचति परनिन्दाभाद्रियते, स्वल्पमुमादित्वेन च सर्वत्र विस्मयते । रसाच्छ-
तया तु पुमर्थोपयोगित्वमपि श्लाघेयम् । गुरुद्वेषप्रधानभावकृत एव च दरास्प-
कादिभेद इति वक्ष्याम । स्वायित्वं चैतावतामेव । जात एव हि जन्तुरिय-
तामि सविद्धि परितो भवति । तथा हि—“दुःखसंश्लेषनिद्वेपी सुखा-
सादनसादरः” इति न्यायेन सर्वे रिरसया व्याप्तः । स्वात्मनुकर्ममानितया
परमुपहृष्टप्रभीष्टनिर्गोसत्तास्तद्वेषु वीपपरवशोऽप्राप्त[तया] च ततो भीरुः,
विचित्रिगीपुरुषि जितवस्तुविषयवैमुख्यमनकतयाक्रान्तः, विविदप्रभीष्टतयामि-
नन्यमानस्तत्त्वकर्तृन्मरर्तनसमुदितवित्तय विविध जिहासुरेव जायते” । न
छेवचित्ताहृतिपासनाशून्य प्राणी भवति । वेधत कस्यचित्काचिदधिका चित्त-
वृत्ति कापिरता, पक्षधितुधितविषयनिवन्निता कस्यचिदन्यथा । स्तुतान्निदेव
पुमर्थोपयोगिनीत्युपदेयः । तद्विभागकृतयोत्तमप्रकृत्यादिव्यवहारः ।

ये पुनरमो रसानिशाप्रभृतयधितवृत्तिविशेषास्ते समुचितविभावाभावा-
भगन्मथ्येऽपि न भवन्त्येव । तथा हि—रसायनमुपपुष्टवतो मुनेर्गन्वातस्य-

33 * स्वात्मनुकर्ममानितया परमुपहृषति । वरकथापात्रमहया शोचति ।
यथायं प्रवि श्रुयति । यथायं परिहारी समस्तहृते । विविदाह्रादिभेति ।
विचिद्वस्तुतयामि नन्यमानो सुगुह्यते । ततश्च परवर्तयवैचित्र्याद्वर्तयवैचित्र्ये ।
विचिद्विहासुखं वैराग्याहृदयमं भवते” इत्येव विषयन्तेनोपन्यस्तम् (प. २४) ।

भ्रमप्रभृतयो नोत्तिष्ठन्ति । यस्यापि वा भवन्ति विभावयतातस्यापि हेतुप्रभृते
 स्त्रीयभाषाः सत्कारशेषतां तावन्नापरयमनुवभ्रन्ति । उत्सादादयस्तु संपादित
 स्वस्वतन्त्रतया प्रलीनकन्या अपि सत्कारशेषतां नातिवर्तन्ते, वस्तुव्यान्तरविपर्य-
 योत्सादादेरखण्डनात् । यथा पठञ्जलि — “न हि चैत एकस्मा श्रियां रहा
 इत्यन्यासु विरक्तः” इत्यादि । उत्सादास्थायिरूपवितृप्तिमूलत्वात् एवामी
 व्यभिचारिणः । स्वात्मानमुदयात्स्वयवैविध्यशतमहत्तमर्माण प्रतिभसमाना
 रहनीलादिसूक्ष्मसूतविस्तभाषो- [पलम्भन]-नभादितमज्ञीसहस्रगर्भस्वद्विकवाचात्र-
 पद्मरागमरवतमहानोलादिमयगोलकादिवत्तस्मिन् सूत्रे सत्कारवैविध्यमभिनिकेश
 यन्तोऽपि तत्सूत्रकृतमुपकारसदृशं विभ्रतः स्वयं च विचिन्तार्थस्थायिसूत्रं विचिन्त-
 यन्तोऽन्तरान्तरा शुद्धमपि स्थायिसूत्रं प्रतिभासावकाशमुपनयन्तोऽपि पूर्वा-
 परव्यभिचारिरञ्ज्ययाशावलिमानमवश्यमानयन्त प्रतिभासन्त इति व्यभि-
 चारिण इच्यन्ते । तथा हि—स्वानोऽयमित्युक्ते कुत इति हेतुप्रभे स्थायि-
 तास्य सूच्यते, न तु राम उत्सादशक्तिमानिलत हेतुप्रभमाहु । अतएव
 विभावयात्सलोद्बोधका सन्त स्वरूपोपरप्रकृत्य विदधाना रत्युत्सादादेरुपपातु-
 वितत्वमाहमावहन्ति । न तु उदभावे सर्वथैव ते निरुपाख्या, वासनात्मना
 सर्वज्ञत्वा तन्मयत्वेनोद्बोधात् । व्यभिचारिणां तु स्वविभावाभावे नामापि
 नास्तीति वितनिष्यते चैतद्यथावोध व्याख्यावसरे । एवमप्रधानतनिरास
 स्थायिनिरुपणाय स्थायिमावादसत्त्वमित्यनया नामान्यलक्षणशेषभूतया विरोध
 लक्षणनिष्ठया च कृतः ।

तत्तानुभावाणां विभावानां व्यभिचारिणां च पृथक् स्थायिनिरुपणो नास्ति,
 बाष्पादेरानन्दार्तिरोमादिजलदर्शनात्, व्याघ्रादेश्च क्रोधभयादिहेतुत्वात्, भ्रम
 चिन्तादेरुत्सादभयाद्यनेकसहचरत्वावलोकनात् । सामग्री वा तु न व्यभि-
 चारिणी । तथा हि—बन्धुविनाशो यत्न विभाव परिदेविताधुपातादिस्तनु-
 भावचिन्तादैन्यादिश्च व्यभिचारी, सोऽदृश्य शोक दृष्टेयैव सशब्दोदवे शङ्कात्मक-
 विप्लवप्रधानाय संयोगोपपातः । सहा शोकव्यवहारे कार्यकारणसहकारात्मकलिङ्ग-
 दर्शने स्थाव्यात्मपरचित्तत्त्वनुमानाभ्यासपाटवाद्बुद्ध्या तैरेवोद्योगकटाक्षइत्यादिभि-

लौकिकीं कारणत्वादिभुवमतिव्यन्तर्विभावानातुभावनानुपरप्रकल्पशार्ङ्गेरस एवा-
लौकिकविभावादित्यपदेशभाग्नि प्राच्यकारणादिरूपसंस्कारोपजावनादयापनाय
विभावादिनामधेयत्वंपदैत्यैर्भाषाध्यायेऽपि वक्ष्यमाणसम्भवेर्देगुणप्रधानतापयो-
येण सामाजिकविधि सम्यग्योग संबंधमैक्याम् वासादितवद्विरलौकिककतिविन्न-
मवेदनारमकवर्णणागोचरतां नीतोऽर्थव्यर्थमात्रेणसारो न तु गिद्वस्त्रभावलालातिक
एव, न तु र्वर्णातिरिक्तातावत्सर्वी स्थायिविलक्षण एव रम ।

ननु शङ्कुकादिभिरभ्यधीयत—स्वाय्यो विभावादिव्यत्यारभ्यमाण वादत
उच्यत इति । एव हि लौकिकेऽपि किं न रस । अततोऽपि हि यत् रसनायता
स्मात्तत्र वस्तुसत्ता वध न भविष्यति । तेन स्थायिप्रतातिरनुमितिरूपप्राप्ता न
रस । अतएव सूत्रे स्थायिग्रहणं न कृतम् । तत्र प्रयुक्तं शक्यभूतं स्मात् ।
येनतमीचिलादेवमुच्यते—स्वायी रसोभूत इति । यांचिन्न तु तत्स्थायिग्रहणेन
कारणादितया प्रसिद्धानामधुना चरणोपयोगितया विभावत्वादित्यम्भनत् ।
तथा हि—लौकिकचित्तात्यनुमाने का रसता । तेनालौकिकमत्कारात्मा
रसास्वाद्य स्मृत्यनुमानलौकिकससवेदनविलक्षण एव । तथा हि लौकिकानातु
मानेन संस्कृत प्रमदादिर्न तादस्येन प्रतिपद्यते, अपि तु हृदयमवादात्मकमहदय-
त्ववत्तातूष्णीमविष्यद्रसाश्चादाहुरीभावेनातुमानस्मृत्वादियोपानयारत्नेव तमयी
भावोचितत्वंवेद्याप्राणतया । न च सा चवद्या प्राप्तावनांतरात्, येनाधुना
स्मृतिरस्यात् । न चात्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणव्यापार । किं चालौकिक-
विभावादिसंयोगबलीयनतैवेव चरणा । सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादि-
लौकिकप्रमाणजनितरत्नायवयोधतस्तया योगिप्रत्यक्षजनितपरमविकृतिज्ञानतु संकल
वैषमिषोपरागश्च यशुसपरयोगितत्वागदैकरसनातुभावाय विशिष्यते । एतासा
यथायोगमर्तनादिविप्राचरोदयाताटस्थ्यास्फुटत्वं विषयावेष्टवैवरय च सौन्दर्य-
विरहात् । अतः तु स्त्रात्मैक्यतत्वनियमानमवास्यानुप्रवेशात्परगततरनियमा-
भावात्तद्विभावादित्यभारत्स्यसप्रबुद्धोचितनिजरत्नादिवायनावेगवत्ताच्च न विप्रा-
न्तरादीनां सभय इत्यवोपाम बहुश । अतएव विभावादयो न विप्रातिहेतवो
रसस्य, तद्वोधापगमेऽपि रससंभवात् । नापि च्छितिहेतवो येन प्रमाणमप्ये पतेयु ,

सिद्धस्य कल्पयिष्येकभूतस्य रसस्याभावात् । किं तर्ह्येतद्विभावादय इति, अलौकिक एवाय चवैणोपयोगी विभावादिव्यवहारः । कान्यसेत्थं दृष्टमिति चेद्रूपणमेतदस्मात् कमलौकिकत्वसिद्धेः । पातकरसास्वादोऽपि हि शुद्धमरिचादिषु दृष्ट इति समानमेतत् ।

नन्वेव रसोऽप्रमेय स्यात्, एव युक्तं भवितुमर्हति । रस्यतैः प्राणो ह्यसौ न प्रमेयादिस्वभावः । तर्हि सूत्रे निष्पत्तिरिति कथम् ? नैव रसस्य, अपि तु तद्विषयरमनायाः । तन्निष्पत्त्या तु यदि तदेकगत्यत्रीदित्यस्य रसस्य निष्पत्तिरुच्यते तेन न कश्चिदत्र दोषः । सा च रसना न प्रमाणव्यापारो न वारक व्यापारः । स्वयं तु नात्रामाश्रिकी स्वसवेदनसिद्धत्वात् । रसना बोधरूपैव किं तु बोधान्तरेभ्यो विलक्षणीय, उपायानां विभावादीनां लौकिकवैलक्षण्यत्वात् । तेन विभावादिसंयोगाद्रसना यतो निष्पद्यते तदस्तथाविधरसनामोचरो लौकिकोत्तरोऽर्था रस इति तात्पर्यं सूत्रस्य । अयमत्र सङ्क्षेपः—मुकुटप्रतिशीर्षकादिना तावन्नटवद्विराज्जायते । गाढप्राक्तनसवित्सत्काराच्च काव्यबलादानीयमानापि न तद्वत् रामधीर्विभ्राम्यति । अतएवोभयदेशनश्लक्ष्णम् । रोमाञ्चादयश्च भूयसा रतिप्रतीविकारितया दृष्टास्तत्रापि लोकिना देशकालानिबन्धेन रति गमयन्ति । यस्या स्वात्मापि तद्वासनावत्त्वादनुग्रविष्टः । अतएव न तदस्थतया रस्यवगमः । न च नियतकरणतया, येनार्जनाभिपदादिसंभावना । न च नियतपरामीक गतया, येन तु खट्वेपाद्युदयः । तेन माप्यारण्यभूता सतानवृत्तेरेकस्या एव वा सविदो गोनरीभूता रतिः शृङ्गारः । साधारण्यभावना च विभावादिभिरिति ।³²

तत्र विभावप्राधान्यं [यथा]—

वेलीवन्दलितस्य विभ्रममथोद्भूयं ययुस्ते रणो

भङ्गोभङ्गुरकामवासुर्कमिदं भ्रममर्कमर्कम् ।

आपातेऽपि विकारकरणमहो वक्राम्बुजमाश्रय

सस्य सुन्दरि वैधस्ततिजगतीसार तमेका कृति ॥³³

32 इति श्रीमानभिवनमुक्ताशाय यतश्चतुर्वैशाखाभिषेकपञ्जीरित वैदित्तगम इति निष्ठागत्यरमतेन वैधवन्द्यम् टीकायामुक्तिः (प ६६) समाप्ता ।

33 वैधवन्द्यकाव्यानुशासने (प ६६) ।

अतः च विभावकृत सौन्दर्यं प्राधान्येन भाति । तदगुणतत्वेन केलाविभ्रम-
भङ्गुरजर्मेवचोमहिषा वायुभाववर्गं भङ्गिकमविकारादिशब्दबलाच्च व्यभिचारिवर्गं
प्रतिभातीत्यत एव नास्त्वन्त्याशङ्कान्न रसासादमये शृङ्गारे विधेया ।

अनुभावप्राधान्यं यथा—शुद्धसारसतत्रवादविविक्तमकल्पकाद्यकर्मद्वार्णवपूर्णं
भावसंपादनद्विजराजस्येदुराजस्य

यद्विधम्य धिलोक्तिषु बहुशो निःश्वेमेना स्रोचने
मृदालासि हरिदति प्रतिदिनं लूनाञ्जिनीनातचत् ।
पूर्वाकाशद्विदम्बकथ निविडो यत्पाण्डिमा गण्डयो
कृष्णे धूनि सयौवनानु यदितारस्वेदं चेदस्थिति ॥³⁴

अत्र विःश्वेमेति बहुश इति प्रतिदिनमिति च पदममर्पिता व्यभिचारिणः, कृष्ण
इति पदामर्पितश्च विभावो गुणवनं प्रतिभासते । विभाति-तल्लक्षणात्मविश्लोक-
वैशिष्ट्यवानतानवतारतन्म्यपुलस्तैषैर्षप्रभृतिस्त्वनुभावसत्यम् ।

व्यभिचारिणां तु प्राधान्यं यद्विभावानुभावप्राधान्यकृतं तलाप यथा—
महाकव्यं बलुगकव्यं

आत्तमात्तमपिदात्तमुच्चितु
पातरा शपराद्विनी जर्ही ।
अजला जलमधोरलोचना
लोचनप्रतिशरीरलाब्धितम् ॥³⁵

इत्यतः शुद्धसारप्रमदापनभूषणभूतस्य व्यभिचारिवर्गस्य वितर्कलाभशङ्कादे
प्राधान्यम् । तद्विभावानां प्राधान्यात् सौन्दर्यप्रियावृत्तादात्मित्यादर्पितानु-
भावस्तु तदनुयायी । एव द्वयप्राधान्ये चोदाहार्यम् । किं तु समप्राधान्य एव
रसासादस्योत्कृष्टम् । तत्र प्रवच्य एव भवति, वस्तुतस्तु दशरूपक एव । यदाह
चामल — तदभेदं दशरूपकं धेयं तद्वि पितृ पितृपञ्चद्विरोपसारत्याम् ॥³⁶

34 श्लोकोऽपि भङ्गुराजस्य ध्वन्यालोचनीयमेतदुदाहृतम् ।

35 अमरकव्याख्यानुशासनश्रुति (पृ ११) नागरहितोऽयं श्लोक उदाहृतः ।

36 आत्मलाभकारणम् १ । १ । ३० ३१

इति । तदुपसमर्पणाय तु प्रवर्धे भाषावेपप्रवृत्तौचित्यादिकल्पनात् । तदुप
जीवनेन मुहुरे । तथा च तत्र सहृदया पूर्वापरमुचित परिकल्प्य इदंगत
वहास्मिनवसर इत्यादि बहुतर पोठवधरूप विदधते । तेन तै कायान्वास
प्राक्तनपुण्यादिहेतुवत्तादिति सहृदया, तेषां परिमितविभाषाद्युन्मीलनऽपि
परिस्तुट एव साक्षात्कारकल्पन काव्यार्थं स्फुरति । अतएव तेषां काव्यमेव
प्रतीत्युत्पत्तिरुत् अत्रपेक्षितनाट्यमपि । तेषां तु नाट्य 'निर्पत्तिता स्फुरिता
शशिरमय इति न्यायेन सुतरां निर्मलीकरणम् । अहृदयानां च तदेव
नैर्मल्यथापि अतः पतिता गीतवाद्यगणिकादयो न व्यसनितायै पर्यवस्यति
नाट्योपलक्षणात् । तत्र च नटो ध्यायिनामिव इदं ध्यानपदम् न हि तत्राय
मेव सिद्ध्यमयो वासुदेव सारणीयप्रतिपत्तिः अपि तु तदुपायद्वारेणातिस्फुटो
भूतलकल्पगोचरो देवताविशेषो ध्यायिनां फलरूपः । तद्व्यग्रप्रक्रिया नाट्योपल
क्षितातिस्फुटाव्यवसायविपर्ययो नियतदेशकालाद्यसृष्टनूतन इदं पक्षमिति
विधिस्थानीयोऽर्था व्युत्पत्ति वितरति ।

THE TEXT OF KĀVYĀLOKA LOCANA IV

The notice in the recent *Descriptive Catalogue*¹ of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library Madras of two manuscripts (A and B) in Devanāgarī character of Abhinavagupta's commentary² on the fourth Uddyota of the *Dhvanyaloka* or *Kavyaloka* first drew attention to this missing chapter³ of the well known work the existence of which was brilliantly conjectured long ago by Prof. Jacobi.⁴ An application was made for a loan of these MSS through the India Office in 1920, but as the rules of the Library did not allow

1 Madras 1918 vol xxii pp 866-7, nos 12893-4

2 The full title of this work (commonly known as *Locana*) as given in the different MSS is *Kāvyaloka locana* or *Dhvanyāloka locana*. Abhinava himself in the present text calls the original *Kavyaloka*. The *Anandavardhanīya Kāvyaśāṅkara kāmādhenu śīka* entered by Aufrecht (i 49) as Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* involves a twofold error due perhaps to Oppert's inaccurate entry. In the first place the term *Anandavardhanīya* is an incorrect designation in the second place by *Kāvyaśāṅkara kāmādhenu śīka* is probably meant the commentary of the same name (ed. Benares Sansk. Series 1908 Śrīnivallāsa Press 1909) on Vīmanā's *Kāvyaśāṅkara* by Gopendra Tipṭha Bhūpāla mixed up through a confusion with the *Locana* commentary of Abhinava.

3 The *Kāvyamālā* (ed. Nir. Sag. Press Bombay 1911) prints only the first three *uddhyotas* of the *Locana* which were the only ones known to Buhler (*Asiatic Report* pp 66 and xvii). Other MSS Burnell, *Tanjore Cat* 55a. Keithorn *Central Prov. Rep* 100 also *Lists of MSS purchased in 1869-78* 20. Oppert 2592.3. 2996. 5513. Bhandarkar, *Rep* 1887-91 593. *India Office Cat* 1008. Stein *Jammu Cat* 62. Kāśnāth Kunte *Lahore Rep* 8. Most of these MSS are described as complete but it cannot be determined whether they include the fourth *uddhyota*.

4 ZDMG 1902 p 404 footnote 1. In addition to the arguments adduced therein it may be pointed out that Abhinava at p 12. ll 19-20 (ed. *Kāvyamālā*) promises to dilate upon a certain point at the end of his work (*granthānte sakti śmaṇ*) a promise which he bears out towards the end of the present text.

such a loan and as a rotograph transcript was impossible the present writer had to be content with certified copies forwarded by the Curator of the Library through the kindness and courtesy of F. W. Thomas of the India Office Library. On return to India another attempt was made to obtain a loan of the MSS through the Calcutta University but as there was no chance of success in this direction Sir Asutosh Mookerjee to whom the difficulties were submitted very kindly directed Pandit Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstrī to make fresh copies personally. His efforts happily resulted in the discovery of a fresh manuscript in the possession of his friend Pandit S. K. Ramanāth Śāstrī of the Madras Oriental MSS Library with which also (C) the present text is collated. Although still deficient in many places on which probably a sight of the original MSS might have thrown some light the present writer ventures to publish the text in its present form not only out of consideration of its importance but also with the hope of drawing to it the attention of interested scholars who may have access to other MSS and can thereby help to determine some of the difficulties left unsolved here.

Apart from the inherent interest of the present text as supplying the missing part of the learned commentary of this champion of the Dhvaṇī School there are several points to which attention may be drawn here. As in the other parts of his commentary¹ Abhinava appears to distinguish here between the Karikakara and the Vṛtikara of the original text by directly opposing them a fact which further supports Jacob's contention² that the author of the Karika the so-called Dhvaṇīkara was different from Anandavardhana the author of the prose Vṛtti. Abhinava uses the term *vṛtti-grantha* in contradistinction to the *Karikā* and in one place

1 Pp. 1, 12, 39, 60, 71, 78, 104, 123, 130-1 etc.

2 First suggested by Bühler *Kaśīnīśaśana* p. 65. See ZDMG loc. cit. p. 405 ff. and S. K. De on the Dhvaṇīkāra and Anandavardhana in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* vol. 1, 1926 pp. 19.

especially, points out that the question as to the source of the endless variety of *Artha* imparted to poetry is mentioned by the *Vṛtikāra* although not touched upon by the *Karikākara* ¹ Towards the end of the present text, Abhinava gives his own reading of some of the *Kārikas*, and his remarks apparently show that the *Vṛtikāra* in several places reads the *Kārikās* by splitting them up (*khandikṛtya paṭhāt*)—a procedure which is not likely if we suppose a common authorship of the *Kārikā* and the *Vṛtti*.

There are two *gathā* verses in the present text (*Dhaavīhala** and *Cāṇana**) one of which is ascribed to Abhinava himself in one of the MSS,² the sense and construction of which do not seem very clear from the obviously corrupt text. The first verse is baffling and obscure as to sense and metre in all the MSS. The next verse is clearer and its *chayā* may be put tentatively thus

*Thyagi jana-kara paramparā samcarana lṣaya nuhsaha śarirāḥ.
Arthāḥ kṛpā-grhasthāḥ sarthad 1yastāḥ śravanīya*

"Riches, enfeebled of body through decay caused by passing to and fro through a succession of hands of bountiful folk melt away, as it were separated from their company and lodging in poor men's houses." This reading, which was first suggested through a discussion of this point with Dr. Barnett, may not be faultless and is perhaps capable of being improved upon, but in the main it may be accepted in the absence of anything better, and there is nothing in it incompatible with the context. The difficulty lies in the two words *savanti* and *sattihāvattha*. The emendation *vasanti* is very natural and tempting, but it is supported by none of the MSS while *svasthavasthah*, instead of *sarthad 1yastah* is attractive although *svasthavasthah* > *sattavaatthā*.

In this connexion attention may be drawn to two Deśi verses in the original text at p. 240 ll 6-7 and p. 243 ll

1 उद्योगीनरत्नवारे शिष्ट निष्कारिणीलक्षणाणि कारिकाकारैश्च नोक्त ।

2 Two other verses are cited as Abhinava's own in the present text.

21 2 which are unintelligible as they stand but which may now be reconstructed in the light of the interesting *chāyas* given by Abhinava Fischel¹ gives the latter śloka somewhat differently thus

*Mahu mahu tī bhānantaaho vijjā kulu janassu
To vi na deu Janaddanau goarīho manassu*

It is interesting to note that Abhinava in his gloss on this verse calls Apabhraṃśa Saindhava bhāṣa thus confirming the modern tradition that Apabhraṃśa originated in Sindhu deśa.²

Another point of interest is the mention by Abhinava of a work called *Tattivaloka* by Anandavardhana in which the latter is said to have discussed in detail the relation between *śāstra naya* and *āvyā naya*. This work yet remains to be recovered.

In one of the concluding verses as in the invocatory śloka at the beginning of the first Uddyota Abhinava mentions the name of his upadhyaya Bhaṭṭendurāja but here he couples this name with that of another teacher of his called Śrī Siddhicela who is not mentioned elsewhere in any of his known works. From Siddhicela he probably learnt philosophy. The reference to *asmad upadhyaya* Bhaṭṭendurāja occurs also at pp. 25 43 116 207 223 of the printed text of the *Dhvanyaloka* and in one place (p. 160) he is adorned with the grandiloquent epithet *vidvat kavi sahrdaya cakravartin* which together with the fact that in the present text Abhinava apparently indicates that he learnt Kavya from this teacher will go to support the conjecture that this Bhaṭṭendurāja was probably a poet and critic held in high esteem by his great pupil. Although chronology does not stand in the way there is hardly any definite means to decide whether Abhinava's teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja was identical with Pratiharendurāja the commentator

1. Ma et al en sur kenn n s d. *Apabhraṃśa* p. 45 also cited in Jacob's *Sanskrit naya* p. xx.

2. See Jacob loc. cit.

of Udbhata¹ From Abhinava's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*² we learn that Bhaṭṭendu was the son of Śrībhūtrāja and grandson of Saucuka of the Katyayana *gotra*, but Pratiharendurāja's genealogy is unknown The only facts known about the latter is that he was a native of Koṅkana and a pupil of Mukula,³ probably the same Mukula who was the son of Bhaṭṭa Kallāja and author of *Abhidha vṛtti matrka*⁴ and who is placed by Bühler⁵ on the authority of *Raja tarangini* v 66 in the reign of Avantivarman Two plausible reasons, however, will lead one to the opinion that the two Indurājas were probably different persons To begin with Bhaṭṭendurāja appears essentially as a poet who wrote as Abhinava's own quotations show, in Sanskrit as well as in Prakrit and whose verses supplied a ready source of poetic illustrations in his pupil's work probably inspired by himself Had he been like Pratiharendurāja, a writer on Poetics as well as a poet his views would very likely have been cited and discussed in the usual course by Abhinava It is also remarkable that Abhinava cites his teacher always as Bhaṭṭendurāja and never as Pratiharendurāja although Bhatta and Pratihara being mere titles need not make any difference The conjecture is not unlikely that Abhinava's teacher may have been the poet Bhaṭṭendurāja who is quoted under the same designation in Kṣemendra's two works *Aucitya-vicara*⁶ and *Suśrīta tilaka*⁷ as well as in the poetical anthologies⁸ of

1 As Peterson (*Subhāṣṭ* p 11) seems to suggest

2 Bühler *op cit* pp 65 80 and *colvin*

3 *Kāvyaśāhikara sara saṅgṛha vṛtti* (ed Kāvyaśāhikara) pp 1 86

4 Ed Kāvyaśāhikara p 22 It is curious that this treatise which deals with the grammatico-rhetorical question of the functions of word and its sense is not cited at all by Abhinava

5 *Op cit* pp 66 78 see Fischel *Sprāṅgatilaka* p 12

6 Under ii 20 31

7 Under ii 2 24 29 30

8 The verse *parāśara yāni pūjanti* ascribed to Indurāja in the *Paṇḍitāni* of Śārngadhara (no 1052) is quoted anonymously to be by Ānanda-vardhana (pp 53 118) a fact which however, is not decisive because

as in his numerous treatises on Kashmir Śaivism. One of these is Bhaṭṭa Tauta cited at p. 178 on whose work called *Kāvya-kautuka* Abhinava had, as he himself tells us, written a *Vivaraṇa* before he wrote his *Locana*. Nothing is known of this Bhaṭṭa Tauta (also Bhaṭṭa Tota), but it appears that Abhinava's commentary on Bharata was written at the instance of this teacher who is reverently cited therein just as his *Locana* was probably inspired by Dharmenduraja. The *Kāvya-kautuka* is also referred to in the *Vyaktiviveka-vyakhyana* (p. 13), and Hemacandra¹ quotes three verses from Bhaṭṭa Tauta while in his own commentary on the same work² he reproduces after Abhinava's commentary on Bharata Tota's opinion in connexion with the theory of *Rasa*. Other reference to *asmad upadhyaya* Bhaṭṭa Tauta in *Locana* occurs at p. 29. Kṛemendra in his *Aṅgīkāra-vivaraṇa* attributes to him a verse (*prajña nava nava**) which is given anonymously in Hemacandra p. 3. Tauta is also cited by Candīdasa in his *Dīpikā* commentary on Maṇḍana.

Sometimes Abhinava refers to his numerous preceptors generally as *asmad guravaḥ*. In his *Locana* (p. 30) however as well as in his *Pratyabhijñā-vimarsinī* *Laghuvṛtti*³ Abhinava refers to Utpala as his *parama guru* the teacher of his teacher. This Utpala son of Udayakara is well known in the history of Kashmir Śaivism as the author of the *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā* on which Abhinava wrote, besides the *Laghuvṛtti* referred to above a *Bṛhaṭi Vṛtti* and is assigned by Bühler⁴ to the first half of the 10th century. It is interesting to note that while commenting on the word *pratyabhijñā* occurring in *Dhvaṇyaloka* i. 8 Abhinava discusses this term and refers to what is said on this point by Utpala (*śodhukam*

1 *Kavyaśāstra* p. 316

2 *Alaṅkāra-cūdā-maṇi* p. 59

3 Bühler *op. cit.* p. clix

4 *Op. cit.* pp. 79-80. Also Bhandarkar *Rep.* 1883-4 pp. 76 f. Eggeling *Ind. a. Off. Car.* iv p. 235 Chatterji *Kashm. Śaivism* pp. 19-40.

asmatparama gurubhikṣu śrīmad utpala-padaṣṭh p. 30) From what Abhinava himself says in his numerous works on Kashmir Śaivism we can indicate the line of spiritual succession (*guru parampara*) thus Somananda → Utpala → Lakṣmana gupta → Abhinavagupta Somananda being probably a pupil of Vasugupta the earliest founder of the Pratyabhijña śāstra.

In the concluding portion of his *Paratrinśika vivaraṇa* Abhinava gives us an interesting personal and genealogical account in which he tells us that he was the son of Kāśmiraka Cukhala¹ and grandson of Varahagupta and had a brother named Manorathagupta. That Abhinava was Śaiva is abundantly shown here as elsewhere in the invocatory and concluding verses of the present text. It may be noted in this connexion that at the end of each Uddyota Abhinava invokes the different manifestations (*vivarta*) of Vac. In the first it is *pratibha* in the second *paśyanti* in the third *madhyama* and in the fourth Uddyota he simply speaks of the fourth manifestation (*turya śakti*) implying thereby presumably *vaikhari*. These manifestations however, are usually enumerated as three and not four although different writers differ as to the particular name attached to individual manifestations in succession. Thus Ruṣṣaka speaks of Vac as *trividha vighraha* (p. 1) which both Jayaratha and Saṃudra bandha explain as constituting in succession *paśyanti* (*para* or *vimarsa rūpa*) *madhyama* and *vaikhari*. This agrees substantially with Abhinava's enumeration with the exception of *pratibha* which is probably Vac itself and not one of its *vivartas*.

The date of Abhinavagupta which forms a central landmark in Alamkāra literature is easily settled from his relation to Utpala and Ānandavardhana as well as from the indications given by himself in some of his works. His *Krama*

¹ Buhler's MS has *kaśmīraśa v. cūhala* (p. clv) as well as *cukhala* (p. clvi).

stotra was written in A D 991¹ His *Bhairava stotra* is dated A D 993² and his *Brhott Vṛtti* on Utpala's *Pratyabliṣṭa* bears the date of A D 1015³ We may, therefore place Abhinavagupta with great certainty towards the last quarter of the 10th century, and he certainly lived into the first quarter of the 11th

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1 Intro to *Dh anydola* ed Kavyamālā p 2 footnote

2 Bühler *op cit* p clix

3 Bühler *ibid* p clix also p 80

श्रीमदभिनवगुप्तोन्मीलित

काव्यालोकलोचनम्

चतुर्थ उद्गोत

वृत्त्यपञ्चकनिर्वाहयोगेऽपि परमेश्वरः ।

नान्योपकरणापेक्षो यथा ता नौमि शाङ्करीम् ॥¹

उद्गोतसमिति विवक्षुर्दृष्टिकारः² आह—एवमिति । प्रयो
जनान्तरमिति यद्यपि 'सहृदयमन प्रीतये' (I 1 p 3 l 3)
इत्यनेन प्रयोजन प्रागेवोक्तम्, तृतीयोद्गोतावधौ च सत्काव्यं कर्तुं
ज्ञातुं वा³ (III 46 p 231 l 6) इति तदेवैषत् स्फुटीकृतम्
तथापि स्फुटतरोक्तुमिदानीं यत्नः । यत्तु सुस्पष्टरूपेण विज्ञायते

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N B —The references are to pages and lines of the
text in the Kavyamala edition Nr Sag Press 1911
(no 25)

1 B reads two verses before this which really belong
to the end of Chap III (see p 233 ll 32 25) श्रीः
काव्यालोके प्रथं नीतान् ध्वनिभेदान् पराध्वनम् । इदानीं शोचन
लोके कृतावधौ संविधाविति ॥ अन्वयितानो भेदानो स्फुटतावति
दायिनीम् । त्रिशोचनप्रियां चत्त पथया परमेश्वरीम् ।

2 उद्गोताख्यं प्रदक्षयितुं इतिकार—A उद्गीतसमिति
विरचयितुं इतिकार—C.

3 यत्तदेवैषत्—A omitts इति

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अतोऽस्पष्टनिर्दिष्टात्^१ स्पष्टनिरूपणायैव प्रतिगातीति प्रयो-
जनान्तरमित्युक्तम् । अथवा पूर्वोक्तयोः प्रयोजनयोरन्तरं विरो-
धोऽभिधीयते । केन^२ विशेषेण सत्काव्यकरणस्य प्रयोजनं^३ केन
च सत्काव्यावयोध^४ इति विरोधो निरूप्यते । तत्र सत्काव्यकरणे
कथमस्य व्यापार इति पूर्वं वक्तव्यम् । निष्पादितस्य श्रेयत्वादिति ।
तदुच्यते—एतन्नेर्यं^५ इति । ननु^६ ध्वनिमेवाव्यतिशयानामनन्त्यमिति
व्यधिकरणमे^७ तदित्यभिप्रायेणाशङ्कते—कथमिति^८ ।

Kārikā 1

Kārikā 2

अतोऽतारम्—अतो हीति । आसतां तावद्दृष्ट^९ प्रकारा ,
एवेनाप्येव भवतीत्यपि-सन्दर्भः । एतदुक्तं भवति—वर्णनीयवत्तु
निष्ठ प्रज्ञाविशेष प्रतिमानं तत्र वर्णनीयस्य पारिमित्यादाय कविर्नैव
स्पृष्टत्वात्तत्वेन स द्विष्य प्रतिमानं^{१०} तच्चातोऽयमेव स्यात् । तत्र च काव्य
मपि तच्चातोऽयमिति^{११} अष्ट द्वादशौ कविप्रवाह^{१२} । उक्तिर्वैचित्र्येण
तु त एवार्था निरूप्यते भवतीति तद्विषयाणां प्रतिमानानामनन्त्य
सुपदममिति । ननु प्रतिमानान्त्यस्य किं फलमिति निर्णेतुं याणी
नवद्वयमायातीत्युक्तम् । तेन वाणीनां काव्यवाक्यानां^{१३} तावत्प्र-
त्यमानाति, तच्च प्रतिमानान्त्ये सञ्जुगप्यते, तच्चार्थान्त्ये^{१४}, तच्च
ध्वनिप्रसादादिति । तत्र प्रथममनन्त्यतिरस्कृतवाच्यान्तरमाह—

१ अतो स्पष्टनिर्दिष्टात्—B

२ Omitted in A

३ Omitted in A and B

४ परकाव्यपूर्वावयोध—B

५ Omitted in A and B

६ व्यधिकरणमेदृषे—A, व्यधिकरणमेदृषे—B

७ तदिति—A

८ आसतां तावद्दृष्ट—B

९ तद्विषयस्य प्रतिमान—B

१० तच्चातोऽयमेवेति—B

११ कविप्रयोग—A

१२ आसतां तावद्दृष्ट—B

१३ तच्चावयव—C, तच्चावयव—A

स्मितमिति । मुग्ध-मधुर-विभव-सरस-विसलयित-परिमल¹-
स्पर्शनान्मलान्तरिस्तुतानि तैरबाहृतसौन्दर्यसर्वजनवाङ्मन्याक्षीण-
प्रसरलसतापप्रशमनतर्पकत्वसौकुमार्यमावेकांतिकतन्मस्यस्थारादुत्तुलित-
यज्ञाभिलषणीन²संगत्वानि ध्वन्यमानानि यानि तैः स्वितादे
प्रतिब्रह्मसारस्य स्फुरिकविषयो³विहितपरमव्यतिरेकेण धर्मान्तर-
पात्रता⁴ यावत् क्रियते⁵ तावत्तदपूर्वमेव समयत इति सर्वत्र
तन्मन्यन्तव्यम् । अस्म्येति "अपूर्वत्वमेव [प्रति]⁶भासत" इति
दूरेण चवन्ध, सर्वत्वैवास्य नवत्वमिति सगति⁷ । द्वितीय प्रथम-
शब्दोऽर्थान्तरेऽनपा⁸करणायत्वप्रधानत्वसाधारणत्वादिव्यञ्जयधर्मा-
न्तरे सकान्त स्तार्थं व्यनक्ति । एव सिद्ध-शब्दोऽपि वीरत्वान-
पेक्षत्वविस्मयनीयत्वादी व्यञ्जयधर्मान्तरे सकान्त स्तार्थं व्यनक्ति ।
एवं प्रथमस्य द्वौ भेदाद्युदाहृत्य द्वितीयस्याप्युदाहर्तुमासूतयति—
वियसितेति⁹ । निद्राय कौतुकी कृतकमुत इत्यर्थः । वदने
विन्यास्य वक्तृमिति वदनस्पर्शमेव¹⁰ तावद्विषय मुख्यं स्यक्तु न
पारयतीति अतएव प्रियस्येति । वधूर्नवीडा । बोधलासेन
प्रियतमप्रबोधनेन¹¹ निरुद्धो हठात्¹² प्रवर्तमान प्रवर्तमानोऽपि
कवचिद् क्षणमात्र धृतधूम्यनाभिलाषो यवा¹³ । अतएवाभोगेन¹³

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1 The text reads परिकर

2 अक्षय्योय—B

3 विकविरिषयो ?—A, सखिरिषयो—B

4 धर्माभिलषणीन—B

5 ०.५३—B

6 Omitted in A, B C, but in the text

7 नराक्षरयोय—A and B

8 Abhinava apparently accepts here the reading of B
in the text

9 वदनस्पर्शनमेव—A

10 प्रियतमप्रबोधने—B

11 हठात्—A

12 यवा—B

13 अतएव भोगेन—B

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पुन पुनर्निद्राविधारनिर्वर्णनयापि¹ लोल² कृत्वा स्थिता । न
 तु सर्वथैव चुम्बनान्³ निवर्तितुं शक्नोतीत्यर्थः । एवभूता एषा
 यदि मया परिचुम्ब्यते तद्विलङ्घा विमुक्ता भवेदिति तस्यापि प्रियस्य
 परिचुम्बनपिपये⁴ निरारम्भस्य हृदय साकाङ्क्षप्रतिपत्ति
 नामेति । साकाङ्क्षा साभिजाया प्रतिपत्ति स्थितिर्यस्य तादृश
 रुद्रहृदिकाकदर्शित न तु मनोरथसंपत्ति⁵वरितार्यं यद्यपि हृदयम्,
 किन्तु रते परस्परजोवितशब्दस्वाभिमानरूपाया परिनिर्जृते⁶
 केनचिदप्यनुभावेनालज्जयापगाहनाया वार गतमिति⁷ परिपूर्णभूत
 एष शृङ्गार इत्यर्थः । द्वितीयश्लोकेन तु परिचुम्बनं सप्तमम् ।
 लज्जाक्षराब्धेनोक्ता तेनापि य सा परिचुम्ब्यतेति यद्यपि पोषित एव
 शृङ्गार, तथापि प्रथमश्लोके परस्परामिलायप्रसरनिरोधपरपरा
 पर्यवसानासम्भवेन वा रतिरक्ता⁸ सोमयोरपि⁹ एकस्वरूपचित्तव्यत्यु
 प्रवेशमाशङ्क्याया रति¹⁰ सुतरां पोषयति ।

Kārikā 3

एव गीत मेदचतुष्टयमुदाहृत्यालक्ष्यकममेदेष्वति¹¹देशमुत्तेन
 सर्वापमेदेष्वित्यमतिदेश करोति मुक्तशानधेति¹² । अतुसर्तध्व
 इति उदाहर्तव्य इत्यर्थः । यथोक्तमिति

तस्याहानां प्रमेदा ये प्रमेदा स्वगताश्च ये ।

तेषामानन्यमन्योन्यसम्पदपरिवर्त्यनम्¹³ । (M 13 p 83)

1 निद्रापि चान्दिर्यथापि—A

2 अ लोल —A निर्वर्णनया विद्योद्य —B 3 चुम्बन—A

4 सप्तमे—A and B 5 वारपत्ति—B

6 परिनिर्जृते—B ; रपनिर्जृते —C

7 वार वार चतुर्विध—B ; वरां वतिविधि—A

8 क्लिप्ति—B 9 सोमयो—B 10 रति —B

11 मेदशेष्वति—A and B 12 The text reads दिशानधेति

13 The text reads अपरिवर्त्यनम्

इत्यतः प्रतिपादितम् । चैतदिति न-शब्दोऽपि-शब्दसाम्ये¹
 निप्रक्रमः । एतदपि प्रतिपादितम् “भाषागचेतनानपि चेता
 पच्यतनानचेतनवत्” (p 122, l 9) इत्यतः । अतथा
 स्थितानपि तथासंस्थितानिचेति² इव-शब्देन एवतरविभ्रान्ति
 गोगाभाषादेव मुत्तरं विवितरूपानिलय³ । हृदय इति प्रधानतमे
 समलभावजनकनिक्रयस्थान इत्यर्थः । निवेशयति यस्य यस्य
 हृदयमस्ति तस्य तस्याचलतया ततः ततः स्थापयतीत्यर्थः । अतएव
 ते प्रसिद्धार्थेभ्योऽप्येवैवैवविरोधा सपद्यते । हृदयनिविष्टा
 एव यः तया भवन्ति नान्यथेत्यर्थः । सा जयति परिच्छिन्न
 शक्तिम् प्रजापतिभ्योऽप्युत्कर्षेण वर्तते । तद्वत्तादादेव कवि
 गोवरो वर्णनीयाथो⁴ विस्तो नि सीमा मपद्यते ।

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प्रतिभायां वार्त्तायां चानन्य एवनिष्कृतमिति⁵ यदनुप्रसक्त
 तदेव कारिकायां भद्रका निरूप्यत इत्याह—उपपादयितुमिति ।
 उपपत्त्या निरूपयितुमिति । यद्यप्यर्थान्तरमात्रे हेतुर्इति-
 कारेणोक्तत्वापि वारिकाकारेण नोक्त इति भावः । यदि वा
 उच्यते समद्वन्द्वोऽयमिति भावः, अतएवास्य श्लोकस्य इतिग्रन्थे
 व्याख्यानं न कृतम् । दृष्टपूर्वा इति । यदि⁶ प्रत्यक्षादिभि
 प्रमाणैः प्राकृतैश्च कविभिरित्युभयया नेयम् । काव्यं यद्युमास
 स्थानीयम् । रघुदां सत्त्वमिति रघुवत्तमुत्कलिका इति
 च शब्दस्मृतेऽथ⁷ का ह्युक्ता । एतानि बोधादरणानि विवतल

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Kārikā 4

1 ०शब्दोऽर्थ—A

2 यदि स्थितानिचेतानिचेति—A, चक्षुष्या—B

3 वर्णनीयो—A

4 यामन्यथानिक्रयमिति—B 5 The text reads यपि

6 रामवत्तादादिकलिकामिति च शब्द स्मृतेऽर्थ—B, रामवत्तादादिकलिकामय इति च स्मृतेऽर्थ—A

कलिकामय इति च स्मृतेऽर्थ—A

पूर्वेमेव व्याख्यातानीति (pp 102, 106) किं पुनरुक्त्या ।
सत्यपि प्राक्तनकविस्मृतत्वे नूतनत्व भवत्येवैतदप्रकारानुग्रहादित्ये-
तावति शास्त्रार्थं हि वृत्तिग्रन्थसाधिक नान्यद् ।

करिणीवैषम्यकरो मम पुत्र एवेन काएवेन विनिपातनसमर्थ ।

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इत्युत्पत्त्या तया कृतो यथा काएडकरएडक बहति ॥

इत्युत्तान¹ एवायमर्थः । माभ्यार्थस्थानात्लीढतैवेति² सग्रन्थः ।

Karika 5

अत्यन्तं ग्रहणेन निरपेक्षभावतया विप्रलम्भाशङ्कां परिहरति ।

दृष्ट्याया परस्परत्वे, पाएडवानामपि महापञ्चशेनानुचिता
विपत्तिः, कृष्णस्यापि व्याधाद्विषयस्य इति सर्वस्यापि³ विरसा
यस्तानमिति । मुख्यतयेति यद्यपि ' धर्मो धाम च कामे

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च मोक्षे च ' इत्युक्तं⁴ तथापि क्त्वारधकारा एवमाहुः — यद्यपि
धर्मार्थकामानां सर्वेषां तादृद् नास्ति⁵ यदस्य न विद्यते तथापि
पर्यन्तविरसत्त्वमवैवावलोक्यताम् । मोक्षे तु यदप्यस्य सारता
तत्रैव निवार्यतामिति । यथा यथेति लौकिकान्तरमात्रं यन्नेन
संभावमानं धर्मार्थ⁶कामप्रत्यापनलक्षणं यस्तु भूतजगामिममतमपि
येन येनार्जुनरक्षणस्यदिना प्रकारेणा⁷सारवस्तुच्छेदप्रजालादि-
वद्विपर्येति प्रमुक्तं विपरीतं नपद्यते । आहो तस्य स्वरूप
चित्तेत्यर्थः⁸ । तेन तेन प्रकारेणात्र लोचनन्ते विरागो जायते
इत्यनेन तत्त्वज्ञानोक्तं⁹ निवेदं शान्तरमन्थानि सूचयता तत्सर्वं

1 इत्युत्ताना म—A and B

2 यथायस्य तादृढतैवेति—B 3 B omits यपि

4 धर्मं धामे च कामे च मोक्षे च भरतधन ।

यदिहास्ति तद्वत्तत्र यत्रेहास्ति न तत् कश्चित् ॥

5 यवच्छान्ता दुःखनास्ति—B

6 धर्मप्रत्यापनार्थः—A

7 A omits प्रकारेण

8 सत्यपि न—A सत्यज्ञानोक्तं—B 9 सत्यज्ञानार्थः—A

सर्वेतराभारत्नप्रतिपादनेन प्राधान्यमुक्तम् । ननु शृङ्गारवीरादि-
चमत्कारोऽपि तत्र भाषीत्याशङ्क्याह—परमार्थिकेति । भोगमि-
निवेशिना लोकवासनाविष्टानामङ्गभूतेऽपि रणे तथागिमानो यथा
शरीरे प्रमातृत्वमिमानं प्रमातृर्भोगवतनमात्रेऽपि । केयले
ष्विति परमेश्वरमकुप्यकरणेन तु न दोष इत्यर्थः । विभूतिपु-
राणिणो गुणेषु^१ च निविष्टधियो मा भूतेति तन्नन्धः । अत्र
इत्यनुक्रमण्यनन्तरं यो भारते ग्रन्थस्तत्रेत्यर्थः । ननु तदुदेवाप्य-
वासुदेव इत्युच्यते, न परमेश्वर परमात्मा महादेव इत्याशङ्क्याह
—वासुदेवसंज्ञाभिधेयत्वेनेति ।

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बहूना जन्मानामन्ते ज्ञानवाग्मां प्रपद्यते ।

वासुदेव सर्वम्^२ (Bhagavadgita vii 19)

इत्यादौ अङ्गि^३ स्वमेतत्तत्त्वज्ञाभिधेयमिति निर्णीतं^४ सात्त्विकम् ।
निर्णीतञ्चेति शब्दा^५ हि नित्या एव सन्तोऽनन्तरं वाक्यालोच-
यन्नाह तथा सकेतितो इत्युक्तं ऋष्यन्धकमुष्णिगुदम्बधैर्यस्य
(Panini iv 1 114) । शास्त्रतय इति तत्तात्त्वादयोभा-
भावे पुरोपार्थ इत्ययमेव^६ व्यपदेशः सोऽत्र, चमत्कारयोगे तु रस
व्यपदेश इति भावः । एतत्तत्त्वप्रकारेण तत्त्वालोके विवक्षितम् ।
इह त्वस्य न मुख्योऽनन्तर इति वास्त्वामिस्त्वयितम् । सुतरामे-
वेति यदुक्तं तत्त हेतुमाह—प्रसिद्धिश्चेति । च शब्दो वस्त्वार्थे,
यत् इयं लौकिकी प्रसिद्धिः । अनादिस्तो भगवद्यात्मादीनामयमेवा^७

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१ लोकवासिना विष्टानामङ्ग—B A reads चम instead of चर

२ सर्वम्—A

३ शब्दो—B

४ अङ्गि—B and C

५ निर्णीत—A

६ तन्वी—A which reads एव after this

७ प्रपद्यतेत्यर्थः तत्त इत्ययमेव—A प्रपद्यतेत्यर्थः इत्ययमेव—B

८ भगवद्यात्मादीनामयमेवास्यवस्थादि—B and C

खण्डानिधाने आशय । अथवा हि क्रियाकारकसम्बन्धादी
नारायण ममस्त्वत्वेत्यादि शब्दार्थनिरूपणे च^१ तथापि एव तस्य
भगवत आशय इत्यस्य किं प्रमाणमिति भाव । विग्मविद्-
ग्रहणेन काव्यनये शास्त्रनय इति वानुसृतम्^२ । “रसादिमय
एतस्मिन् कवि स्यादवधानवान्” (iv 5, p 237 l 14)
इति यदुक्तं तदेव प्रसङ्गादागतभारतसम्बन्धनिरूपणान्तरसुप्तहरति
—तस्यास् स्थितमिति । अत इति नत एव स्थितमत एवेदमपि
यत्तदये^३ दृश्यते तदुपपन्नम्, अन्यथा तदनुपपत्तमेव^४ । न च
तदनुपपन्नं बाह्येन^५ प्रतीयते, तस्याश्चेतदेव कारणं रसानुगुणार्थ
स्वमेवेत्याशयः । अलंकारान्तरेति अन्तर-शब्दो विशेषवाची ।
यदि वा दित्सते उदाहरणे^६ रसवदत्तवारस्य विद्यमानायास्तु तद्
पेसयालकारान्तरशब्दः । ननु मल्लकण्ठ्यदर्शनात्प्रतीयमानं यदेक
चुलके जलनिधिसन्निधानं ततो मुनेर्माहात्म्यप्रतिपत्तिरिति न
रसानुगुणेनार्थेन द्वाया पोषितेत्याशङ्क्याह—अत्र हीति । नन्वेव
प्रतीयमानं जलनिधिदर्शनमेवाद्भुतानुगुणं सवदिति रसानुगुणोऽतः^७
वाच्योऽर्थ इत्यस्मिन् शेषे कथमिवमुदाहरणमाशङ्क्याह—भुञ्जते इति ।
पुनः पुनर्वर्णननिरूपणादिना यत् पिष्टपिष्टत्वादति^८ निर्भिन्नस्य
मित्यर्थः । बहुतरतश्चम्पापकं चैतदिति दर्शयति^९—न चेत्या
दिना । रघुपायां तुलाप्रेन वाक्यालीयेन^{१०} प्रतिलप्य साम्प्रत्येन

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1 Omitted in B

2 वानुसृतम्—A

3 यत्तदये—A and B

4 तदनुपपत्तमेव—A

5 तदनुपपत्ताबाह्येन—B

6 उदाहरणे—A and B

7 अनुगुणोऽर्थ—B

8 पिष्टत्वादति—A

9 Omitted in B—A

10 तुलाप्रेन वाक्यालीयेन Hemacandra *Deśik* v 15

स पार्थाऽद्यापि मुमय तस्या येनात्यतिकान्तः^१ । रसप्रतीतिरिति
परस्परहेतुकञ्छारप्रतीतिः । अस्वार्थस्य रसानुगुणत्वं व्यतिरेक
द्वारेण दृश्यति—सा तयामित्यादिना । “ध्वनेर्दं सगुणीभूतं
व्यक्तयस्याभावा प्रदर्शितः” इत्युपनिषद्वाक्ये य^२ श्लोकः^३ (iv : p
234 : 5) तत्र ध्वनेरुत्पत्त्या कथोना प्रतिमागुणोऽन्तर्गतो^४ भव
तीत्येव भागो व्याख्यात इत्युपपन्नमिति—तदेवमित्यादिना ।
सगुणीभूतव्यक्तपक्षेऽप्यस्य भागो व्याचष्टे—गुणीभूतत्वादिना ।
त्रिप्रमेदो^५ वस्तुत्वकाररसात्मना यो व्यक्तास्तस्य मापेक्षा नाप्ये
गुणीभावस्तस्येत्यर्थः । तत्र सर्वे ये ध्वनिभेदास्तेषां गुणोभावा
दानन्त्यमिति तदाह—अतिविस्तरेति^६ । स्वयमिति तत्र वस्तुना
व्यक्तेन गुणीभूतेन नवत्वम्, सत्यपि पुराणार्थस्पर्शः । यथा^७ सर्वव^८

भक्तविह्वलरक्तो वल्लभस्तस्यैव गच्छति अत्राण ।

तच्छब्देन विद्यादिव्या विस्मयमकरोति नुत्तमिणम् ॥^९(2)

रसमननरसमर्थान् शब्दसीति^१ श्रीदार्यलक्षणे वस्तु ध्वन्यमान
वाच्योपस्कारकं भवत्वं ददाति स्वयमपि पुराणव्यतिष्ठेऽर्थः ।
तथा हि पुराणो^२ गथा

१ शब्दव्यापितिकारणम्.—A 2 Omitted in A

३ न पर्याप्तो—C

४ Abhinava apparently accepts the reading of क in the text 5 The text reads अतिविस्तरेण

६ Omitted in A

७ B reads, अयदिदृशस्तस्यैव विस्तृतमननरसमर्थान् गथा ।
गुणमिति विद्यादिव्या विस्मयमकरोति नुत्तमिणम् । C reads
मिहदिदृशः and गीताः in the second line Both come pr

८ स्वयमिति—B

९ गीताः—B

पाइअणकरपरपरसधारणसअणिसइसरीरा ।

अथा किञ्चिदप्युक्तं सत्यं वा सत्यं न सत्यं ॥^१ (१)

P 240 अलक्षरेण व्यक्तेयत साध्योपकारेण^३ गणत्वम् . यथा ममैव

यस-दमत्तालिप्यपरोक्षमा

पद्मनाभवालयनं तिलं रायशुद्धयः

रमंशानभूभागपरागभास्त्रा ६

कथं तदेतौ न मनो विरहये ॥

अत्रासेपेयं विभावयता वा' चन्द्यमानाभ्या वाच्यमुपसृष्ट
मिति नवत्वम्, गत्यपि पुराणार्थयोगित्वे । तथा' पुराणं श्री

शतपञ्चाङ्गमनात्पुनर्मरणाय महद्दयम् ।

पञ्चैतानि विवर्धन्ते दार्ढ्ये विदुषामपि ।।

दति । व्यङ्ग्येधन¹⁰ रथेन¹¹ गुह्यगुह्येन वाच्योपसर्गरेण नवत्नम्,¹²
यथा समैव

गरा नेय मूर्ति प्र दमपशनी कालभजन

कृधान्य^{१३} फात्कारै स्फटमरल^{१४}पेनै प्रविरति ।

१. वाचस्पतिकपरंपरास्यवाचस्पतीयोमहमरीरा । अयं क्रि
 त्पुनराया मयावया मन्मो—A द्वाचस्पतिकपरंपरास्यवाचस्पतीयो
 महमरीरा । अयं क्रिपुनराया मयावया मन्मो—B C
 reads किं द्वाचस्पतया in the second line

२ वाण्योषकारि—B ३ •इतये—A ४ •पासुना—B

5. ममा—A, मता—B 6. चर दासेमैव—B and C

7 Omitted in B 8 •सुपएकश्रमिति—B

9 This sentence and the following verse omitted in A

10 $\text{Fe}^{2+}-\text{C}$ 11 $\text{Fe}^{3+}-\text{C}$

12 This line is omitted in A. 13 बाब A; हबाब—B.

14 ॐ नमः—॥

तदेन¹ उपपद्यते च सुप्रतिमम्वद्दय

शिवोपाय ने-छन् बत बत सुधीर खलु जन ॥

अनाद्भुतेन व्यङ्गेन वाच्यमुपसृत शान्तैरसप्रतिपत्तयैः²
आहभनतीति नवावम्, सत्यप्यस्मिन् पुराणश्रीवे

जराश्रीशरीरेऽस्मिन् पैराग्य यत्र जायते ।

तन्मूषन³ हृदये मृत्युर्दृष्टं नास्तीति निधय ॥

सत्सपीत्यादि कारिकाया उपस्कार⁴ । तन् पादान्⁵
स्पष्टान् मत्वा त्रुयं पाद व्याख्यातुं पठति—यदीति⁶ । विद्यमानो
ह्यसौ प्रतिभाशुष्य उक्तलोला भूयान्भवति, न वल्यन्तासनेष्वेव⁷ ।
तस्मिन्निति अनन्तीभूते प्रतिभाशुष्ये । न किञ्चिदेवेति सर्वे
हि पुराणवर्णनैव स्पष्टमिति किमिदानीं वर्यं यत्र केवेर्गुणा
व्यापार स्यात् । ननु यद्यपि वर्यमपूर्वं⁸ नास्ति तथाप्युक्ति
परिपाकमुष्क⁹ अनाद्यपरपर्यायवन्मच्छाया मना नवा भविष्यति यत्रि
नेशने चम्पन्तराणां सरम्भ इत्याशङ्कपाह—चन्द्रच्छायापीति ।
अर्थद्वयं¹⁰ शुखोभूत-यज्ञय प्रयानभूतव्यह¹¹ य । नेदीय इति
निकटतरम्, हृदयातुप्रवेशो न¹² भवतीत्यर्थः । अथ हेतुमाह—
एव सतीति । अनुस्त्व समासमपठना । मधुरत्वमपाठ्यम् ।
तथाविधतामिति अपूर्वबन्ध¹³ च्छायायुक्तानामपि । परीष
निबद्धार्थं¹⁴ निबन्धने परकृतकाव्यव्यवहार एव स्वादिलक्षणाया¹⁵

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Kāṇka 6

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| 1 तदेतान्—B | 2 *मुपकृतप्रमाण—A |
| 3 *रसमत्तमव्यङ्ग्यता—A | 4 तमेन—A and B |
| 5 उपस्कार—B | C is not available after this |
| 6 त्रिपादान्—A | 7 यदिति—B यदि—A |
| 8 यद्यपि ध्रुव—A | 9 *सुख—A and B |
| 10 अपेक्षया—A | 11 Omitted in B |
| 12 *प्रवेशेन—B | |
| 13 *अर्थद्वय—A | 14 परीषनिबन्ध—B A simply reads परीषनिबन्धने |
| | 15 स्वादिलक्षणाया—B |

पूर्वत्वमाश्रयणीयम् । श्वनीयं काव्यं तस्य भावः काव्यत्वम् ।
न त्वय^१ भावप्रत्ययान्ताद्भावप्रत्यय इति सङ्कितव्यम् ।

Kārika 7

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प्रतिपादयितुमिति प्रसङ्गादिति शेषः^१ । यदि वा
वाच्यं तावद्विधिब्यक्त्यधोपयोगि, तदेव चेदनन्तम्, तद्वत्त्वादेव
व्यक्तपानन्त्यं भवतीत्यनेनाभिप्रायेणैवं प्रकृतमेवोच्यते—शुद्ध-
स्येति । व्यक्त्यनिपयो गो व्यापारकत्सर्प^२ वित्तप्यानन्त्य
स्वरूपमात्रेणैव । यथास्तु तथा स्वप्नेष्टान्त^३ सव्यवशं व्यङ्ग्यतेति
भावः । ननु सर्वथा तत् व्यक्त्यं नास्तीति मन्तव्यम्, इत्थम्-
मूलतद्रूपमात्रेण काव्यव्यवहारहाने^४ । तथा^५ चोदाहरणेषु
रसत्वने यद्भावे^६ अस्तेन । आदि-ग्रहणं व्याचष्टे—स्वालक्षण्या-
च्चेति स्वाभावेत्यर्थः, यथा रूपस्पर्शयोस्तीव्र^७ काव्ययोरेकद्वय-
निष्ठयोरेकान्त्यर्थः ।

न च तेषां घटतेऽपि^८ न च ते दृश्यन्ते कथमपि पुनरुक्ता^९ ।

ये विभ्रमाः प्रियाणामर्था वा मुकविवाणोनाम् ॥

पकाराभ्यामतिविलस्य सृज्यते । प्रथमपीति प्रकृतेन विचार्य
मात्रं पौनरुक्त्यं न लभ्यमिति यावत्^१ । प्रियाणामिति
बहुवचनं हि मुनयो राधावल्लभप्रावसात्ताः कामिनी परिभोग-
मुनयमुपभुञ्जानोऽपि न विभ्रमपौनरुक्त्यं पश्यति । तदा घटतेव
प्रियतन्त्रमुच्यते यदाह^२

१ तथा—B

२ तत्र रूपेण—B

३ स्वरूपैवास्तर—B

४ तदा—B

५ यथा—B

६ स्वाद्यविषया—A and B

७ विधि—B

८ 'पौनरुक्त्यं' कस्यि तदा घटतेव प्रियातन्त्रमुच्यते यदा न च यथा
मिति यावत्—B, a confusion with the lines which
follow९ B omits due to the above confusion, the sentence
from तदा to यदाह

सृष्टे सृष्टे यमवतामुपैति

तदेव रूपं रमणीयताया । (Magha iv 17)

इति । प्रियाणामिति वाससार प्रबद्धोऽयं¹ कान्तानां
विधर्म²विशेष म³ नवनव एव दृश्यते । न ह्ययं अतिचयनादि-
वदन्यतः सिद्धिः, केन यत्सादस्याशुनदकृतां यच्छेत् । अपि
तु निष्कर्मोद्धियमानमदनादुरविकासमात्रं तदिति नवनववम् ।
तदुत्तरकीयशिक्षानुपेक्षनिःप्रतिभागुणनिष्पन्नमूत काव्यार्थं इति
भावः । तावदिति उल्लेखस्त व्यङ्ग्यस्पर्शनेन विचित्रतां परां
भवतां नाम तावदिति⁴ तु सम्भावेनैव सा विचित्रतेति तावच्छब्द-
स्याभिप्रायः । तन्निमित्तानां चेति श्रुतमात्वादीनां स्वातुभूत
परानुभूतानां यत्सामान्यं तदेव विशेषान्तररहितं तन्मात्रं तस्या-
श्रयेण । न⁵ हि तैरिति कविभिः । एतच्छाल्यतासमावकार्यं
सूक्तम् । प्रत्यक्षदर्शनेऽपि हि

शब्द⁶ सकेतितं प्राहुर्व्यवहाराय स स्मृत⁷ ।

तदा स्वतत्त्वञ्च नास्ति सकेतस्तेन तत् न⁸ ॥

इत्यादियुक्तिभिः सामान्यमेव स्पष्टयते । किमित्यसंवेद्यमानार्थं
पीनरूप⁹ कथं¹⁰ प्रामाणिकै¹¹ रङ्गोक्तार्थमिति भावः । तमेव
प्रकटयति—न चेदिति । उक्तिर्हीति¹² पर्यायमात्रमेव यद्युक्तिः¹³
विशेषस्तत्पर्यायान्तरैरनिकलतदर्थोपनिबन्धे¹⁴ऽपीनरूपरूपामिमांशे न

1 प्रबद्धरूपे योऽर्थः—A

2 विधर्म—A 3 Omitted in A 4 तावदिति—A

5 Omitted in A 6 मन्त्र—A and B

7 व्यवहारायमस्मृत—A 8 एव तद्वत् न—A

9 पीनरूपमात्रपर्यपीनरूपमित्यर्थ—A 10 Omitted in A

11 प्रामाणिकै—A 12 उक्तिर्हीति—A 13 व्यङ्ग्युक्ति—A

14 निबन्धेऽपि यथोक्तम्—A

भवति तस्माद्विशिष्टवाच्यप्रतिपादकतैवोक्तैर्विशेष इति भावः ।
 ब्राह्मविज्ञेयेति¹ प्राक्त्य प्रत्याज्ञादिप्रमाणैर्यो विशेषस्तस्य यो भेदः ।
 तेनायमर्थः—पदानां तावत् सामान्ये वा² तद्वति वापोदे³ वा
 यत् कुत्तापि वस्तुनि समय⁴ । किमनेन वादात्तरेण ।
 वाक्यात् विशेष⁵ प्रतिवत् इति कस्यास वादिनो विमतिः⁶ ।
 अन्विताभिधानात् द्विपर्ययसप्तपर्ययभेदप्रतिपादि⁷ वाक्यार्थपक्षेषु सर्वत्र
 विशेषस्याप्रत्याक्षेप्यत्वादुक्तिरैविध्यं च न पर्ययत्वमात्रं⁸ इव
 मित्युक्तम् । अन्यत् यत्तत्प्रसुतास्याक पक्षसायकमिलाह—किं
 चेति । पुनरिति भूय इत्यर्थः । उपमानं हि विम⁹ प्रतिम
 पक्षप्रतिविम्बप्रतिच्छायागुह्यम¹⁰ राभासादिभिर्विविक्तानिर्गुणि¹¹
 विचिन्तीभरत्येव । वस्तुत एतासां गुह्येनाम¹² यैविध्यस्य
 विगमनत्वादिभ्यमेत भावः¹³—योगाद्भि निम-शब्दस्य दृकातरया
 प्रतिम शब्द इत्येव सर्वत्र वाच्यम्¹⁴ । केवल¹⁵ यौगिक¹⁶ (१) काव्य
 टोका¹⁷ परिवर्तितलदीराभ्यादेषु पर्यायवञ्जय इति भावः । एवमर्था
 नन्व¹⁸ मूलकाराबन्ध च मण्डितिवचिभ्याद्भवति । अथवापि
 च तत्त्वतो भवतीति दर्शयति—मण्डितिवचि¹⁹ । प्रदिनियताया
 भाषाया गोचरो वाच्यो योऽर्थ²⁰ सत्कृत यैविध्यं तन्निबधन²¹

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- 1 The text reads वाङ्मयिषः 2 च—A
 3 वाच्येति—A 4 यत्समय—B
 5 वाक्यात् विशेष तस्य यो भेद—B 6 वाङ्मयिषि पति—B
 7 प्रतिपाद—B 8 वाङ्—B 9 निष्कट—A
 10 विचिन्वापि युक्तिभि—A 11 एतासां गुह्येनाम—B
 12 निमयेऽनुमान—B 13 वाच्य—B
 14 केवल वा—B केवल—A 15 यौगिक—A
 16 वाच्यमिति—B 17 एवमर्थानि—A
 18 योचरेत्यर्थो—A ; B om ts यो after वाच्यो and reads
 वाच्योदय 19 निबधननिमित्त—A and B

निमित्तं यस्य । अलकाराणां काव्यार्थानां जानन्त्य¹ तत्त्वमभूत्²
मण्डितवैचित्र्यं कर्तृभूतमापादयतीति सबन्धः । कर्मणो विरोपण
पक्षेन³ हेतुर्दर्शितः ।

मम मम इति मणतो व्रजति कालो जनस्य ।

तथापि न देवो जगद्दर्शनो गौचरो भवति मनसो मधुमधन ॥
इति । ओशनवरत मण्डति तस्य कथं न देवो मनोगोचरो भवतीति
विरोधात्कारच्छाया सन्धवमापाया मद् मद् इत्यनया मणित्वा
समुन्मेषिता ।

अवस्थादिविभिन्नानां वाच्यानां विनिबन्धनम्⁴ ।

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भूमेव स्वयते लक्ष्ये⁵ तत्तु भाति⁶ रसाश्रयात् ॥

Kārika 8

इति कारिका⁷ । अन्वस्तु अन्यो मध्योपस्कारः । अत्र च
पादतत्त्वार्थमनूय चतुर्थपादाद्यौऽपूर्वतयाभिधीयते—तस्वित्यादि ।
शान्तीनामित्यन्ततः कारिकयोर्मध्योपस्कारः⁸ ।

द्वितीयकारिकायास्तुरीया पाद व्याचष्टे—यथा हीति । P 244

सचादास्त्विति⁹ कारिकाया अर्थम्, नैकरूपतेति द्वितीयम् । Kārika 10-11
विभिन्न राजास्त्विति प्रायेणाशङ्कते—कथमिति चेदिति ।

सवादो¹⁰ ह्यन्वसाद्वर्त्य तत्तुनं प्रतिविम्बवत् ।

आलेख्याकारवत्तुल्यदेहिबन्ध शरीरिणाम् ॥

Kārika 12

1 वाच्यमर्थम्—B 2 तद्भूतम्—B 3 लक्षणे—B

4 अविवक्षितम्—B 5 लक्ष्ये—B 6 भासते—A

7 Omitted by B The Kārika reads differently in the text.

8 Abhinava's reading of the text here is interesting

9 B is corrupt here and reads आशास्त्विति कारिकाया
प्रायेण ग्रहणे कथमिति चेदिति 10 सवादो—B

इत्यनया कारिका । एषा खण्डीकृत्य श्रुती पठिता ।
शरीरिणामित्यर्थ¹ न शब्दः प्रतिवाक्यं द्रष्टव्य इति दर्शितम् ।
शरीरिण इति पूर्वमेव प्रतिलिख्यस्वरूपतया प्रधानभूतस्येत्यर्थः ।

तत्र पूर्वमनन्यात्म तुच्छात्म तदनन्तरम् ।

Kārikā 13

तृतीय² तु प्रतिष्ठात्म नान्यत्वात्³ द्यजेत्कविः ॥

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इति कारिका । अनन्यं पूर्वोपनिषद्वाक्यादात्मा स्वभावो यस्य
तदनन्यात्म⁴ । येन रूपेण भाति तन्माह विस्पृष्टमेव⁵ । यथा
स्वेन रूपेण प्रतिबिम्बं भाति तेन रूपेण विम्बमेव । तत्स्वयं तु
रात्रौशमिलाह—तार्त्थिकशरीरशून्यमिति । न हि तेन
किंचिदपूर्वमुत्प्रेक्षितम्, प्रतिबिम्बमप्येवमेव । एवं प्रथमं प्रकारं
व्याख्याय द्वितीयं व्याचष्टे—तदन्तरं त्विति । द्वितीयमित्यर्थः ।
अन्येन ताम्बं यस्य रात्र्या । तुच्छात्मेति अनुकारे ह्यनुकार्य-
बुद्धिरेव चित्तपुस्तकादाविव न तु सिन्दूरादिवुद्धिः स्फुरति । सापि
न चातद्यायेति भावः । एतदेवेति तृतीयस्य रूपस्य न स्वात्मत्वम् ।

आत्मनोऽन्यस्य⁶ सद्भावे पूर्वस्थित्यनुयाय्यपि ।

Kārikā 14

मस्तु भातितरां तस्याः⁷ शशिष्ठावमिवाननम् ॥

इति कारिका श्रुती खण्डीकृत्य पठिता । देवुचित्तपुस्तकेषु कारिका
असाक्षिता एव दृश्यन्ते । आत्मन इत्यस्य शब्दस्य पूर्वपठिता-
भ्यामेव तत्त्वस्य सारभूतस्येति पदाभ्यासार्थो निरूपितः ।

1 शरीरिणामिति अन्य—B, शरीरिणामित्वं च—A

2 तृतीय—B

3 प्रतिष्ठात्मता अन्यत्वात्—A ; प्रतिष्ठाता नाम्ना—B

4 तदनन्यात्मा—A and B

5 तत्स्पृष्टमेव—B

6 अनुकारेऽनुकार्य—B

7 The text reads तत्त्वस्यान्यस्य 8 The text reads तस्याः

सप्तवादानामिति¹ पाठ, सवादानामिति² तु पाठे वाक्यार्थ
रूपाणां समुदायानां³ ये सवादास्तेषामिति । वैयधिकरस्येन
सङ्गतिर्वस्तु शब्देन⁴ ।

एको द्वौ वा त्रयो वा चतुरादयो⁵ वा पदानामर्थाः । तानि
त्विति अत्रराणि पदानि च तान्येवेति तेन रूपेण युक्तानि,
मनागन्धरूपतामवागतानीत्यर्थः । एवमत्ररादिरचनैवेति दृष्टात
भाग व्याख्याय दार्शन्यन्तिके योजयति—तथैवेति । श्लेषादि
विषयानि(नी)ति⁶ श्लेषादिस्वभावानि(नी)त्यर्थः । यदुत्तरेष्वस्ति
शुण्डिवातयो हि शब्दा⁷ पूर्वपूर्वैरेव कविष्वहसं श्लेष
प्रायया निबध्यन्ते । निबद्धाश्च चन्द्रादयश्चोपमानाश्च⁸ । तथैव
पदार्थरूपाणीत्यत्र नापूर्वाणि घटयितुं शक्यन्त इत्यादि
विद्वद्भ्यन्तीत्यत्र आह्वनं वाक्यमनुसंधयीष्य ।

Kāśka 15

लोकस्येति व्याचष्टे—सदृश्यानामिति । अमत्कृतिरिति
आत्माद्रममाणबुद्धिरित्यर्थः । अभ्युज्जिहीत इति व्याचष्टे—
उत्पद्यते उदयतीत्यर्थः । बुद्धेरेवाकार⁹ दर्शयति—स्फुरणेय
काचिविति ।

Kāśka 16

यदपि तदपि¹⁰ रम्य यत्र लोकस्य किञ्चित्

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स्फुरितमिदमितीयं बुद्धिरभ्युज्जिहीते ।

Kār 13 16

- 1 सप्तवादानामिति—B, सवादानामिति—A
- 2 सवादानामिति—A, सप्तवादानामिति—B
- 3 Abhinava apparently accepts the reading of न in the text 4 सङ्गतिरस्य—B 5 Repeated by A
- 6 The text reads श्लेषादिस्वभावानि A reads यानि after this 7 आह्वयोद्दि⁷ चन्द्र—A
- 8 चन्द्रादयोपमानाश्च—A 9 बुद्धेरेवाकार—B
- 10 Omitted by B

अनुगतमपि पूर्वच्छायया वस्तु तारु
सुकविरुपनिबध्नित्यता¹ नैव याति² ॥

इति कारिका खण्डोक्त्य पठिता ।

स्वविषय इति खय तात्कालिकत्वेन स्फुरित इत्यर्थः ।
परसादानेच्छेत्यादि द्वितीय श्लोकार्धं पूर्वापस्कारेण सह पठति ।

परसादानेच्छाविरतमनसो वस्तु मुक्ते

P 246 इति तृतीय पादः । कुत खल्वपूर्वमानयामीत्यारायेन निरुध्य
Kacilā 17 परोपनिबद्धवस्तुनोवशो वा स्वादित्याशङ्क्याह—स्वरस्यत्यैवेति ।
कारिकायां सुकवेरिति ज्ञातावेक्यपनमित्यभिप्रायेण व्याचष्टे—
सुकवीनामिति³ । एतदेव स्पष्टयति—प्राक्तनेत्यादिना तेषां
मित्युक्तेन । आविर्भावगतीति सूत्रात्पर्यं । इतीति कारिका-
तद्वतिनिस्संशयेनेत्यर्थः ।

Concluding
verses

अङ्किता रसाभयेण उभिता ये गुणालकारास्वत⁴ शोभा या
ता विभति बाध्यम् । तयानमन्वङ्किथो यो रसः सैकादिकृतस्तदा
थगस्तकृतो यो गुणानां सौकुमार्यज्ञानादन्वसौगन्ध्यप्रवृत्तीनामलकार
पर्याप्तताकारण्येन च या शोभा तं विभतिः । यस्मादिति⁵
काव्यादुपानाह । स्वयं समीक्षितमिति व्युत्पत्तिरिति प्रताप
लक्षणेमित्यर्थः । एतच्च सव पूरमेव निरुल्लोकमिति श्लोकार्धं
भात व्याख्यातम् । सुकवेरिति⁶ ये कष्टोपदेशेन विनापि

1 निबध्नित्यता—A

2 The text reads नोपयाति

3 The text reads सकवेरिति कवेरिति

4 निबध्नित्यता—A

5 सतो—A, B is corrupt and reads सदेवा .

6 यस्मादिति—B 7 सुकवेरिति B, which drops this
line from here to the end of the text .

वयानिष¹पक्षमात्रं हेतुद्वयं । अखिलसौख्यघास्त्रीति अस्मिन्
 दुःखलोभेनाप्यननुविद्यं यमौज्यं तस्य यात्रि² एकाग्रतन
 शयनं । सर्वथा प्रिय सर्वथा च हितं दुर्लभं जनयतीति³ भावः ।
 विद्युद्योधानं न दनं⁴ कुर्वतीवा कृतज्योतिशोमादोनामेव समीहि
 ताघादननिमित्तम् । विद्युपाय काव्यतत्त्वविदः । दर्शित इति
 स्थितः⁵ एव सन् प्रकाशितः, अप्रकाशितस्य हि कथं भोग्यत्वम् ।
 कल्पतरुणा⁶ उपमानं यस्य तारद्वयदिमा यस्येति बहुव्रीहिरागौ
 बहुव्रीहिः । सर्वसमीहितप्राप्तिर्हि काव्यादेकाग्रता⁷ । एतच्छोह
 विस्तरतः ।

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सहजान्वयतत्पनयवर्मे विर⁸प्रभुस-
 कर्त्तुं मनः सु परिपक्वमिषां यदातीतः ।
 तद् व्यापरोत्सहृदयोदनताम्रदेवोर्

इति सङ्घानिधेयप्रयोजनोपसंहारः । इदं बाहुल्येन श्लोको श्लोक-
 प्रसिद्धं⁹सम्भलनाश्रयवस्तेन श्रवणोः । स च सुभाषनाश्रययो नाम
 श्रवणवशात् प्रसिद्धान्कदोषसमाचारकृत्विक्¹⁰विद्वत्वादिस्मर-
 णेन भवति । तथा हि—मर्त्यद्विरोधं कृतम्, यस्यायमौदार्यं
 नहिमा¹¹ यस्यासपेक्षा¹² एवंविपत्तातो हरवत्ते उन्माय शोक-

See Locana
 p 12 II 19-20

-
- 1 •क्षेत्रेणापि तद्वत् द्विपक्षमात्रं—A, B omits this line
 2 यापयि—B
 3 ज्ञानातीति—A 4 यमौज्यम्—B 5 स्थिति—B
 6 •कल्पतरुणा—A 7 काव्यादेकाग्रता—A
 8 •विर—A The text reads सहजान्वयतत्पनयवर्मे स्वरुचितं
 9 प्रसिद्धा—A and B 10 •सम्भलनाश्रयवि—A
 11 यस्यायमेतादृशवर्जिता—A 12 यस्यास्मिन् भास—B

अनुगतमपि पूर्वेष्वप्यदा वस्तु तादृक्
मुकविषयनिबध्नित्यता¹ नैव याति² ॥

इति कारिका मण्डवीकृत्य पठिता ।

सविषय इति खन सात्कास्त्रिप्रयेन स्फुरित इत्यर्थः ।
परस्यादग्नेच्छेत्कादि द्वितीय श्लोकार्थं पूर्वापस्तरेण तद् पठति ।
परसादानेच्छाविरतमनसो वस्तु मुञ्चे

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Kārikā 17

इति तृतीय पादः । पुनः सत्यपूर्वमानवामीत्याशयेन निहृद्येण
परोपनिबध्नस्तुल्योक्तौ वा स्मादित्याशङ्क्याह—सख्यस्यैवेति ।
कारिकायां मुक्तेरिति आतावेक्ष्यजनमित्यभिप्रायश्च व्याचष्टे—
मुकवीनामिति³ । एतदेव स्पष्टयति—प्राक्तनेत्यादिना तेषां
मित्यन्तेन । अत्रिर्मात्र्यताति सूत्रतात्पर्यं । इतीति कारिका-
तदुक्तिनिरूपणेनेत्यर्थः ।

Concluding
verses

अष्टिष्टा रसाग्रयेण उचिता ये गुणालम्बराग्निता⁴ शोभा या
ता विभति काव्यम् । तद्वानमन्यक्रियो यो रस चेकादिकृतस्तदा
भयस्तकृत्तो यो गुणानां सौकुमार्यद्व्याभावात्तसौगन्ध्यप्रवृत्तीनामलङ्कार
पर्यस्तताकारण सेन च या शोभा तां विभति । यस्मादिति⁵
काव्यादुधानात् । सत्यं समीहितमिति व्युत्पत्तिर्हीतिप्रताप
लक्षणमित्यर्थः । एतच्च स्य पूर्वमेव वितत्योक्तमिति श्लोकार्थं
भात व्याख्यातम् । सुदृष्टिमिति⁶ ये कष्टादेशेन विनापि

1 निबध्न निबध्नात्—A

2 The text reads नीपयति

3 The text reads वरुतिना करोना

4 निबध्नचद्वारेण—A

5 कृत्तो—A, B as corrupt and reads कर्मेता

6 यस्मादिति—B 7 सुदृष्टिश्च B, which drops this
line from here to the end of सैरिचम् ।

प्रपन्थ, तस्मादादरणायमिति लोहः प्रवर्तमानो ररपते ।
 लोहस्यापरस्य प्रवर्तनीयः । तत् १ साधोदित^२प्रयोजनतत्पत्तये
 तदनुप्राणधोवृत्ताप्रवर्तनात्तरवाद् प्रत्यकारा स्तनामनिबन्धन
 कुर्वन्ति । तदुमिश्रायेणाह—आनन्द्यर्धेन इति । प्रथित शब्दे
 नैतदेव प्रथितं यत्तदेव नामभ्रवणं केवाधिभिरिति करोति । तन्मा^३
 त्मर्यविजृम्भितं नास्य गणनीयम् । नि श्रेयसप्रयोजनादेव हि
 ध्रुताद् शोऽपि रागाधो^४ यदि निर्वर्ति स्मिन्तावता प्रयोजन
 मप्यम्यहमेव स्यात् । तन्मादर्धिना^५ प्रहरयत्^६ नाम प्रथितमिति^७
 सिद्धम् ।

स्फुटीकृतार्थवैचित्र्यवदि प्रसरदायिनीम् ।

तुषीं शक्तिमहं वादे प्रत्यक्षार्थनिदर्शनीम् ॥

आनन्द्यर्धेनविवेकविकासिकाव्या

लोकार्यतत्त्वघटनादनुमेयगारम् ।

मश्रोन्मिदत्सकलसद्विषयप्रकाशि

व्यापार्यताभिनवगुमविलोचनं तत् ॥

भीसिद्धिषेत्^८वरणाञ्जपरारगपूतो

मष्टे^९दुराजप्रतिसंस्कृतबुद्धिरेण^{१०} ।

काव्यप्रमाणपदवैदित्युत्प्रवप

सेवारसो व्यरचयद् भवनिवस्तुष्टिम् ॥

१ Om tted by B

३ यक्षान्—A

५ अर्धार्थानां—B

७ शोभतिविधि—B

२ साधोदित—B

४ लो रिपोभाव—A

६ प्रथितचित्ति—A

८ शेषम्—A

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